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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis is concerned with the evaluation of experimental design. It reviews design 
research in general and notes some methodological limitations. The process of experimental 
design is considered in the light of this review, particularly in terms of the ability of 
designers to evaluate potential designs. Experiment 1, a prospective study involving the 
creative design of psychology experiments, reports inadequate assessment of experimental 
power and little or no evidence of explicit evaluation processes. Experiment 2 assesses the 
evaluation of existing experimental designs and demonstrates that judgements of the quality 
of experimental design are influenced by the presence of outcome information more than any 
other factor. Following this result a review of the hindsight and outcome bias literature is 
presented. 
Experiments 3,4 and 5 demonstrate that outcome bias is a pervasive effect not 
mediated by task presentation, explicit definitions of quality or statistical expertise. Also, by 
manipulating subjects' perspective, Exp^eriment 5 differentiates between the effects of 
outcomes themselves and their financial implications. The term outcome salience is defined 
as "the relative importance of the implications of an outcome from the point of view of the 
subject". It is shown that both the size and direction of an outcome bias are determined by 
(and could be predicted from) the associated outcome salience. Experiment 6 explores 
subjects' beliefs about the relevance of experimental factors, outcome information and the 
financial implications of outcomes to quality judgements. Ratings of relevance are shown to 
be in direct opposition to the actual use of these factors in judgements. Relevance ratings are 
also shown to be influenced by a subject's perspective. 
Experiment 7 tests the links between outcome bias effects and traditional, memory 
based, hindsight bias effects using a memory based paradigm. Results show that, in 
addition to biases of judgement in foresight, the same outcome information will also bias the 
memory of earlier judgements and the memory of relevant task details in hindsight. 
The practical implications of outcome bias are discussed. Using a motivational 
account based on the concept of outcome salience, hindsight bias is redefined as one 
particular form of outcome bias. This account unifies two previously separate research areas 
and is shown to explain a number of previously unexplained effects in the hindsight 
literature. Accounts of reasoning are reviewed, as are information processing and 
motivational accounts of hindsight bias. The theoretical implications of the present results 
are discussed in the light of these accounts. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE R E L A T E D TO DECISION MAKING IN 
DESIGN TASKS 
LI THESIS INTRODUCTION 
This research ufilised the design of experiments as a domain in which to explore the 
ways in which subjects used information in qualitative judgements. The study of the 
evaluation of experimental designs presented a number of advantages over research in other 
domains. In this domain normative analysis allows for the possibility of at least determining 
that in some cases experimental designs are unequivocally bad; although it is often more 
difficult to define those designs which are good. As it is possible to determine the factors 
which are relevant to the statistical reliability of experimental designs and those which are 
not, the study of experimental design allows for a more quantitative evaluation than that 
available in other design domains. 
The thesis will first explore the evaluation of putative experimental designs as a 
necessary part of the overall process of experimental design. This will be followed by a 
number of experiments which will explore judgements of the quality of existing experimental 
designs. The inclusion of outcome information in these descriptions of experimental design 
will generate a paradigm in which biases related to the influences of irrelevant hindsight 
information can be clearly differentiated from the inclusion of relevant factors in judgements 
of quality. Because of this clear differentiation manipulations of this paradigm can be 
expected to lead to clearer and more consistent results than previous hindsight bias or 
outcome bias paradigms. From these results it should be possible to generate a clearer 
theoretical description of the underlying nature of these biases. 
It is the intention of this thesis to show that judgements relating to the quality of 
experimental designs are inevitably biased by the nature of their outcomes where those 
outcomes are known. The findings of these studies will have important practical 
implications in such areas as peer reviewing of putative journal articles and the examining of 
Ph.D. theses. Information about the outcomes of experimental procedures can be seen as a 
form of hindsight information as they are not available to the designer of an experiment at the 
time of design. Thus the studies presented in this thesis will be strongly linked to previous 
studies of hindsight bias and will attempt to differentiate between varying theoretical 
explanations of hindsight and related biases. 
1.2 C H A P T E R ONE INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I is concerned with a review of studies related to the processes involved in 
experimental design. Within psychological research a number of persistent design problems 
have been reported; notably failures to correctly assess the power of experimental designs 
and problems with the interpretation of experimental results (Cohen, 1990, Sedlmeier and 
Gigerenzer, 1989). It is the intention of this thesis to determine to what extent bias in the 
evaluation of experimental design may be responsible for these shortcomings. There is at 
present little or no research into the cognitive processes involved specifically in the design of 
psychology experiments, however, there is a great deal of research available from other areas 
of design and from goal oriented problem solving within psychology. It is the intention of 
this chapter to determine some of the processes involved in designing a complete experiment 
by using relevant studies from these fields to gain an insight into design in general. In an 
attempt lo overcome the problems inherent in making valid comparisons across areas as 
diverse as those in design related research and problem solving a system of categorisation of 
the different stages of design tasks is presented. This may help to clarify a number of 
contradictory results in this extensive and varied research area. This categorisation uses a 
conceptual division of the design process into a design stage and an evaluation stage. Some 
methodological problems inherent in the study of design are explored with reference to these 
proposed stages. 
The second part of this chapter focuses on experimental design in general and the 
design of psychology experiments in particular. Experimental design is compared to other 
design tasks using the proposed categorisation scheme in an attempt to determine common 
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underlying psychological processes. Factors relating to evaluation of putative designs are 
explored in the light of these processes. 
1.3 STUDIES OF DESIGN PROCESSES 
1.3,1 History of design studies 
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the cognitive processes involved 
in design. In most cases this interest has stemmed from attempts to create intelligent systems 
to aid design processes. Subsequently a number of computer aided design (CAD) systems 
have been developed in such areas as architecture, mechanical engineering, electrical 
engineering and computer programming. At the present time there are, "hundreds of 
functioning expert systems and thousands more under development" (Shanteau and Stewart, 
1992, p. 101) yet despite this apparent success there has been no great breakthrough in 
understanding the cognitive processes used by experts in design. 
Ullman (1991), in a review of design theory research; reports that despite their recent 
proliferation C A D systems are "best suited for drafting and ..are...little help in design" (page 
206) and thus have not lived up to their claims of being aids to the design process. Ullman 
points to the failure of this whole area of research to produce any consistent design theory 
and concludes that design research is still in the pre-theory stage. 
This failure to find a consistent design theory must, in part, be due to the wide range 
of areas in which design is studied and the lack of connections between these areas. In an 
international survey of research and studies on design Tempczyk (1986) listed 191 projects 
completed or in progress. A brief analysis of this list reveals the very diverse areas under 
which design has been studied. There are 27 different departmental specialities represented. 
The majority of studies are in engineering followed by a large number in architecture. At the 
other end of the scale are departments such as philosophy and business administration. 
Notably only one study out of the whole 191 was within a psychology department. This 
seems a very strange state of affairs; design is clearly a complex psychological process and 
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yet it is studied with almost no reference to psychology itself. 
Within psychology judgement and decision making research pre-dates expert systems 
research and has studied many allied areas. Specifically studies of cognitive processes in 
problem solving tasks which start with an initial problem state and attempt to achieve a final 
goal state seem to be particulariy analogous to design tasks. However, there has been almost 
no consideration of this research in the design literature. As Chan (1990) points out, this 
may be because judgement and decision making research has focused on the deficiencies of 
experts whilst expert system research has focused on what experts do best. However this 
difference in focus alone should not be sufficient to prevent comparison between these allied 
areas. 
Another clue to why these fields may have remained separate comes from the 
surprising lack of agreement within any single field of research. For example Stauffer and 
UUman (1988) in a comparison of the results from six empirical studies of mechanical design 
found twenty seven different general conclusions across the six studies. None of these 
conclusions were agreed on by more than half the studies. The authors also found very few 
similarities in design task and methodology between the studies. The majority of the article 
was taken up with discussing these differences between studies and this led to the authors' 
final conclusion; that a great deal more research was needed before areas of agreement could 
be found. Similarly, Hubka and Eder (1987) in a review of engineering design conclude that 
"A broad analysis..(of design studies)..is sorely needed" (page 123). 
Since this time a great deal more research has been completed and yet a comparison of this 
research reaching any firm conclusions has still not been made. As Ullman (1991) points 
out, "design research is still discipline and viewpoint fragmented" (page 207). 
In trying to reach general conclusions from design studies the researcher is presented 
with a bewildering array of different problem solving strategies. This may be a result of 
designers using a huge number of different strategies. However it would be a mistake to 
reach this conclusion without considering the wide range of fundamental differences in the 
type of problem being studied and the methodological difficulties inherent in this field of 
research. 
1.3.2 Categorisation of Design Tasks 
The intention of this literature review is to assess the results from previous studies 
which relate to decision making in the design of psychology experiments. There have been 
very few studies of experimental design and those that are available generally refer to specific 
aspects of statistical decision making (Evans and Bradshaw 1986, Reagan 1989, Gi l l 1987, 
etc.). These experiments present subjects with an almost completed design scenario and 
require them to complete the missing attribute; for example an estimate of statistical power or 
necessary sample size. 
Whilst this work is of great interest and will be considered later the focus on a 
specific aspect of design does not allow for an overview of the processes involved in 
designing a complete experiment. Therefore, initially it is necessary to analyse the small 
number of relevant studies from other fields in order to gain an insight into the overall design 
process selecting first those studies which focus directly on generative design processes 
where the design process is seen as a process of problem solving directed at the goal state of 
a completed design. As has been shown, due to the complexity and variability of different 
design tasks these studies often have little in common making general comparison difficult. 
Therefore this review will start by attempting to categorise the important factors within a 
design task and then go on to explore previous studies in the light of these factors. 
A clear categorisation of design tasks is necessary to prevent the erroneous comparison 
of studies which may vary hugely in terms of design attributes, evaluation methods and 
associated semantic knowledge. Analysis of studies within this framework should enable 
more valid conclusions to be drawn from comparisons of research from very different design 
fields. This method should also allow for the inclusion of relevant psychological research not 
strictly in the domain of design. For example, this strategy should enable the inclusion of 
findings from judgement and decision making research in a framework covering the whole 
range of human problem solving related to design. 
In order to achieve this synthesis it is necessary to have a clear understanding of 
differences in design tasks. These include various levels of multi-attribute problem, 
complexity of solution evaluation and variations in associated semantic knowledge. Despite 
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the possibilities for comparison of diverse research fields created by the use of a 
categorisation system it is not the intention of this review to cover the whole gamut of 
research on design. Even if this were possible the task would be irrunense thus criteria have 
been applied limiting the range of research included. These criteria are firstly relevance to the 
understanding of underlying cognitive processes in design, and secondly relevance to 
processes likely to be common to the design of psychology experiments. 
For the purpose of this analysis of design tasks the process of design has been broken 
down into a design stage and an evaluation stage. This analytical method is not intended to 
suggest that these are discrete stages; in the real life design process there may be a great deal 
of overlap between the two stages. 
The primary factors in a design task are the number of attributes to be considered in the 
design stage and the relationship between these factors. Thus at one end of the scale subjects 
may be presented with a task where they only have to determine the value of a single 
attribute; as in a simple mathematical task. Conversely a task might require the combination 
of values for large numbers of inter-related attributes as in large scale architectural design. 
Secondly, studies vary in the level of semantic knowledge associated with 
successfully determining appropriate values for these auributes (and also in evaluating the 
final solution). This can also be seen as the level of expertise associated with the task. 
Semantic knowledge is, strictly speaking, a quality of the designer and not of the design 
task. In numerous studies relating to expertise the same task is given to both expert and 
novice subject groups; differences between the groups being related to the level of semantic 
knowledge brought to the task by the subject. 
However a particular level of semantic knowledge can also be seen as a requirement of 
the task used in a design study. In this respect there is often a fundamental difference 
between the goal oriented problem solving tasks studied in psychology and the studies of 
realistic design tasks. For example, Kahney (1993) defines four different sorts of 
information present in well-defined laboratory problems such as the 'tower of Hanoi' or the 
'missionaries and cannibals' problems. These four sorts of information completely define 
the problem in terms of; the initial state, the goal state, legal operators (things you are 
allowed to do in solving the problem) and operator restrictions (factors which constrain legal 
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operators). Given this information in the problem instructions no semantic information 
whatsoever is required for the solution. At the other end of the scale the chemical engineering 
thermodynamics design problems used by Bhaskar and Simon (1977), require a high level 
of semantic information in terms of detailed expert knowledge and these tasks are only 
relevant to a very specific subject group. Other realistic design related tasks such as the 
planning of meals used by Byrne (1977) may seem at first to be semantically poor as the low 
level of general knowledge they require makes them relevant to a large range of non-expert 
subjects. However, the high levels of semantic information required should not be 
disregarded simply because they are shared by a large proportion of the population. 
Thirdly, the evaluation stage of a design study can vary greatly in complexity. This 
may not only affect the final checking of a solution but also may affect the design process in 
complex designs (where design strategies may be based on the results of a series of 
evaluation stages). For example, in some tasks the solution may be a single number which 
can be simply checked for accuracy. Alternatively, the solution may be a description of a 
complex engineering system which will require detailed analysis to estimate its efficiency; in 
this case partial evaluation may be an integral process determining subsequent design 
strategy. 
Finally, as well as differences in the complexity of design and evaluation stages there 
are also differences in the levels of fuzziness in both the original problem and in the 
evaluation. The concept of fuzziness relates to uncertainties brought about by vagueness of 
definition and can be seen as closely related to the need for expertise (i.e. semantic richness) 
in a problem, in that an expert can often fill in gaps in a fuzzy definition by referring to 
previous experience. However this need to search for additional information complicates the 
design process and can create uncertainties beyond the scope of the designers' semantic 
knowledge. Thus fuzziness is an important category in its own right and cannot simply be 
subsumed under the semantically rich/poor category. 
Thus this categorisation of design studies involves evaluation on each of five relatively 
independent scales. Table 1.1 lists these five categories which are also separated in terms of 
the design stage in which they have the most influence. In this table each of the categories 
represents a design task variable presented with the simplest extreme value on the left and the 
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most complex extreme value on the right. 
Table l.I 








Using the above template studies could be classified by assigning a value on a scale 
for each of the five task variables. Noticeably, by considering general classes of design 
research study, patterns of categorisation readily emerge. For example, studies falling at the 
right hand end of all categories would generally be real life design studies; such as 
architectural or engineering design projects. This class of study typically necessitates 
analysis by verbal protocol. Studies utilising tasks which fall at the left hand end of these 
categories are typically artificial or logical tasks; such as the goal oriented problem solving 
tasks mentioned earlier. These studies are usually designed for formal experimental 
analysis. Thus, particular groups of studies can be identified by this classification method. 
It should be noted that there is a further category not included here. Design is often 
studied as a group process and the number of designers involved is another important 
variable in categorising design studies. In very complex real life design tasks it is usual for a 
team of designers to be responsible for the final design. For example, Stauffer and Ullman 
(1988) quote a study of engineering design involving thirty seven individuals over a three 
year period. As group decision making is beyond the range of this review only studies 
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relating to individual design processes or those in which individual methods of design can be 
determined will be included. As Siauffer and Ullman point out "Organisations and the 
individuals in those organisations are a part of the behavioural aspect of design" (page 113). 
They also note that designers working alone will often investigate solutions one at a lime 
(serially) whereas in group design solutions are generally investigated in parallel. Thus 
group design can fundamentally change the design strategy for a given problem. It should 
be remembered that this will limit the generalisation of results from studies of individuals. 
1.4 R E L E V A N T FINDINGS F R O M P R O B L E M SOLVING RESEARCH 
By applying the above categorisation scheme to problem solving research it becomes 
immediately apparent that great care should be taken in generalising findings from this area to 
the area of realistic design tasks. Laboratory problems such as the 'towers of Hanoi' fall at 
the left hand end of all the categories (see Table 1.1). Firstly, they have no true design 
stage, instead there a simple statement of the initial and goal states. The problem is rigidly 
defined and usually involves the manipulation of a single attribute for which clear rules are 
set. This is in sharp contj'ast to the complex determining of multiple inter-related attributes 
fuzzily defined in real life design tasks. 
Secondly, as the problem state and rules are rigidly defined there is no requirement for 
semantic knowledge. Nevertheless, skill related transfer effects can be seen with 
homomorphic (Reed et al. 1974) and isomorphic problems (Luger and Bauer, 1978) these 
effects depend on similarities of underlying rule structure. Transfer can also be negative; 
where related real-world knowledge is in opposition to the defined problem rules this serves 
to make the problem more difficult (Kahney, 1993). This situation is analogous to the 
biasing and de-biasing effects of knowledge known as "belief bias' in deductive reasoning 
(See Evans, 1989 for a complete review). 
Finally, the evaluation stage in problem solving tasks is so simple and clearly defined 
as to be practically non-existent. It is only necessary to determine if the state you have 
reached matches the desired goal state defined in the initial problem. 
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Despite these clear differences some very genera! conclusions can be drawn from this 
research which should be relevant to experimental design tasks. Although design and 
evaluation stages are qualitatively and quantitatively different to those in experimental design, 
there are similarities of problem structure. These involve the moving from an initial state to a 
goal state often through a series of sub-goals. A similar sub-goal strategy is often reported 
in the design literature. Notably the positive transfer effects reported by Reed et al. (1974) 
and Luger and Bauer (1978) are specifically facilitated where problems have a similar sub-
goal structure and if subjects are aware that the problems are similar. Thus in experimental 
design we could expect the formation of a positive expertise where a designer has experience 
of a particular format of design problem within a particular area where sub-goal strategies are 
common. This 'expertise' would however become a negative infiuence when attempting any 
new design which was not amenable to the same sub-goal strategy. In addition the effects of 
analogical transfer reported by Gick and Holyoak (1980) may also be of some relevance. It 
seems reasonable to assume that where a valid analogy could be made with the skills 
required for successful experimental design this analogy would facilitate subsequent design. 
There is also no reason to suppose that the findings related to the limitations of 
working memory capacity in problem solving would not have similar influences in the field 
of experimental design. The work of Simon (1978) on the limits of working memory 
capacity clearly predicts performance limits in complex problems, although in practice these 
may be to some extent alleviated by taking and referring to notes. As all experimental design 
tasks can be expected to go beyond the limits of working memory, the work of Kotovsky et 
al. (1985) on the interactions between working memory and long-term memory may be of 
more practical importance. This research shows that in complex problems expertise in terms 
of learning and practising the application of rules is crucial in developing the ability to plan 
sequences of moves. In terms of experimental design this research strengthens the earlier 
predictions of the importance of specific task related expertise. 
1.5 R E L E V A N T FINDINGS F R O M DESIGN RESEARCH 
It was possible with the experimental problem solving tasks outlined above to make a 
general and all inclusive categorisation. This sort of generalisation is impossible with the 
tasks used in design research. Design research has focused on 'real world' problems in a 
number of quite specific and different areas; e.g. engineering, iirchitecture, software design, 
etc. These areas produce radically differing tasks and even within one specific area the range 
of tasks can be immense. Thus in order to make any valid conclusions which may be 
relevant to experimental design tasks research will be analysed in temis of its problem 
structure based on the categorisation scheme proposed in section 1.3.2. Comparisons will 
be drawn within these categories where a number of studies have common values in that 
category. As a result of these limitations comparisons are necessarily of a very general 
nature. 
1.5.1 Methodological problems in design research 
In addition to the problems of comparison across different design tasks outlined above 
there are also some methodological issues which must be addressed. Studies of the process 
of design have typically relied on 'think aloud' verbal protocols recorded whilst subjects 
complete a design task. This method has the advantage of very good external validity, 
however, the subsequent analysis of these protocols is constrained by the level of self-
knowledge that can be attributed to subjects. Whilst most researchers appear to be 
theoretically aware of these constraints; in practice the conclusions drawn from protocol 
analysis often overstep the bounds of this methodology. Therefore it is necessary to be 
acutely aware of the limitations of this methodology before assessing the results of this 
research. 
Think aloud verbal protocols have become an important tool in tracing cognitive 
processes. The increased use of verbal protocols has led to increasing debate on their 
validity. Ericsson and Simon (1984) prescribe a theoretical basis for the use of verba! 
protocols as data and this has become the standard reference for all work in this field. 
Within this theoretical framework is the assumption that given the correct instructions 
and using the right kind of task subjects will reliably report the contents of their short 
term memory (STM). Protocols must be recorded concurrently with instructions to 
avoid theorising and interpretation of thoughts. In terms of task selection they suggest 
that only tasks which lead to the contents of the subjects' S T M being coded in verbal 
form should be used. Tasks that involve re-coding from a non-verbal representation in 
STM or automated tasks which leave little trace in S T M will lead to invalid protocols. 
This raises two questions. How do we know that a particular task will lead to 
verbal coding in STM? Also, if a task generally does lead to verbal coding will this be 
the case for all subjects? The answers to these questions are not clear; whilst it is easy to 
avoid tasks which are clearly pictorial and are likely to lead to visual representations in 
S T M this does not guarantee that the remaining tasks will necessarily be coded verbally. 
In addition to this problem is the question of self-knowledge. The self-knowledge 
debate is concerned with how much awareness people have of their own thought processes. 
This question is of crucial importance to the study of real life design processes. Wiihin this 
review the details of self-knowledge research will not be presented (for a review of the area 
see Evans, 1983, Chapter 5). Nevertheless, despite different theoretical standpoints and 
continuing debate there are few commentators who would not agree that people have a 
limited knowledge of their own cognitive processes. 
Within the self-knowledge debate it is postulated that there are two forms of 
knowledge; explicit and implicit. Explicit (declarative) knowledge is consciously accessible 
and thus can be verbalised. For example knowledge which has been formally learned and 
committed to memory such as the names of the kings and queens of England or factual 
knowledge such as what you ate for tea yesterday. Implicit (procedural) knowledge is not 
consciously accessible in a verbal form. This includes such knowledge as how to ride a 
bicycle or how to play a musical instrument. It should be noted that implicit knowledge 
cannot be learned by rote but must involve practice and experience. For example in learning 
to play a musical instrument there are associated explicit rules such as which key produces 
which note and which notes are in which musical key, nevertheless the actual playing must 
be learned through practical experience. 
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Expertise in any particular iirea can be seen to be based to a large extent on detailed 
implicit knowledge. Firstly expertise is based on extensive practical experience and as we 
have seen this is clearly related to the learning of implicit knowledge. Secondly it can be 
argued that even where the learning of a task involves explicit rules (such as how to drive a 
car) the achievement of expertise necessitates such a familiarity with these rules that they 
become internalised. At this stage the originally explicit consciously remembered rules seem 
to have been assimilated into an implicit procedure. For example it is a common experience 
that when letirning to drive at first it is necessary to consciously remember to put the clutch in 
before changing gear. As one becomes more expert this rule becomes "automatic" i.e. 
subconscious. Research into bias in human reasoning suggests that biases should not be 
seen as errors of reasoning but rather as the direct result of the use of goal directed implicit 
cognitive processes in areas where exphcit rule based processes would be more appropriate. 
Evans and Over (1996) define these processes as Type 1 and Type 2 and argue that both lead 
to different forms of rationality in a two-factor theory of reasoning. This approach will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
This situation of limited self-knowledge in the cognitive processes related to design 
leads to a number of practical implications for knowledge elicitation from designers. Early 
studies of design and studies related to the creation of expert systems often gave experts a 
task and simply asked them directly to report the strategies used to solve the task. This 
method took no account of the limits of self-knowledge and demonstrated the allied problem 
thai even if a person has no awareness of their cognitive processes they will still produce a 
reasonable (but often completely false) account of the strategies they have used. These 
accounts will be based on post-hoc rationalisations rather than on any actual strategy used. 
This situation of subjects readily generating false strategy reports was clearly 
demonstrated in several experiments reported by Evans (1983). Wason and Evans' (1975) 
study of matching bias in the Wason selecfion task shows that whilst subjects' reports of 
what cards they were attending to during the task were reliable reports of why they were 
attending to these cards were based on a rationalisation deduced from the consequences of 
this choice. This was further supported by an experiment in which subjects were shown to 
readily jusfify any of several solutions to the Wason selection task presented as 'correct' by 
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the experimenters, (Evans and Wason 1976). Nisbett and Wilson (1977) in a review of 
verbal reports conclude "little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive 
processes" to the extent that "subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a 
stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the 
response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response" (Page 231). This is 
not to say that verbal reports are of no use as data (indeed none of the above authors suggest 
this). However, it does appear to be necessary constantly to remind researchers of the 
danger of believing verbal reports to be a description of underlying cognitive processes. 
These limitations are reiterated by Ericsson and Simon (1980) who present a general model 
of verbalisation containing variables related to; recognition, long-term memoi7, short term-
memory, control of attention, fixation and automation. A l l these factors contain unspecified 
variables which have consequences for the verbalisation process. Despite their general 
support for the use of verbal reports as data Ericsson and Simon limit their definitive 
statements to "the information verbalised will ...be some portion of the information 
currently attended to" (page 225, italics mine). Thus there is no guarantee either of 
completeness or of any particular links to underlying cognitive processes. 
The general failure of most early expert systems (Ullman 1991) and the failure of 
design research to reach any firm conclusions on the cognitive processes of design may well 
be due to the failure by many design researchers to take into account the limitations of this 
method of knowledge elicitation. 
At the other extreme the use of strictly experimental methods necessitates the use of 
simple and easily repeated tasks. Unfortunately these tasks do little to test the abilities of 
experts; the nature of expertise being precisely in dealing with the complexity and confusion 
created by real life tasks. Thus in attempting to create tasks which are as close to real life as 
possible studies of design have avoided the constraints of experimental control giving 
subjects freedom in their approach to design. This realism is necessary as designing is a 
complex multi-attribute decision making process which cannot be fully understood when 
separated into a series of simpler tasks. For example evidence of parallel processing in 
complex design (Stauffer and Ullman, 1988) would be absent in a series of simpler 
problems. Unfortunately this need for realism precludes the use of experimental method and 
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limited self knowledge precludes the use of direct questioning. 
1.5.2 Interpretation of findings from the literature 
The inherent methodological limitations outlined above necessitate great caution in the 
interpretation of findings from the literature. The information in verbal protocols tells us 
only where a designer's attention was focused at a particular time in the design process. 
Given these limitations we can expect only very general conclusions based on commonalities 
in verbal report data. Therefore we can expect to discover common stages in design and 
perhaps a typical order in which these stages occur. 
Looking at design from a theoretical point of view it is possible to infer some general 
processes which must be present in any successful design. Starting with the simplest 
possible theoretical model of a design process there are three factors which are necessary for 
success. First, it is necessary to understand the nature of the design problem. Thus we 
would expect design to begin with an evaluation of the task itself, leading to a clear definition 
of the final requirements of a completed design. Second, it is necessary to create a putative 
design. It is this stage that has been the focus of most research and yet to a great extent has 
remained a mystery. Third, it is necessary to evaluate this putative design solution; at least in 
terms of the problem definition achieved in the first stage. Further evaluation of factors such 
as efficiency and cost of design are preferable but not entirely necessary in this stage. 
Initially then we are expecting evidence of design which can be grouped into these 
stages. It should also be possible to discover from the research some of the common factors 
to which a designer pays attention in these stages. We can also expect that conclusions about 
underlying cognitive processes drawn from verbal protocol data will be at best misleading 
and contradictory. 
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1.6 T H E DESIGN S T A G E 
1.6.1 General findings from the literature 
In some design areas it is possible to define the important variables in the initial design 
stage in terms of the number of atu-ibutes to be considered and the relationship between these 
attributes. For example, in the design of psychology experiments there is a need to balance a 
number of attributes to maximise the efficiency of the design. The choices determining the 
final design are, between or within subjects or mixed design, the subject numbers, the 
subject population, the levels of independent and dependent variables and their 
measurement. These attributes are inter-related, each affecting the evaluation factors of 
internal and external validity, ethics, power and cost. The effect of altering one design 
attribute can influence the values of the other design attributes, as well as all the evaluation 
attributes. Often these changes occur in a complex non-linear manner. 
Many architectural and engineering studies have areas of similarity in the design stage. 
A number of related design attributes must be determined in order to maximise subsequent 
design quality (subsequent quality being based on a number of evaluation attributes). Here 
quality related factors such as strength, speed of operation, etc. must be balanced against 
cost. 
The following conclusions were based on a number of studies covering over 100 
subjects and 30 different design tasks. These were: Adelman and Bresnick (1992), Bhaskar 
and Simon (1977), Byrne (1977), Chan (1990), Eckersley (1988), Eekels and Roozenburg 
(1991), Evans and Bradshaw (1986), Gi l l (1987), Hubka and Eder (1987), Reagan (1989), 
Roozenburg and Cross (1991), Stauffer and Ullman (1988), Stone and Schkade (1991), 
Tempczyk (1986), Ullman (1991) and Ward (1989). The initial overwhelming impression 
from this review is that findings from these studies show more disagreement than agreement, 
even within studies using the same design problem and subjects with similar training 
backgrounds. For example Eckersley (1988), in a study of interior designers, concludes that 
there are "remarkable differences in the design problem solving behaviour of five 
individuals" (page 93). Because of these numerous differences no specific general model of 
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design processes can be determined from the literature and there is continuing disagreement 
over models which have been proposed (Roosenburg and Cross, 1991). This was not 
unexpected for the reasons outhned above and as predicted agreement between studies is 
limited to a few common strategies of a very general nature in the design stage. 
At the beginning of the design process, many studies report task clarification to 
determine clear objectives of the design. This phase is particularly evident in engineering 
design and is defined as the first stage in the consensus model of engineering design, 
(Roosenburg and Cross, 1991). However engineering problems are generally extremely 
clearly defined, as their final solution has to meet very specific criteria, thus in this case 
initial clarification is cleariy important. In designs relying on more aesthetic evaluations such 
as architecture or interior design (and thus having more fuzzy task instructions) this stage is 
less often reported and may be completely absent (Eckersley, 1988). 
Also relatively early in the design process the formation of a hierarchy of design is 
often reported. This can involve final goal setting; the formation of a goal plan involving a 
series of sub-goals which focus on the critical areas, or a sequential ordering of these sub-
goals. This practice is also more apparent in clearly defined tasks such as engineering 
design. This may be due to the inherent nature of mechanical or electronic systems which 
are traditionally seen as a series of inter-connected functional sub-systems rather than 
holistically, and certainly engineers have been trained to understand complex systems in this 
way. Eckels and Roozenburg (1991) argue that it is only in cleariy defined areas such as 
engineering, that this hierarchical structure and essentially linear process of design stages can 
be determined. They argue for a more cyclic structure with less clearly defined stages in 
areas of design where problem definition and evaluation are fuzzy. 
Thus both the initial task clarification and the subsequent task structuring are seen to be 
dependent on the levels of fuzziness of the problem. Clearly the complexity of the problem 
will also influence these potential first stages in terms of the number of attributes to be 
considered and the relationships between these attributes. With increasing problem 
complexity the limits of working memory will necessitate the breaking down of a problem 
into stages and the structuring of these stages into a goal plan for a successful solution to be 
achieved. 
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Also both parallel and serial approaches to problem solving have been reported in the 
literature. Stauffer and Ullman (1988) in a review of design studies argue that the use of 
parallel or serial development of solutions is largely dependant on the complexity of the 
original task; "where a problem is difficult or there is a lack of manpower, solutions are 
examined in series" (page i l l ) . 
Vtiriations in the initial methods of approaching a design task may not only depend on 
the differing varieties of task as seen above, there is also evidence demonstrating the 
importance of the specific presentation of a task. In the design stage we can expect multi-
attribute decision making to be largely influenced by task characteristics (Stone and Schkade, 
1991) , and even the sequence in which information is presented (Adelman and Bresnick, 
1992) . 
One area of agreement across different design studies is the stage of creating putative 
design proposals or "conceptual design". In engineering studies this stage follows task 
clarification and task structuring. Often in architectural studies it is seen as the first stage of 
design and leads to subsequent refining of goal plans (Ward, 1989). Nowhere in the 
literature is there any attempt to further define this stage beyond naming it and reporting that 
it is a creative process. This inability of the research to gain insight into the creative 
processes of design is clearly predicted by the limitations of the methodology described 
above. Finally there is also general agreement that once a putative design has been created 
the next stage is an evaluation of the quality of this design. 
1.6.2 Problems in studying the design stage 
The results of previous research relating to the design stage of various design tasks are 
clearly confused and often contradictory. When the design task is broken down into design 
and evaluation stages (as has been done here) rather than looked at as a whole these results 
are not surprising. It becomes clear that these two stages may to a large extent involve 
different types of cognitive process. 
The design stage in its purest sense involves at most the creation of new and original 
ideas or at least the balancing of the levels of a complex set of variables. Berry and 
Broadbent (1988) report that it is exactly this sort of complex and possibly creative task 
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which is subject to implicit learning and thus is not associated with verbalisable knowledge. 
Tt may be argued that this design stage relies on the use of heuristics rather than being truly 
creative. If this is the case then it is the choice of a particular heuristic which is the 
determining factor of successful design. Evans (1989) presents evidence that in reasoning 
tasks the choice of a heuristic is pre-attentional and that this leads directly to biases and 
errors. If this is also the case in design tasks then this choice will be affected by the form of 
the original design specification. This would lead to the same bias and errors in judgement 
which have been shown with varying task presentations in decision making studies and the 
same lack of verbalisable knowledge and false strategy reports shown by Evans (1989) (See 
Section 1.3.3). It seems likely therefore that a large number of previous studies have 
reached no firm replicable conclusions on the nature of design because they have employed a 
methodology almost totally ineffective in charting implicit reasoning. 
In fact when we look at the few consistent results from the design stage we find such 
things as task clarification and in some cases the formafion of .sub-goals. However task 
clarification is actually a form of evaluation (where the description of the task itself is 
evaluated) and has only been included in descriptions of the initial design stages because it 
inevitably happens early in the total design process. It can be seen as a logical and formal 
process of understanding and is clearly not a creative process involved directly in the 
formation of a conceptual design even though the resulting evaluation may affect the nature 
of the subsequent design process and may play a large role in defining subsequent sub-goal 
strategy. 
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1.7 T H E E V A L U A T I O N STAGE 
1.7.1 The importance of evaluation 
Given that some basic aptitude for design is present, it could be argued that contrary 
to the prevailing view the evaluation stages (task clarification and evaluation of quality of the 
putative solution) are the most important stages in design. If no errors are made in either of 
these evaluation stages any putative solution not meeting the requirements of the task will be 
rejected. If the task requirements are not met the solution must then be changed and re-
evaluated. By an iterative process of change and re-evaluation finally a correct solution will 
be found or the task abandoned. Looked at in this way it becomes apparent that an 
inefficient design stage will only serve to make the whole design process longer. However a 
failure to correctly clarify the task or an inefficient evaluation stage will result in errors in 
design solutions. That is not to say that good creative designing is not important. A good 
designer will arrive at a quick and efficient solution. However, accurate evaluation is crucial 
if design errors are to be avoided. 
Apart from the obvious importance of studying design evaluation there is the added 
advantage that evaluation processes are much more likely to be amenable to investigation 
using verbal protocol methodology. Unlike the creative (or heuristic) design stage which is 
likely to be largely a result of imphcit processing; the evaluation stages involve logical 
processes of checking defined factors, these are more likely to be explicit processes. It is 
also possible to study evaluation of designs experimentally by asking subjects to judge the 
quality of designs which vary systematically across a number of factors. This method is 
particularly appropriate for tasks such as engineering or experimental design where it is 
possible to clearly define the quality of a given solution. 
28 
1.7.2 Evaluation factors reported in the literature 
Previous design studies particularly in the fields of engineering and architecture 
demonstrate many similarities in terms of evaluation. The consideration of cost (in terms of 
rime, as well as financial) is universal and it is the considerafion of cost versus quality which 
makes the design process difficult. By removing cost as a consideration a simple design 
heuristic of maximising the values of all the other attributes could be applied. However, this 
would not necessarily lead to parsimony of design but would be more likely to create 
inefficient designs which would safely satisfy evaluation requirements. 
Cost can be seen as always reciprocally related to the other attributes of design quality, 
for example, power and validity in psychology experiments, accuracy, longevity or technical 
quality in engineering and numerous measures of quality in architecture including longevity, 
strength and aesthetics. 
Thus in different types of design study there are similar factors involved in evaluation 
and findings from these studies are in general agreement. Evaluation is seen as a final stage 
where if evaluation criteria are met the potential design becomes the solution. If evaluation 
criteria are not met a feedback system operates and the designer returns to an eariier stage. 
Changes specific to the evaluation failure are made and the new design is re-evaluated. 
Although this process may be common to all design activity there are large differences in the 
actual procedures involved. In tasks where the evaluation criteria are specific and well 
defined, (e.g., engineering) a failure to meet one or more of the criteria is generally clear 
from a simulation of a potential design and often leads to quite small and specific changes in 
the potential design. With more fuzzy evaluation criteria the situation is not so clear, designs 
may have to be tested in the real-worid. Failure at this stage is expensive and may lead to a 
complete re-design rather than minor adjustments. To take an example from architecture; 
socially disastrous tower blocks are routinely demolished and replaced with low level 
housing estates. 
This situation is even more complex in experimental design where acceptance of a bad 
design may never be noticed without substantial replication of the experiment. An 
experiment which demonsu-ates the hypothesised effect may be showing a true effect or may 
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be subject to Type 1 error. Conversely an experiment may find no effect either because no 
effect exists or because of Type 2 error. Thus assessing the probability of Type 1 and Type 
2 errors in a putative experimental design is crucial to the evaluation stage and yet errors 
made in this stage will only become apparent if an experiment has been replicated a number 
of times. 
1.8 E X P E R I M E N T A L DESIGN 
In order to draw any conclusions from the previous research which will remain valid 
for experimental design tasks, it is necessary to determine the level of similarity between the 
tasks used in this previous research and the task of designing an experiment. Using the 
categorisation scheme proposed earlier (Section 1.3.2) it is possible to generate a description 
of the factors involved in experimental design tasks in order to enable comparison with other 
areas of design. 
In experimental design the initial design stage is inevitably multi-attribute; it involves 
determining appropriate values for at least six factors some of which are inter-dependent. 
Problem definition in the design stage is generally fuzzy. Levels of semantic knowledge 
required depend to some extent on the specific task, however, in most areas of psychology 
tasks are semantically rich. In the evaluation stage assessment of the quality of putative 
designs is both complex and fuzzy. The following sections present a detailed analysis of 
each of these specific attributes as related to the design of psychology experiments. 
1.8.1 Design attributes 
The important attributes in the design of psychology experiments are, ethics, external 
validity, intemal validity, experimental power and cost. The question of ethics may be seen 
as different to the other attributes as it holds a veto over the whole design. A design with 
bad ethics will not be run whereas a design with bad validity or power may be run anyway, 
it will just be less efficient. Despite this difference ethics must still be considered (at least as 
an evaluation attribute) as there is always a need to check any prospective design for possible 
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ethical considerations. Thus there are at least four main attributes to be considered. These 
are also inter-related in a complex manner and each one is dependent on a number of factors. 
External validity is the extent to which the results of an experiment can be generalised 
to the real-world. This is dependent on a number of factors relating to choice of hypotheses, 
experimental method and subject selection. External validity is to a large extent a fuzzy 
concept. Validity is enhanced by making the experimental situation as close to real life 
experience as possible. This is, however, inevitably balanced against the need for 
experimental control in order to reduce extraneous and possibly confounding variables. In 
terms of evaluation there is no definitive measure and the external validity of a given 
experimental finding may only become apparent after a considerable number of replications 
under differing conditions. Under these circumstances the designer can only rely on 
heuristics to avoid obvious problems. 
Intemal validity is the extent to which an experiment tests a given hypothesis. It is 
enhanced by avoiding confounds and the possibility of alternative hypotheses and by 
constraining the probability of Type I error. The avoidance of confounds and alternative 
hypotheses involves the control of all extraneous factors which may have an influence on the 
dependent variable. In practice the designer can only hope to have recognised any 
confounding variables amongst the infinite number of variables present in any given 
situation. This process involves a mental search of the problem space (Klahr et al. 1993) 
and there is no prescriptive method for evaluating the completeness of this search. Again the 
presence of confounds may only be discovered through subsequent replications under 
differing experimental conditions. 
Unlike the previous factors related to intemal validity, evaluation of the probabilities of 
Type I and Type 2 errors is to some extent calculable. The probability of Type 1 error is 
pre-set by the experimenter as the level below which an effect will be regarded as significant. 
This significance level is generally standardised in the behavioural sciences at less than p = 
0.05. The probability of Type 2 error (the probability of failing to discover an effect where 
one exists) is much more difficult to determine. The power of an experiment is the 
probability (usually expressed as a percentage) of avoiding Type 2 error. Experimental 
power is influenced by a number of factors and estimating power can be quite complex. 
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Given a specific size of effect (and predetermined significance level) the power of an 
experiment fundamentally depends on the sample size; with power increasing as sample size 
increases in a complex non-linear relationship known as the power curve. Thus it is possible 
to calculate the exact number of subjects an experiment requires for a given power. 
However, this requires the experimenter to know in advance the expected effect size (a large 
effect requiring lower subject numbers for equivalent power). (For examples and 
mathematical analysis of these relationships see Lipsey, 1990) Appendix 7 describes the 
definition of effect sizes used throughout this thesis. 
Whilst the need to know expected effect sizes ina*oduces an element of fuzziness into 
power calculations this can be dealt with by adopting standard guidelines for small, medium 
and large effects such as those suggested by Cohen (1988). The adoption of such guidelines 
and the quoting of effect sizes in the literature would prevent two common errors of 
experimental interpretation. Those due to excessive rates of Type 2 error and those due to 
the reporting of significant results which relate to effects so small as to be of no practical 
importance (See Cohen 1990). However, as yet categorising and reporting of effect sizes is 
far from common practice despite these obvious advantages. 
An additional factor influencing experimental power is the accuracy of measurements 
of both the dependent and independent variables. The fact that any form of random 
measurement error (or indeed anything increasing the variability of observations) will reduce 
power, introduces more uncertainty into experimental power analysis. Thus an estimate of 
experimental power should be seen as the maximum available power given perfect 
experimental conditions and not a definitive probability of Type 2 error. 
1.8.2 Problem definition 
The original task definition is an area where the design of psychology experiments 
differs greatly from other fields of design. The starting point of design of a psychology 
experiment is a hypothesis which defines the design and evaluafion attributes to a greater or 
lesser extent. The overall design and evaluation goal of any experimental design is that it 
should test the related null hypothesis. However, it is rare in psychology that a hypothesis is 
.sufficiently detailed for this evaluation to be specific. 
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In engineering design it is usually the case that task instruction consists of explicit 
requirements of the final design. In these and similar studies it is commonly reported that the 
early stages of design involve clarification of specific design requirements (Staufferand 
Ullman 1988). In experimental design this stage may be present but it would be qualitatively 
different. The hypothesis is unlikely to contain detailed information on requirements for 
subject populations or for independent and dependent variables and their measurement; 
decisions on these factors are usually seen as part of the design process itself. For example, 
it is possible to start a design with a clearly specified hypothesis such as 'Manual reaction 
time to the stimulus of a red light increases in a background noise condition consisting of a 
continuous tone of 200Hz at 40db, for right handed boys aged between the ages of 16 and 
18'. In practice a much more likely hypothesis would be 'Reaction time increases in 
background noise' the specific details of the variables and subjects being left to the designer 
(who is often the person who created the original hypothesis anyway). This complicates the 
design and evaluation processes and although experimental design is a scientific pursuit 
based on specific statistical rules and procedures its related design processes may have a lot 
in common with the more fuzzily defined areas of design. 
Smith (1989) explores some effects of unstructured decision problems. Where initial 
problem definitions are incomplete there is often a failure to identify key problem elements. 
This constrains the scope of problem solving activities and harms overall performance. 
1.8.3 Semantic knowledge 
Required levels of semantic knowledge associated with experimental design are high. 
The minimum level of domain knowledge required to successfully design an experiment is 
an understanding of statistical research methods. This involves a working knowledge of all 
the design attributes and the relations between these attributes described in Section 1.7.1. 
Within psychological research there are also domain specific research methodologies which 
may lead to additional effects of expertise which are limited to quite specific domains. 
There is a large body of research confirming the facilitation due to expert (domain 
specific) knowledge in semantically rich domains (Abdolmohammadi and Shanleau, 1992, 
Bhaskar and Simon, 1977, Chan, 1990, Hammond et al., 1987, Sanbonmatsu et a!., 1992, 
33 
Shanteau, 1992). It is of course self-evident that a problem requiring semantic knowledge 
will be easier for a person with expertise in this domain; i.e. with the required knowledge 
readily at hand. However, the overwhelming impression from this research is that the mere 
availability of domain knowledge is not as important as the expertise in applying this 
knowledge to the problem in hand. Schraagen (1993) supports this view by demonstrating 
that when experts are confronted with a novel problem in experimental design "their form of 
reasoning remains intact, but the content of their reasoning suffers due to a lack of domain 
knowledge" (page 285). 
These selected effects of expertise are briefly mentioned here for the sake of 
completeness. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to form a comprehensive review of what 
is in itself a huge research area. 
1.8.4 Evaluation attributes 
Evaluation of experimental designs involves checking the appropriateness of decisions 
made in the design stage. The subsequent judgement of experimental quality should be 
based on some form of cost-benefit analysis. At a basic level the experiment should satisfy 
minimum requirements for ethics, cost (financial and practical constraints), internal and 
external validity. Beyond this level optimum quality involves obtaining the highest possible 
levels of internal and external validity for given cost constraints. Estimating these levels 
requires exactly the same processes as described in the design stage (see section 1.8.1) and 
these will not be repeated here. 
It can be argued that evaluation in not a separate stage; rather that the design stage is 
one continuous process which is only complete when evaluation criteria are met. However, 
in the study of experimental design there are some good reasons for continuing to make this 
conceptual division into design and evaluation stages. Firstly, because of the ill-defined 
nature of experimental design evaluation criteria are never explicitly stated in the task. 
Determining what criteria the final design should meet must therefore be included in the 
overall design process. This may be a complex process as these factors are inter-dependent 
and optimum levels will of course vary depending on the hypothesis to be tested. For 
example, i f a drug company is testing for possible side effects in a new drug it would be of 
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critical importance to constrain the possibility of Type 2 error. In this case failing to find an 
effect where one exists would lead to very damaging repercussions. On the other hand if the 
drug were being tested for a desired effect it might be more important to constrain Type 1 
error in order to avoid introducing an ineffective drug. 
It is also useful to view evaluation as a separate stage because in a wider view it is an 
important skill for researchers to be able to evaluate existing designs. When interpreting the 
importance of previous research studies and particularly in refereeing new research it is 
necessary to judge the quality of experimental designs. It is this evaluation which determines 
whether a particular interpretation of an experimental result enters the literature. 
1.8.5 Findings from related researcii 
Research into experimental design suggests the presence of a number of specific and 
intractable problems relating to the evaluation of experimental design. Foremost amongst 
these is the widespread failure of experimenters and reviewers to consider experimental 
power. Cohen (1962) has demonstrated that psychologists often severely overestimate the 
power of a prospective experimental design. In a meta-analysis of the 1960 volume of the 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Cohen found the median power to detect a 
medium effect (Pearson r of 0.4) to be .46 (46%). Thus in these experiments there was a 
better than 50% probability of failing to achieve a significant result where a medium sized 
effect existed (Type 2 error). Since this original study there has been great interest in 
experimental power in the literature and a number of definitive works on power analysis 
have been published (i.e.Cohen, 1988). Despite this general interest the average power of 
experiments has not improved. Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989) replicated Cohen's meta-
analysis using the 1984 volume of the same journal only to find that twenty four years later 
median experimental power had fallen to .37 (37%). In addition only two out of sixty four 
experiments reviewed in this study mentioned power at all and it was never estimated. To 
make matters worse the authors report "Nonsignificance was generally interpreted as 
confirmation of the null hypothesis (if this was the research hypothesis) although the median 
power was as low as .25 in these cases". Clearly these findings demonstrate a failure to 
evaluate power both by the original experimenters and the reviewers of the subsequent 
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articles. It is hard to believe that all these researchers are either unaware of the basic need for 
sufficient experimental power or are incapable of formally analysing experimental power. It 
seems more likely that they are relying on an intuitive statistical judgement or utilising some 
sort of heuristic to judge power. In either case the subsequent power evaluation is clearly 
inadequate. 
The results of these meta-analyses are entirely consistent with the results of a study by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1971) showing that experimental psychologists consistently 
overestimate the statistical power of experiments with small sample sizes. In addition 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) have shown subjects'judgements to be unduly influenced 
by sample proportion to the detriment of considerations of sample size in a study based on 
the construction of sampling distributions. They suggest that this may be due to the use of a 
'representativeness' heuristic rather than a logical statistical analysis of the problem. Evans 
and Dusoir (1977) have subsequently shown these errors to be mediated by problem 
complexity. However, in this study insight into the role of sample size was present only in 
extremely simple problem formats. Well, Pollatsek and Boyce (1990) report a series of 
studies specifically aimed at measuring subjects' understanding of the effects of sample size 
on the variability of the mean in which aspects of problems relating to sampling distributions 
were systematically varied. They conclude that although some subjects appreciated some 
aspects of the law of large numbers this "does not seem to result from an in-depth 
understanding". 
The general failing of published psychology research to take account of power 
requirements and the research findings cited above demonstrate lack of intuitive statistical 
judgement to be a pervasive problem even amongst experts. 
1.8.6 Bias in evaluation of psychology experiments 
Having demonstrated pervasive and persistent failures of evaluation in the previous 
section, this section speculates on some possible sources of bias which might account for 
these problems. Some of these speculations will be tested in subsequent chapters. 
As we have seen Cohen (1990) reports numerous errors of design and interpretation 
of results throughout published psychological experiments; these errors and resistance to 
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change are entirely consistent with designs biased by confirmation and positivity and based 
on overconfidence. Allied with Confirmation and Positivity biases overconfidence of 
judgement is likely to be detrimental to accurate evaluation of experimental design. 
Designers of experiments can be expected to ignore factors which may subsequently dis-
confirm their results, ignore factors which negatively affect their design and yet remain 
confident that their design is much better than it actually i s . 
Overconfidence in intuitive judgements is a strong and well replicated effect in which 
there is a tendency for subjects to maintain a much greater confidence in the correctness of 
their judgements than is warranted. This research has been reviewed by Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff and Phillips (1982) who conclude that people consistently overestimate what they 
know. There is evidence that experts making numerous similar judgements with clear 
feedback of success rates, (weather forecasters) do not suffer from overconfidence. 
However, clear feedback is almost non-existent in experimental design. In fact the 
immediate result of an experiment (either a significant or a non-significant result) should not 
be used as evidence of experimental quality as there is no way of knowing whether either of 
these results reflects the true state of the world or the presence of Type 1 or a Type 2 error 
(see section 1.7.2). 
This failure of the outcome of an experiment to give useful feedback relating to the 
quality of the design is unusual. In the majority of design and judgement tasks the final 
outcome is at least a guarantee of the design having achieved sufficient quality. Under these 
circumstances it seems quite likely that the evaluation of experimental designs is influenced 
by the subsequent experimental results; indeed it would be difficult to ignore them. If this is 
the case then it is not surprising that problems arise in judgements of experimental quality 
based on incorrect feedback. Under these conditions these judgements can be regarded as a 
form of 'hindsight bias'. 
Hindsight bias is also a form of overconfidence in judgement, first shown by 
Fischhoff (1975). It is the tendency for subjects to overrate the probability of an event when 
given the knowledge of its outcome (and similarly to underestimate the likelihood of an event 
given the knowledge that it did not occur). This effect includes a bias towards 
overestimating the relevance of factors supporting the known outcome. Within experimental 
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design hindsight bias could be expected to influence choice of experimental factors. 
Experience of previous experiments which have produced a significant result would lead to 
designers having an overconfident view of the relevance of the factors used in these 
successful experiments (particularly when experiments with negative results which may have 
used similar factors ctre rarely published). Thus whether through schemas, mental models or 
preconscious heuristics created on the basis of this past experience any new experimental 
design is more likely to be based on previous designs than on an objective analysis of 
required power. This situation seems on the surface to be a reasonably logical approach to 
design; based as it is on previous successes. However, when we consider that these 
apparently successful experimental results may have been due to consistent errors this 
approach can equally lead to persistent repetition of the kind of experimental shortcomings 
de-scribed above. 
1.9 S U M M A R Y OF CHAPTER ONE 
Chapter 1 reviewed a wide range of studies into the process of design and explored the 
difficulty of determining general conclusions from this highly disparate research field. As 
there were no previous studies into the design of experiments, a design task categorisation 
scheme was proposed in order to distinguish those findings which might generalise to the 
process of experimental design. Utilising this categorisation scheme relevant findings from 
both problem solving research and design research were discussed as were methodological 
problems in research into design processes in general. Subsequent discussion of these 
findings was presented in terms of a design stage and an evaluation stage. 
Tentative conclusions for the design stage of experimental design predicted the 
presence of a task clarification phase early in the design process and the possibility of the 
subsequent creation of a hierarchical system of sub-goals leading to the formation of a 
putative design solution. Despite these tentative conclusions, the overwhelming view from 
previous research was of inconsistent and often contradictory results. It was proposed that 
this confusion of results might be based on methodological problems associated with 
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detemiining the nature of the largely implicit cognitive processes in the creauve design stage. 
It was possible to form more reliable conclusions in terms of the evaluation of 
experimental design. It was predicted that as in other design areas there would be some 
fomi of evaluation and re-design loop only terminating when a putative design was deemed 
acceptable. The clear differences between the rather fuzzy evaluation of putative 
experimental designs and the straightforward evaluation in areas such as engineering design 
were also noted. In the light of these differences the specific problems associated with 
evaluating the quality of experimental designs were discussed. 
Previous psychology reseiirch was also reviewed. This research has reported 
consistent failure to consider the effects of experimental power and sample size in 
experimental design. Possible reasons for the persistence of these failings were discussed in 
terms of overconfidence and hindsight in the process of evaluation of experimental designs 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Two initial studies 
2.1 C H A P T E R TWO INTRODUCTION 
This chapter comprises the first two experimental studies. These studies were 
designed to explore evaluation in the design of psychology experiments and the factors 
involved in this evaluation. 
The first study explored the extent to which evaluation of experimental quality played a 
part in the design of psychology experiments. This study utilised concurrent verbal 
protocols of research students designing psychology experiments. In this study subjects 
were presented with experimental hypotheses and asked to design experiments to test these 
hypotheses. In addition to concurrent verbal protocols subjects were required to complete an 
answer sheet listing the details of their final designs. This was a prospective study designed 
only to elicit evidence of the extent of evaluation processes in experimental design. Due to 
the methodological problems oudined in Chapter 1 (Sections 1.5.1 and 1.6.2) it was decided 
not to attempt further analysis of these verbal protocols beyond a gross measure of the extent 
of subjects' considerations of evaluation factors. From the answer sheets it was also 
possible to gain some measure of the quality of the resulting experimental designs. 
The second study focused directly on the evaluation of completed designs. This study 
utilised a more formal task structure in which a number of sampling procedures were 
presented to subjects who were asked to judge their quality. These sampling procedures 
varied in terms of sample size, pre-set significance level and experimental outcome. The 
experiment was designed to assess the relative influence of these factors on subjects' 
judgements of experimental quality. As experimental outcome information was available to 
subjects, it was predicted that the results of this study would demonstrate the presence of 
significant outcome bias in the evaluation process. 
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2.2 E X P E R I M E N T ONE 
A prospective study of evaluation stages in the design of Psychology 
experiments using concurrent verbal protocols 
2.2.1 Introduction 
This study explored the nature of design processes used by psychologists in designing 
studies to test given hypotheses. As there were no previous studies in the field of 
psychology involving realistic experimental design tasks it would have been premature to 
generalise results from other design areas. In Chapter 1 it was argued that the immense 
variation in design tasks precludes direct compiirison between different design processes 
without reference to their specific attributes; as described in the suggested classification 
scheme (Section 1.3.2). In order to place experimental design in the general field of design 
research it was therefore necessary to complete an exploratory study. This study had the 
intention of discovering common cognitive strategies and approaches and delineating 
differences to other design tasks in the specific area of design evaluation. 
The present study used verbal protocols of experimental design tasks completed by 
experienced subjects proficient in the design of psychology experiments. Although it has 
been shown that the use of protocol analysis may be inappropriate for the study of the 
creative processes of design (see Sections 1.5.1 and 1.6.2) it remains the only practical 
method of determining general strategies in complex real life decision making tasks. As 
mentioned above (Section 1.3.1) three general stages can be assumed to be present in any 
design process; a task definition (evaluation) stage, a creative design stage and a design 
evaluation stage. Bearing in mind the limitations of this methodology, this prospective study 
was designed only to explore the extent and nature of the evaluadon stage in the experimental 
design process. In addition it would be possible to check the resulting verbal protocols for 
the presence of an early task clarification stage. Thus a full analysis of the verbal protocols 
was not intended and no conclusions would be drawn on the nature of the creation of 
putative experimental designs. Analysis of the protocols was thus limited to a basic 
categorisation of verbalisations relating to evaluation either of the initial task or of the factors 
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relating to putative designs. 
The four tasks used in this study were presented in the fonn of experimental 
hypotheses (See Section 2.2.2 below). In each case the subject was required to design an 
appropriate experiment to test the hypothesis. The four hypotheses (A,B,C andD) were 
designed to elicit specific design factors. Hypotheses A and D varied in terms of expected 
effect size. In hypothesis A it could be predicted that differences in table height would only 
have a small effect on writing speed. In hypothesis D the difference in recognition times 
between pictures of close friends and people only seen very rarely could be predicted to be 
very large. If subjects were properly considering experimental power requirements it would 
be appropriate for them to use a greater number of subjects in an experiment to test 
hypothesis A than in an experiment to test hypothesis D. It was predicted that subjects 
would fail to make appropriate considerations of experimental power; in line with the general 
failures to consider power reported by Cohen (1962). Hypothesis B presented physical pain 
as an independent variable in order to expliciUy cue the need for ethical considerations. It 
was predicted that ethics would only be considered as a factor of experimental design where 
it had been specifically cued. 
The above three questions required relatively simple one-way designs. Question C 
introduced greater difficulty in terms of two independent variables requiring a two-way 
design (background noise and mathematical ability). This makes the overall task more 
difficult and particularly makes any initial task clarification stage more complex. 
2.2.2 Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were ten psychology postgraduate research students studying at the 
University of Plymouth . The subjects were experienced in the kind of task presented 
(design of psychology experiments) but were not necessarily expert in the particular areas of 
experimental design required. Two subjects were used in the pilot study and the remaining 
eight in the experiment proper. 
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Materials and Procedure 
Pilot study 
It was the intention of this study to be as close to real life experimental design as 
possible. This meant presenting the design task with the minimum of instruction to prevent 
cueing of the subjects in the categories of answer required for a successful design. The 
initial intention was only to present subjects with very basic instructions such as: 
Design an experiment to test the hypothesis - 'Differences in 
table height affect writing speed* 
However, it was recognised that a completely open task devoid of any instruction might 
serve to confuse subjects. A complete lack of task constraints would be extremely rare in a 
real life experimental design, where during the process of generating an experimental 
hypothesis task constraints would normally become apparent as the hypothesis was refined. 
Given this lack of direction subjects might use an initial task clarification phase to generate a 
more specific hypothesis including constraints of their own choosing. If this was the case it 
would result in subjects effectively attempting different tasks thus precluding any between 
subjects analysis of results. It was also recognised at a purely practical level that some time 
constraints might be necessary. For these reasons a pilot study was carried out on two of 
the experimental subjects. 
Each subject was presented with the following four problems: 
A . Design a study to lesi the hypothesis: 
Differences in table height affect writing speed. 
B. Design a study lo test the hypothesis: 
Physical pain affects reaction time to non-painful stimuli. 
C . Design a study to test the hypothesis: 
Background noise will increase solution times for quadratic equations 
for more mathematically able subjects, less able subjects will not be 
affected. 
D- Design a study lo test the hypothesis: 
Faces of close friends in photographs are more readily recognisable 
than faces of people only seen very rarely. 
Subjects were also given an instruction sheet containing the following guidance to 
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thinking aloud at the outset of the experiment. This sheet remained on the table in front of 
them throughout the experiment as did the question sheet on which they were allowed to jot 
down notes if required. 
Thinking aloud; 
During this expcrimcni it is important to talk aloud, you should try simply to report 
whatever thoughts are in your head at the time. You will not be judged on what you say so 
please try to relax and be spontaneous, the focus of the experiment is on what you arc thinking 
about at a particular time, rather than whether or not these thoughts make sense. U is not 
necessary to explain or justify your thoughts to the experimenter. 
Experimental recordings will be kept strictly confidential and will be erased once the 
verbal protocols have been transcribed. The resulting written transcriptions wil l not be 
traceable to individual subjects. 
Subjects were given an hour to complete the tasks. No other instructions were given. 
Results from the pilot showed the necessity of a more well defined problem suuclure 
particularly in terms of guidance on time constraints. One subject spent the whole hour on 
the first task without ever achieving a completed design whilst the other subject felt they had 
completed all four tasks within the first twenty minutes and could not think of any more 
details which might be relevant. Neither subject presented enough detail for a complete 
experiments design in terms of subject population, required subject numbers, within or 
between subjects analysis, etc. 
Main study 
It was decided to define the task requirements and lime constraints more rigidly for the 
main study. Firstly, subjects were instructed that they had fifteen minutes for each question. 
Secondly, an answer sheet requesting specific details of the completed design was presented 
to the subjects after the fu-st ten minutes on each task. This had the disadvantage of cueing 
the subjects to the requirements of a completed design on all but the first task, but ensured 
the availability of explicit details of designs. 
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The following task instructions were added to the thinking aloud instructions: 
Task Instructions 
You wil l be presented with four problems, in the form of experimental hypotheses. 
Your task, in each case, is to design a study to test the hypothesis. Your design should 
attempt to find the best possible method of testing the given hypothesis. 
During the task it is important that you talk aloud describing what you are thinking 
about at that moment. If you fall silent you will be prompted to continue talking. You may 
jot down any notes you need on the question sheet, you will have fifteen minutes to consider 
each question. After the first ten minutes you will be given an answer sheet requesting 
specific information about the study. 
The above four questions were then presented one at a time. After ten minutes 
subjects were presented with an answer sheet requesting details of their experimental design. 
(See appendix one for complete instructions and answer sheet). The order of question 
presentation across subjects was balanced using a Latin square. Verbal protocols were 
recorded and later transcribed from audio tape. Video tape recordings were also made in 
order to record the timings of written notes; these were not used in the present analysis. 
2.2.3 Results and Discussion 
The following results were based on the coding of utterances from the experimental 
verbal protocols into sixteen categories. (See appendix one for coding scheme and coded 
results) Results for subjects' estimates of required sample sizes were taken from written 
answer sheets. As there was no formal verbal protocol analysis these prospective results 
will be discussed as they arise. 
Categorisation of utterances was performed by the experimenter. In order to check the 
reliability of this categorisation two randomly chosen protocols were categorised by a blind 
judge. These categorisations were scored and correlated with the originals. The reliability 
coefficient was 0.88. 
Consideration of independent and dependent variables 
By far the greatest proportion of utterances were related to considerations of 
independent and dependent variables. These factors accounted for 30.8% of all utterances 
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and were generally related to setting levels of the independent variable and appropriate 
measurement of the dependent variable. 
Confounds and practicality 
The second greatest proportion of utterances were related to considerations of possible 
confounding variables and to the practicality of the physical running of putative experiments. 
These factors accounted for 25% of all utterances. Confounds and the physical practicality 
of experimental designs have been assessed together as there was a great deal of overlap 
between these categories and they were often both contained in a single utterance. This is 
not surprising when you consider that the discovery of a potential confound will nearly 
always lead to a change in the physical way in which an experiment is mn in order to avoid 
this possibility. 
Evidence of a task definition stage 
There was clear evidence of an initial task definition stage. In 24 of the 32 u*ials (75%) 
clarification of the task was included in the first three utterances. There were only 4 cases 
where task definition was not referred to at all. Overall, 9.6% of utterances were concemed 
with task definition. However, this figure may be artificially low as an attempt to define 
either the independent or dependent variables slated in the question would be classified as a 
consideration of those variables rather than an attempt to clarify the task . 
Ethical considerations 
Explicit references to ethical considerations were only made in response to question B 
which included physical pain as the independent variable. Five of the eight subjects referred 
to ethics in this question. Overall 13.7% of all responses to question B were concemed with 
ethics. No considerations of ethics were made in any of the other questions. This result 
was in line with the prediction that explicit consideration of ethics would only be present 
where ethical problems were cued by the question content. (See section 2.2.1) 
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Evidence of evaluation 
Overall there was surprisingly litde evidence of explicit evaluation of experimental 
designs. Any statement relating to considerations of experimental power, potential effect 
sizes or the probabilities of either Type 1 or Type 2 error was considered an instance of 
evaluation. This category also included any return to and reconsideration of an experimental 
variable already determined or any reference to the overall appropriateness of the 
experimental design. Of the eight subjects in the study only four made any reference to 
evaluation of their putative designs. One of these four made no evaluations on the first two 
questions (Questions A and B) and only made one reference to evaluation on each of the 
remaining two questions. The most complex question (question C) attracted the largest 
amount of evaluation. Evaluation accounted for 5.8% of all utterances. However, this 
overall figure was subject to considerable individual differences. See Table 2.1 for details. 
Table 2.1 
Overall number of utterances related to experimental evaluation 
Question A Question B Question C Question D Total 





Subject 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 6 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 7 0 0 1 1 2 
Subject 8 3 0 5 1 9 
Subject 9 3 3 5 3 14 
Subject 10 1 8 3 2 14 
Total 7 11 14 7 
Considerations of subject numbers and experimental power 
There was no evidence whatsoever of any explicit consideradon of experimentiil 
power. None of the utterances from any subject on any question were categorised as 
referring to experimental power. However, it is possible that subjects were making implicit 
judgements of appropriate power based on knowledge of expected effect sizes and the 
determination of requirements for significance levels and subject numbers. 
There was also no evidence of any utterances referring to significance levels. This 
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was not surprising given the almost universal practice of using the p < 0.05 level as a 
standard for significance in psychology experiments. Although it is theoretically reasonable 
to determine and pre-set an appropriate significance level for any given experiment, the use 
of any other level has become extremely rare (in any area other than medical research where 
the more stringent level of p < 0.01 may be used as a standard). Thus it is likely that 
subjects automatically assume a level of p < 0.05 and may utilise a simpler intuitive estimate 
of experimental power based only on knowledge of expected effect sizes and the subsequent 
determination of subject numbers. However, as any mention of expected effect size would 
have been categorised as a consideration of experimental power there was also no evidence 
of any subject making any explicit reference to effect size. 
This leaves the setting of subject numbers as the only possible determinant of 
appropriate experimental power. There is also very little evidence of subjects determining 
required numbers of subjects during the design process. In this experiment subjects were 
cued to the need to determine subject numbers on all but the first question by the presentation 
of an answer sheet requesting this information at the end of each design phase. Despite this 
clear cue only four of the eight subjects made any determination of required subject numbers 
before reaching the point on the sheet where they had to fill in a specific value, hi addition 
none of these four subjects determined subject numbers for all of the four questions they 
attempted. (See Table 2.2 for details) In general this meant that subject numbers were only 
decided upon as an after-thought when the experimental design was apparently complete. 
Even then figures were only supplied when specifically requested. It would appear that 
subjects did not consider this information to be part of the design process. 
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Table 2.2 
Instances of considerations of subject numbers and decisions made 













Subject 3 1 1 * 0 2 2 
Subject 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 6 1 1 0 0 2 
Subject 7 0 2 1 * 0 1 
Subject 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 10 1 2 0 2 3 
Total 
decisions 3 3 0 2 
N.B. * denotes a final decision was not made 
Each subject was compelled to give a figure for required numbers of subjects in the 
subsequent answer sheet stage of the experiment. Thus it was also possible to analyse these 
forced decisions which are presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 











Subject 3 30 20 b 16 b 30 
Subject 4 Not specified 20 b 50 b 20 
Subject 5 20 b Not specified 10 b 30 
Subject 6 40 b 50 b 15 b 100 
Subject 7 Not specified 10 Not specified 5 b 
Subject 8 10 Not specified 20 b Not specified 
Subject 9 60 Not specified Not specified Not specified 
Subject 10 40 10 40 20 
Mean subject 




20% 50% 54% 95% 
N.B. The letter b after a number denotes a between subjects design in which case subject 
numbers are for each subject group. The figure for mean subject numbers is therefore 
per subject group in any given design. 
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Despite the absolute requirement of the answer sheet for subjects to provide specific 
figures for sample sizes there was a general unwilhngness to comply. In nine cases values 
were not specified. From the figures that were provided there was no evidence for 
considerations of experimental power. Two questions were specifically designed to elicit 
power considerations; question A had a potentially very small effect and thus required a large 
sample whilst question D had a potentially very large effect and thus only needed a small 
sample. The other two questions required a sample somewhere between these two 
extremes. As a guide to the sort of sample sizes required the following estimates were 
calculated on the basis of the power of a t-test at a significance level of p < 0.05. These 
calculaUons used Cohen's (1988) definitions of small and large effect sizes (d = 0.2 and 
d = 0.8 respectively) to achieve a relatively conservative experimental power of 75%. (i.e. 
25% chance of Type 2 enor) Values given are for within subject designs and should be 
doubled for between subject designs. 
For question A (small effect) this would require 275 subjects. The mean value of 
subjects' estimates of the sample required for this question (33.3) reflects an experimental 
power of 20%. For question D (large effect) only 18 subjects would be required to achieve 
a power of 75%. The mean value of subjects' estimates of the sample required for this 
question (34.2) reflects an experimental power of 95%. For a medium effect size (d = 0.5 ) 
44 subjects would be required to achieve an experimental power of 75%. The mean values 
of subjects' estimates of the sample required for questions B and C reflect experimental 
powers of 50% and 54% respectively. Calculations of mean experimental power have been 
included in Table 2.3. 
From these results it is clear that subjects had a strong tendency to ignore sample size 
in the design process. When forced to provide a value they seriously underestimated sample 
size requirements and generated designs with very high probabilities of Type 2 error. This 
reluctance to use large sample sizes may have been due to considerations of experimental 
cost. However, there was httle evidence of explicit references to cost in the verbal 
protocols. Cost was only mentioned by four of the subjects in a total of five of the 32 
completed experimental designs. Considerations of cost amounted to less than one percent 
of all responses. 
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2.2.4 Conclusions 
The results of this experiment showed a strong concern by the designers for the 
practicalities and mechanics of the potential experiment and virtually no consideration of the 
probabilities of Type 1 and Type 2 errors in any subsequent results this experiment might 
generate. In general there was evidence for an initial clarification stage. This stage was 
followed by considerations relating to manipulation and measurement of experimental 
variables and consideration of possible confounds and the physical practicality of the 
potential experiment. There was little evidence of any form of explicit evaluation of putative 
designs. Evidence of any form of power analysis (explicit or implicit) was completely 
absent with estimates of sample sizes reflecting completely inadequate experimental power 
for designs testing small or medium effects. 
This failure to consider power had been predicted (see section 2.2.1). However the 
lack of any form of explicit evaluation of putative designs was surprising and had not been 
reported in previous design research. This may be due to task differences in different areas 
of design research as discussed in chapter one (section 1.7.2). The task used in this case 
was in the form of a minimal hypothesis and specified no particular limitation criteria. This 
is quite unlike the clearly defined tasks typical of engineering design studies which are often 
in the form of a list of criteria to be met by the final design and thus cue the need for specific 
evaluations. 
It is possible, therefore, that psychologists are quite capable of efficient experimental 
evaluation but will only make this evaluation when specifically cued to do so by question 
content. Experiment two attempts to assess this possible capability more directly by 
eliminating the design stage and asking subjects to evaluate the quality of existing 
experiments. 
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2.3 EXPERIMENT TWO 
A study of evaluation of the quality of sampling procedures 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated little evidence of formal experimental 
evaluation during the design of psychology experiments. Nevertheless these formal 
evaluations are made by psychologists on a regular basis when reviewing the experiments of 
others. These evaluations are particularly important in such areas as peer review of potential 
joumal articles and the examination of PhD theses. The present experiment was designed to 
explore this type of evaluation by presenting subjects with descriptions of sampling 
procedures which they were required to judge for quality. 
The quality of a given experimental design is largely dependent on the magnitude of 
chosen experimental factors. Assessing these factors is normally a complex multi-attribute 
task including considerations of confounding variables, practical restraints, measurement 
issues, ethical considerations, choice of statistical analysis, etc. Experiment 1 showed that 
most of these factors were considered in the design process, but evidence of consideration of 
factors specifically relating to experimental power was not apparent in this study. For this 
reason Experiment 2 focused on a simplified task which included only the most basic factors 
of sample size, chosen significance level and cost of sampling. 
In this case rational choice of appropriate subject size and significance level in a given 
experiment depends on a cost-benefit analysis balancing the probability and cost of Type 1 
and Type 2 errors against the cost of sampling. Thus a design of high quality would retain 
sufficient power and low probability of error at the minimum cost. 
As described in Chapter 1 (Section 1.8.5) there is little evidence in previous research to 
suggest that subjects would approach these choices rationally, findings generally show a lack 
of understanding of statistical principles in both students and researchers. The results of this 
previous research were supported by the results of Experiment 1 in which experienced 
research students failed to take due consideration of experimental power requirements when 
designing experiments. In this second experiment it was hoped that systematic variation of 
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sample sizes and pre-set significance levels in experimental descriptions would permit a more 
direct assessment of the nature and extent of subjects' understanding of the principles of 
statistical sampling. Quality judgements should be based on a clear understanding of the 
statistical implications of var>'ing these factors. However, previous studies strongly suggest 
that they will not reflect this understanding. 
As this experiment was designed in part to reflect the evaluation task facing the 
reviewer of an experimental study it was decided to include the results of each sampling 
procedure. This information is available in the normal course of evaluation of any previous 
study and is likely to significantly influence a reviewer's judgement of quality in hindsight. 
(See Chapter 1, Section 1.8.6) The given result of an experiment should in fact have little or 
no relevance to the quality of the original design. A significant result may be a true finding 
(demonstrating at least sufficient experimental power) or may be a Type 1 error. A non-
significant result may be a true finding or a Type 2 error; representing no additional 
information either way. Thus without additional long-term outcome information on 
replication, inifial experimental results are no help in judging the original quality of an 
experimental design. Even with this information there are only minor implications for the 
quality of the original experimental design. Nevertheless, it was decided to include an 
experimental condition in which subjects were presented with long-term outcome 
information on the replication or otherwise of the initial experimental results given in each 
description. The interaction of long-term outcome information with the initial experimental 
result created four different overall possible outcomes: a significant result subsequently 
shown to be correct, a significant result subsequently shown to be false, a non significant 
result subsequently shown to be correct and a non significant result subsequently shown to 
be false. Each of these four long-term outcomes had specific implications in the 




Subjects were 72 first year psychology undergraduates at the University of Plymouth. 
The experiment took place at the end of their first year when they had ail completed a 
research methods and statistics course. Subjects participated on a voluntary basis and were 
allocated to experimental conditions by random distribution of question booklets; ensuring 
only that equal numbers of each type of question booklet were distributed. A l l responses 
were anonymous. 
An analysis of experimental power based on the the calculations of Lipsey (1990) and 
assuming a medium effect size estimated that a minimum of 65 subjects would be required to 
achieve experimental power of 80% in the overall analysis of this experiment. 
Materials and Procedure 
Materials compri-sed an instruction sheet and a question booklet. The instructions 
contained an introduction followed by a scenario description. Having read the instmctions 
subjects were presented with a booklet containing sixteen short descriptions of experiments. 
For half the subjects these descriptions were followed by long term outcome information. 
SubjecLs were required to make a judgement of the quality of the experimental design 
of the described experiment in each case. 
Instructions and scenario were as follows; 
In t roduc t ion 
The following description and series of questions are designed to study understanding of 
the concept of quality in experimental design. Your co-operation in this experiment is greatly 
appreciated, and the results should be of use to you as they will demonstrate general levels of 
understanding of experimental design principles, results and explanations wil l be made 
available as soon as possible. You do not need to put your name on this booklet. 
S c e n a r i o 
Over the last five years all the major drug companies have been competing to licence 
synthesised plant extracts. A large number of these new drugs have been created to treat 
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hypertension, all these drugs are designed lo reduce blood pressure. They have all been 
experimenially tested on human subjects to see if they do significantly reduce blood pressure. 
These initial clinical trials can be expensive to run and the cost of developing these drugs is 
high. 
In initial trials, experimental methods vary between companies. A brief description of the 
experimental methods used in a selection of comparable drug trials from four different 
companies is outlined below (the companies are not named). A l l these experiments used 
between subjects designs comparing experimental (drug) conditions with placebo conditions 
ihcy were all analysed using t - tests. 
T a s k 
Your task is to read each description and give an estimate of the quality of the 
experimental design of the initial experiment by writing a percentage mark (from 0 to 100) in 
the space provided. Please try to use the whole range of marks. 
A typical question (with outcome information) was as follows; 
I. 
In an experiment to test the effects of the drug Largacil 15 adult subjects were each given 
the standard therapeutic dose. Resulting blood pressure levels were compared with a placebo 
group of 15 subjects, using a t - test. Significance levels were set at O.OI. A significant 
reduction in blood pressure was found. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials confirmed this effect on blood pressure. The drug was 
licenced for clinical use and has made profits for this company. 
Quality 
score 
For details of all sixteen questions see Appendix 2. 
Design 
Three experimental factors (each with two levels) were varied on a within subjects 
basis. These factors were: subject numbers (100 or 30), pre-set significance level (.05 or 
.01) and experimental result (significant result or non-significant result). 
As exposure to long-term outcome information would cue subjects to consider the 
validity of initial results, the presence of long-term outcome information was manipulated as 
a between subjects factor (36 subjects receiving long term outcome information and 36 
receiving only the inifial result). 
The manipulation of these four factors within a standard experimental description 
created the sixteen different sampling procedures presented to the subjects (see example 
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above and Appendix 2). In these experimental descriptions all other factors were held 
constant. AH experiments were based on the testing of a drug designed to reduce blood 
pressure. A l l experiments were between subjects designs comparing a drug condition to a 
placebo condition. The dependent variables in each case were measures of blood pressure. 
Wording of experimental descriptions were varied to prevent cueing of subjects to the 
relevant design factors. 
For those subjects receiving long-term outcome information this also had two levels 
(experimental result subsequently shown to be correct or subsequently shown to be false). 
These were manipulated on a within subjects basis for this subject group. For these subjects 
the interaction of long-term outcome information with the initial experimental result created 
four different possible overall outcomes: a significant result subsequently shown to be 
correct, a significant result subsequently shown to be false, a non significant result 
subsequently shown to be correct and a non significant result subsequently shown to be 
false. (See Appendix 2 for details of presentation of outcome information) 
Although this factor created an unbalanced design it was still possible to utilise an 
overall five factor analysis in which the presence of long-term outcome information was a 
between subjects factor. This meant that the nature of long-term outcome (experimental 
result subsequently shown to be correct or subsequently shown to be false) was analysed as 
a within subjects factor but was a mock factor for the group of subjects not receiving this 
information. 
The dependent variable was the subjects' intuitive judgement of the quality of each 
experimental design. Subjects were instructed to use a range from 0 to 100 for quality 
scores. 
A normative analysis of the power of these sampling procedures to discover a medium 
sized effect (using the stated t-test) gives the following results: 
30 subjects at p < 0.05 = 47% power 
100 subjects at p < 0.05 = 94% power 
30 subjects at p < 0.01 = 24% power 
100 subjects at p < 0.01 = 82% power 
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2.3.3 Results 
Influences of all factors 
A five factor Anova was performed with four within subjects factors (subject numbers, 
pre-set significance level, initial result and long term outcome) the fifth factor the presence or 
absence of long term outcome information being between subjects. 
Effect sizes for main effects were calculated following the recommendations of Cohen 
(1988). Values given are for product moment correlation coefficients (r) and are quoted in 
square brackets. Using this convention definitions of small, medium and large effect sizes 
are O.I, 0.3 and 0.5 respectively. (Cohen, 1988; Page 532) 
In this overall analysis both subject numbers (F = 59.0, p = 0.001) [r = 0.74] and 
pre-set significance level (F = 16.1, p = 0.0001) [r = 0.32] had significant influences on 
quality ratings. Experimental descriptions with higher subject numbers were rated as having 
higher quality; as were those with smaller pre-set significance levels. 
In addition both the experimental result (F = 6.0, p = 0.017) [r = 0.2] and long-term 
outcome information (F = 15.9, p = 0.002) had significant influences on quality ratings. 
Overall significant experimental results atu-acted higher quality ratings than non-significant 
results and replicated results attracted higher quality ratings than non-replicated results. 
However, the precise nature of these effects was masked by the fact that in this analysis the 
nature of long-term outcome informafion was a mock factor for one subject group. That this 
factor influenced these main effects was demonstrated by the presence of a significant three-
way interaction between the experimental result, the presence of outcome information and the 
nature of this information (experimental result replicated or not replicated), F = 5.4, p = 
0.02. In order to gain a clearer picture of the influences of these factors it was necessary to 
perform separate analyses of the two different subject groups (those receiving and those not 
receiving long-term outcome information). 




Means for experimental factors from overall analvsis 
(Standard deviations in brackets) 
30 Subjects 100 Subjects 
Significance Significance Significance Significance 
level 0.01 level 0.05 level 0.01 level 0.05 
True Significant 56.2 49.6 66.9 62.1 
Result (17.1) (18.9) (21.6) (21.3) 
No (Mock Non- 51.1 50.1 64.0 60.9 
outcome factor) significant CI7.8) (20.1) (21.5) (19.6) 
infonnaiion False Significant 56.1 50.4 71.8 61.4 
given Result (17.6) (17.7) (19.0) (20.3) 
(Mock Non- 49.5 49.5 62.6 58.7 
factor) sijinificant (20.1) (22.0) (21.7) (21.6) 
Significant 56.4 54.6 72 66.5 
True (24.9) (23.0) (17.2) (18.8) 
Result Non- 54.5 51.1 64.5 56.4 
Outcome significant (22.1) (23.6) (22.1) (22.4) 
information Significant 47.3 41.2 59.2 50.7 
given False (17.7) (17.9) (24.4) (21.5) 
Result Non- 49.6 42.7 55.3 54.0 
significant (19.5) (21.7) (21.7) (18.9) 
Influences of experimental results and long-term outcome information 
A . Analysis for subject group receiving experimental result only 
An Anova was performed on the data for those subjects who did not receive long-term 
outcome information, this had three within subjects factors (subject numbers, pre-set 
significance level and initial result). 
In this analysis (as in the previous analysis) both subject numbers (F = 40.7, p = 
0.001) and pre-set significance level (F = 6.3, p = 0.017) had significant influences on 
quality ratings. Experimental descriptions with higher subject numbers were rated as having 
higher quality, as were those with smaller pre-set significance levels. 
However, for these subjects (n = 35) the effect of experimental result failed to achieve 
significance (F = 3.57 p = 0.067) [r = 0.25]. Neverthless, the difference was in the expected 
direction; higher quality ratings were given to those experiments achieving a significant result 
and the effect was larger than the effect in the overall analysis. In this analysis this effect 
was mediated by a significant interaction between the experimental result and the significance 
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level of that result (F = 6.07, p = 0.019) such that an experimental result of high significance 
was rated as having higher quality than an experimental result of low significance. These 
results can be seen graphically in Figure 2.1. In this interaction an experimental description 
which had a significant result at the p < 0.01 level attracted significantly higher quality 
ratings than all other combinations. There were no other significant differences. (See 
appendix two) 
Figure 2.1 
Interaction between experimental result and significance level 
















B. Analysis for subject group receiving experimental result and long-term outcome 
information 
An Anova was performed on the data for those subjects who did receive long-term 
outcome (replication) information; this had four within subjects factors (subject numbers, 
pre-set significance level, initial result and long-term outcome). 
In this analysis (as in both previous analyses) both subject numbers (F = 21.6, 
p = 0.001) and pre-set significance level (F = 10.1, p = 0.003) had significant influences on 
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quality ratings. As before experimental descripfions with higher subject numbers were rated 
as having higher quality; as were those with smaller pre-set significance levels. 
For those subjects given long term outcome information (n = 35) experimental result 
alone did not significantly influence quality ratings (F = 2.4, p = 0.13). However there was 
a significant main effect of long-term outcome (F = 18.7, p = 0.0001) [r = 0.60] with 
experimental results which had been replicated attracting higher quality ratings than those 
which were not replicated. The interaction between experimental result and long term 
outcome failed to achieve significance (F = 3.73 p = 0.061). These results can be seen 
graphically in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 
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For complete Anova tables and tables of means see Appendix 2. 
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2.3.4 Discussion 
Overall the results showed a clear preference for designs with larger sample sizes; this 
was the largest effect of any of the variables. This effect appeared not to have been mediated 
by considerations of experimental cost. The only factor influencing cost in these scenarios 
was the number of subjects used and across all conditions the highest number of subjects 
attracted the highest quality ratings. In addition experimental descriptions with higher pre-set 
significance levels attracted higher quality ratings than those with lower pre-set significance 
levels in all conditions. This preference was not consistent with judgements based solely on 
maximising experimental power (see Section 2.3.2 for normative power analysis). 
However, this preference for higher significance levels may have reflected a desire to reduce 
the possibility of a false positive result which in this scenario would lead a drug company to 
waste a great deal of money on unnecessary clinical trials. 
Both these findings may be seen as reasonable judgements. Firstly, no information on 
desired effect sizes was given; although it would be appropriate to assume that a drug would 
need to have a reasonably large effect on blood pressure to be clinically useful. Secondly, 
no information on the costs of running subjects was given and in this scenario it is 
reasonable to assume the potential financial benefits (or losses) to a drug company 
developing a new drug may be immense. In comparison the cost of running subjects may be 
seen as negligible. 
Another possible interpretation of the effect of pre-set significance level is that there 
was little understanding of statistical principles and that quality judgements were based on a 
feeling that a result at the level of 0.0 i was somehow better than one at 0.05. There is 
evidence for this latter view from the interaction between significance level and experimental 
result shown in Figure 2.1. This interaction demonstrated that a higher pre-set significance 
level only had a positive influence on quality ratings when it was known in hindsight that the 
experiment found a significant result. Thus this would seem to be more a hindsight bias 
effect (not only a significant result but a very significant result) than one due to 
considerations of statistical implications. 
The prediction that the presence of outcome information would produce hindsight bias 
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(See Section 2.3.1) was upheld by the results. Overall, subjects were biased towards higher 
ratings of quality for those experiments finding a significant result. In the condition where 
subjects were also given long-term outcome information this initial experimental result failed 
to have a significant effect. In this condition this effect was replaced by an effect of long-
term outcome information where replication of the experimental result was seen to 
significantly increase quality ratings. Notably, this was a much larger effect than that for 
initial experimental result (or pre-set significance level). This is consistent with the 
prediction that the presence of long-term outcome information would cue subjects to consider 
the possibility that the initial experimental result might be an error; and thus they would be 
less influenced by this inifial informafion (See Section 2.3.1). However this does not 
explain the size of the subsequent bias towards sampling procedures which have been 
replicated. Before accepting an explanation of these results based purely on hindsight bias 
the possibility of subjects utilising outcome information as a valid predictor of original 
experimental power must be considered. There is some justification in the view that an 
experiment finding a significant result has at least a high probability of having been powerful 
enough. As the probability of Type 1 error is equal to the pre-set significance level then the 
probability of an experiment with a significant result having had sufficient power is inversely 
proportional to this value (i.e. the probability that the significant result is not a Type 1 error). 
Similarly, a non-significant result would imply a probability that the experiment lacked 
power which was inversely proportional to the probability of Type 2 error. If this were the 
case and subjects were treating experimental results as probabilistic evidence of sufficient 
power, then there should be evidence of an increasing tendency to favour significant results 
in those scenarios where sufficient experimental power is in question; as compared to those 
known to have high power. There was no evidence for this trend in the results. In addition 
the tendency to favour significant results remained present in the outcome condition; 
specifically the quality of a significant result subsequently proved to be true was rated much 
higher than that of a non-significant result subsequently proved to be true. In this case there 
is no logical reason to differentiate between these results. 
It is worth noting that the replication of an experimental result increases the probability 
that this result reflects the true state of the world. This does not imply that any sampling 
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procedure finding the same result must have been a good procedure. For example, an 
experiment with very low power will have a high probability of producing a non-significant 
result (Type 2 error) which will always be replicated if no effect exists. Conversely, any 
experiment producing a Type 1 error will subsequently be replicated if a effect does exist. 
Therefore, this preference for significant results overall and towards replication in the long-
term outcome condition would appear to be clear evidence of bias. This bias involves the 
consideration of evidence (experimental outcome) which would not have been available to 
the designer when the experiment was designed and to this extent it is a form of hindsight 
bias. In addition the presence and strength of this bias is all the more remarkable as the 
evidence on which it was based is also not relevant to the judgement being made. 
Although these results appear to demonsu-ate failures in statistical rea.soning and cleiir 
influences of hindsight bias, alternative hypotheses may exist. Firstly the definition of what 
the experimenters had meant by "quality of the experimental design" may not have been 
sufficiently clear to prevent subjects from including the quality of the outcome in their 
judgements. Secondly, it was possible that these effects were specific to the statistical nature 
of the task; either subjects may have attempted (and failed) to make specific statistical 
calculations, rather than intuitive judgements, or subjects may have been confused by the 
apparent statistical complexity of the task. 
Despite these possible experimental problems it was apparent that at least in this case 
the evaluation of experimental designs was to a large extent biased by the presence of 
outcome information. In addition the size of this bias was dependent on the type of outcome 
information presented. Consequently, it was decided to run further experiments to explore 
the nature of these biases. In order to address the problems apparent in the present study 
these experiments would involve more detailed instructions clearly defining quality and 
using an equivalent task based on a betting scenario. In the proposed scenario for the next 
experiment all explicit references to statistical concepts will be removed as will any direct 
references to statistical significance levels in sampling descriptions. In addition the sixteen 
descriptions in the question booklet will be made shorter and more concise in order to make 
the task less confusing. 
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2.4 S U M M A R Y OF CHAPTER TWO 
Chapter 2 presented two experiments which developed out of an interest in the 
cognitive processes involved in the evaluation of experimental designs. Evaluation of the 
quality of an experimental design is a necessary stage in the general process of experimental 
design. Following the creation of a putative experimental design some form of assessment 
must take place to ensure that at least the experiment is testing the desired hypothesis. 
Ideally this evaluation should include specific determination of the probabilities of Type 1 
and Type 2 errors (in terms of choice of pre-set significance level and experimental power) 
and the balancing of these attributes against limitations of cost. Outside the design process it 
is also a commonly practised and necessary skill for students and researchers to evaluate the 
quality of the designs of others. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that during the design of psychology experiments only the 
minimum levels of evaluation were made. Subjects evaluated designs in terms of their 
appropriateness to test the hypothesis in question and checks were made for possible 
confounding variables and for the practicality of putative designs. Beyond this there was 
little evidence of formal evaluation of potential statistical validity. In general this led to the 
use of standardised significance levels and inappropriate choices of sample size (usually fai-
too low for sufficient experimental power). 
Given this failure of Experiment 1 to elicit formal evaluation of the statistical validity of 
experimental designs, it might be assumed that this form of evaluation rarely takes place. 
This view is supported by numerous reports in the literature of the failure of psychological 
research studies in general to utilise sufficient experimental power. (See Chapter 1, Section 
1.8.5) Nevertheless, the ability to judge the quality of an experimental design accurately is 
clearly an important skill for both researchers and students. If this skill is not evident in 
experimental design then it should at least to some extent be present in the assessment of 
published studies. Experiment 2 was therefore designed to reflect the evaluation processes 
necessary in peer review or Ph.D. examination where assessment is made of the quality of 
descriptions of existing sampling procedures. The results of Experiment 2 again 
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demonstrated little understanding of statistical validity and showed judgements of the quality 
of an experimental design to be largely influenced in hindsight by outcome information. 
Given this large influence of hindsight information it was necessary to make a complete 
review of current research into hindsight bias. This review is the subject of Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
A Review of hindsight bias 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Experiments 1 and 2 (reported in Chapter 2) showed that subjects were reluctant to 
make formal evaluations of the statistical validity of sampling procedures; either in the design 
of their own research or after the event in assessing existing studies. In Experiment 1 verbal 
protocols recorded during the design process showed very little evidence of any fonnal 
evaluation of the statistical validity of putative designs. In Experiment 2 subjects were 
forced to make a judgement of the quality of an experimental description. In this case 
subjects generally failed to make appropriate use of sample size and significance level 
information. Their final judgements relied to a large extent on information given relating to 
the outcome of the experiment that they were judging. 
Given this finding the present chapter reviews research on hindsight bias and includes 
a wider range of studies with findings related to the infiuences of hindsight informadon. 
Subsequent experiments presented in this thesis will be designed to extend the findings of 
these first two experiments in terms of hindsight bias in experimental evaluation. In addition 
these experiments will seek to extend knowledge of the influences of hindsight information 
in a new domain (judgements related to experimental designs) and using a new paradigm 
where outcome information has no direct relevance to the decision being made. 
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3.2 HINDSIGHT BIAS STUDIES 
Hindsight bias was first reported by Fischhoff (1975). This seminal study is 
remembered for its description of the "knew-it-all-along" effect which has become 
synonymous with hindsight bias. However, it is worth looking at this study in some detail 
as it described a number of effects related to the presence of outcome information which 
have not gained the same popular attention as the "knew-it-all-along" effect. This early 
study also used a piiradigm somewhat different from that which has now become the 
standard paradigm. 
Fischhoff (1975) reported three experiments. The first experiment presented subjects 
with descriptions of real life events. These descriptions either contained no information on 
their outcome or they presented information describing one of four mutually exclusive 
outcomes as the true outcome. Subjects were asked to rate the probability of the occurrence 
of each of the four possible outcomes. Results showed higher likelihood ratings where the 
outcome rated was the one which had been presented as true, compared to the rated 
likelihood where no outcome was presented. This is the familiar hindsight bias effect where 
if subjects know a true outcome they perceive this outcome to have been more likely all 
along. Subjects in this study were also asked to rate the relevance of specific sentences in 
the event description. These relevance scores were also influenced by the stated outcome in 
a way which may suggest a post hoc rationalisation of the biased probability scores. 
Generally sentences which supported the given outcome were perceived as being more 
relevant to the required probability judgement. 
Fischhoff s' second experiment was a replication of the first except that subjects given 
outcomes were asked to respond "as they would if they had not known the outcome" 
(Fischhoff, 1975 page 293). This instruction had no effect on hindsight bias; thus subjects 
were either unaware of the bias or, if aware they were unable to alter its effects. In a third 
experiment subjects were told that previous subjects had not been given outcome 
information, they were then required to respond as had these previous judges. This 
manipulation also had no effect on levels of hindsight bias. Overall these studies 
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demonstrated a number of effects associated with the presence of outcome information. 
Firstly, given outcome information judges will overestimate how likely this 'true' outcome 
would have appeared, either to themselves if they had not had this information or to others 
without this information. Secondly, judges are unaware of this effect or they are unable to 
control it. Finally, information supporting the given outcome will be seen as more relevant 
to the required judgement. 
These findings were extended by Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) in a study where 
subjects were asked to predict in advance the probability of a number of possible outcomes 
of a real life event. After the event had taken place subjects were asked to recall their original 
judgements; subjects remembered having given higher probabilities for those outcomes they 
believed to have occurred. Thus the effect of subjects overestimating what they would have 
known without outcome information can be extended to include an overestimation of what 
they did know before the outcome. Notably this study also demonstrated that hindsight bias 
also works in the opposite direction; lower probabilities were remembered for those 
outcomes t)elieved not to have occurred. Task definition is another important factor in this 
study. Whereas in the previous studies it was possible that subjects had interpreted the 
instructions to include current estimates of outcome likelihood, in this study subjects were 
clearly presented with a memory task in which they were required to recall their own original 
judgements. It is hard to imagine that they could have misunderstood this task. 
Since these early studies there have been a whole range of studies demonstrating 
consistently replicabie effects of hindsight over a varied range of tasks and conditions. The 
'memory' paradigm used by Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) has now largely become the 
standard paradigm: here subjects rate the probabilities of an outcome in foresight and at a 
later time attempt to reproduce these probabilities in hindsight. Studies have utilised 
subjects'judgements of the probability of the occurrence of a wide range of real life and 
artificial events. The presentation of hindsight information and subjects' subsequent 
attempts to reproduce their earlier judgements have followed after intervals varying from one 
day to several months. Hawkins and Hastie (1990) present a review of these studies. Tasks 
utilising this memory paradigm include the use of real life events such as Pennington's 
(1981) study before and after the Fireman's strike of 1977, Leary's (1982) study of 
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hindsight distortion in the 1980 U.S. presidential election and Powell's (1988) study using 
the 1984 U.S. presidential elections, to name but a few. In all these cases subjects had 
predicted the probability of various outcomes before the event. After the event subjects 
consistently overestimated the probability they had assigned to the actual outcome. 
Another common task involves the use of almanac information questions in the 
memory paradigm . Here subjects rate the probability that their answer is correct before and 
after receiving the actual correct answer. With numerous minor task variations this paradigm 
demonstrates a robust hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1977. Wood, 1978. Hasher etal. 1981. 
Hoch and Lowenstein, 1989.). In addition to these common tasks hindsight bias in memory 
of previous judgements has also been demonstrated in a number of more unusual areas such 
as; personal history (Ross and Conway, 1986) and the outcome of pregnancy tests 
(Pennington et al. 1980). 
The findings listed above are based on two different paradigms. In the original (on-
line) paradigm, subjects were presented with a 'true' outcome as a section of the original text 
and asked to estimate the likelihood of this outcome as if they had not received this 
information. Subjects consistently rated the given outcome as more likely when compared to 
control groups with no outcome information. In the second (memory) paradigm subjects are 
required to judge the likelihood of an outcome with no knowledge of what happened. At 
some point in the future they are then told the 'true' outcome and asked to recall their original 
judgement. It should be noted that although both these paradigms lead to what is commonly 
termed hindsight bias these are essentially two different effects. One is a bias of likelihood 
judgement the other is a bias of the memory of a likelihood judgement. The original 
paradigm which leads to a direct bias of judgement has been described as an "on-line' 
judgement task by Hastie and Park (1986) who argue for a distinction to be made between 
these tasks and memory based tasks as there is no clear evidence for any commonality in the 
causal relations underlying memory and judgement. 
Whilst the memory paradigm has the advantage of clarifying the task instructions and 
thus avoiding the need to ask subjects to ignore information already presented it is quite 
possible that the resulting bias results from different causal processes. Certainly it would be 
difficult to argue for the same motivational basis for these biases. In the case of on-line 
71 
judgements the effect could be due to a motivation for subjects to include outcome 
knowledge in an attempt to appear intelligent or knowledgeable. If a similar motivation was 
present in the memory paradigm it would be mediated by a monvaiion to accurately 
remember the original judgement. This would at least reduce the apparent size of any bias. 
In addition, in the memory paradigm the effect of hindsight bias may be significantly 
reduced by the subjects' ability to remember the original judgement. Both these mediating 
effects have been demonstrated by Hell et al. (1988) who explored the influences of 
motivation and memorability over time in memory based almanac type hindsight tasks. 
Although the results of this study ruled out purely motivational effects [as did an earlier 
study by Fischhoff (1977)] they did demonstrate that motivation to recall correctly reduced 
hindsight bias. By varying the factors influencing memorability of the original response 
they demonstrated a reduction of hindsight bias from 22% in a weak memory condition to 
only 3% where the memory trace is strong and well motivated. 
Hindsight bias has important and potendally very damaging effects on judgement 
depending upon the situation in which it arises. The focus on studies using the memory 
paradigm has led a number of researchers to underestimate both the size of the bias and its 
potentially damaging effects. In this paradigm the bias only affects the memory of an earlier 
judgement. This serves to make subjects overconfident in their own judgements and may 
limit the amount they learn from previous experience. However, in the on-line paradigm it is 
the judgement itself that is influenced by the bias and this may have serious consequences in 
a number of real life situations where outcome information is present. In addition to being 
of more practical importance the on-line paradigm would be expected to lead to larger biases 
as it is not subject to the mediating effects of memory and motivation to remember oudined 
above. The remaining sections of this chapter are concemed with hindsight based studies in 
areas which have considerable practical importance. 
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3.2.1 The inability to Ignore relevant information 
In Fischhoffs (1975) study subjects' perceived likelihood of an outcome was biased 
by the knowledge of the 'true' outcome presented on-line as part of the task description. 
This effect can be seen as an inabihty to ignore relevant information once it has been 
presented and includes the fact that subjects are unaware of having been influenced by this 
information. As suggested by Fischhoff (1977), this effect has real life implications 
particularly in terms of dealing with inadmissible evidence in the courtroom and is not 
reduced by telling subjects about the bias or exhorting them to try harder. A large number 
of studies have explored this inability to ignore inadmissible evidence; Wyer and Budesheim 
(1987), Wyer and Unversagt (1985), Schul and Burnstein (1985), Caretle and Moreland 
(1983), Werner et al. (1982), Tanford and Penrod (1982), Thompson et al. (1981), 
Horowitz et al (1980), Wolf and Montgomery (1977), Hans and Doob (1976), Hoiberg and 
Stires (1973), Sue et ah (1973), Doob and Kirshenbaum (1972). A l l these studies have 
demonstrated consistent influences of information which subjects have been asked to ignore. 
It should be noted that these effects relate to biases in judgements of the guilt of a third party 
rather than biases in likelihood judgements so far reported in the hindsight literature. In this 
respect these studies have more in common with 'outcome' bias studies and will be 
discussed in section 3.3 on outcome bias. 
3.2.2 Reverse hindsight effects 
A number of studies have demonstrated a reduction or possibly a reversal of the 
hindsight effect under conditions where the given outcome is perceived as very unlikely or 
surprising. Slovic and Fischhoff (1977) introduced the notion of surprisingness in 
hindsight using a number of tasks based on descriptions of experiments each of which had 
two possible outcomes. Subjects were asked to rate the probability of each of the two 
possible outcomes being replicated. Hindsight bias was found in ail conditions but 
hindsight effects were smaller for those results which subjects rated as more surprising. 
However, none of the outcome results in this series of experiments was particularly unlikely 
leading to only small differences in subjects' ratings of surprisingness. 
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In a more extreme real life case Verplanken and Pieters (1988) in a study of attitudes to 
nuclear power plants found that after the Chernobyl disaster subjects recalled their earlier 
judgements of the probability of a disaster as lower than they had been before the disaster. 
This result is in direct opposition to the usual hindsight effect. However, it should be noted 
that the result was in line with the official viewpoint consistently repeated in the media that 
the disaster was an extremely unlikely event resulting from a series of improbable 
coincidences and that "nobody could have known it was going to happen". 
A study by Mazursky and Ofir (1990) also claims a reversal of hindsight bias using a 
somewhat different procedure to previous studies. The experiments in this study used 
expected and post-exposure quality judgements as the dependent measure and manipulated 
the quality of various stimulus materials. Materials used were good and bad educational 
films, plastic suction hooks and graphics software packages. In each case the materials 
were rated for quality after subjects were given practical experience of them. The results 
showed that where subjects expected low quality materials and subsequently found high 
quality materials their estimate of what their original quality judgement might have been was 
divergent from their actual quality judgement. However, the results from this study are 
confounded by a number of factors. Mark and Mellor (1990) point to a possible contrast 
effect and also suggest effects may be due to the desire to rate one product as superior to 
another. It is difficult to compare this study with normal hinsdsight studies as subjects in 
these experiments did not make an original estimate of quality before they were exposed to 
the products. The comparison made was between an actual quality rating and an estimate of 
what an initial quality rating might have been. Both these ratings were made post-exposure. 
Both the previous studies claiming reversals of hindsight bias have introduced a new 
factor in terms of positive or negative outcome information. In earlier studies outcome 
information simply referred to whether a particular result had happened or a particular 
answer to a question was right and the required judgements were based on likelihood. 
These judgements have little or no personal importance to the subjects and the questions or 
scenarios they were based on were generally neither particularly negative or positive from 
the point of view of the subjects. In exception to this were the .studies related to political 
elections where presumably some of the subjects had strong preferences for one party or the 
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other. This would lead to individual beliefs of particular outcomes being highly negative or 
positive. Surprisingly this factor of personal preference does not appear to have been 
included in the analysis of any of these studies. Considering this factor it seems reasonable 
that a value laden outcome would influence the resulting hindsight bias. For example, in the 
Chernobyl scenario the event itself has very strong negative connotations. A subject 
following the normal hindsight pattern would suggest they knew the disaster was going to 
happen all along, in this case this would leave them in the uncomfortable position of having 
known and done nothing to prevent the disaster or warn others. Also a judgement that this 
event could have been foreseen by others is tantamount to an accusation of negligence of all 
parties concerned. This is clearly not comparable to the judgement facing subjects in the 
standard hindsight paradigm. 
The Mazursky and Ofir (1990) study described earlier in this section also included 
value laden outcomes although of a somewhat different form. In this case products were 
shown to be either good or bad in practical demonstrations. It is important to note that the 
results showed differential biases for these positive and negative outcomes although the 
authors do not discuss these. In fact the 'reverse' hindsight effect was only demonstrated 
where initial expectations were negative and the subsequent outcome was unexpectedly 
positive. The methodology of this study has a great deal in common with what have come to 
be known as 'outcome bias' studies and these results are not unusual when looked at from 
an outcome bias point of view where the subjective value of the outcome is the major 
determinant of the resulting bias. 
These effects also have a great deal in common with belief bias effects. Possible 
theoretical links between outcome information and belief bias will be discussed at length in 
Chapter 6. 
75 
3.3 O U T C O M E BIAS STUDIES 
It is difficult to make a clear distinction between hindsight bias studies and outcome 
bias studies and there is considerable confusion and overiap within the literature. Outcome 
bias studies generally involve the use of on-line paradigms where outcome information is 
presented along with information on which the subsequent judgement is to be made. In 
addition, outcome bias studies utilise judgements other than outcome probabilities. 
Nevertheless, these two factors alone do not prove that an outcome bias effect is 
fundamentally different to the hindsight bias effect in terms of underiying processes. In a 
number of cases (e.g. Mazursky and Ofir (1990) cited earlier) studies describing effects as 
hindsight bias fall within these criteria. Within this section the terms outcome bias and 
hindsight bias follow the relevant authors' usage, possible definitions and differences 
between these two biases are discussed later. 
There are methodological problems within both the hindsight bias paradigms discussed 
eariier. In the on-line paradigm there are a number of problems which relate to the fact that 
hindsight information presented as the outcome of a set of events or questions is relevant and 
useful information. As Hawkins and Hastie (1990) point out, where outcome information is 
relevant to the original judgement it is a rational response to change beliefs in the light of this 
new information. In addition it would not be surprising if subjects were confused in 
paradigms where relevant outcome information is presented by the experimenter along with 
the instruction to ignore this same information. If this information is to be ignored there is 
little justification for the experimenter presenting it. Outcome bias studies eliminate these 
methodological problems. They differ in that there are generally much clearer logical 
reasons for ignoring the biasing infomiation or alternatively this information is not direcUy 
relevant to the decision required. 
There are a number of studies where there are clear reasons for subjects to ignore 
information which has been presented to them, for example, the courtroom based 
inadmissible evidence scenarios described earlier. The results of these studies are generally 
described in terms of hindsight bias, despite the fact that the scenarios involve on-line 
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presentation of information to be disregarded and the required judgement is not one of 
likelihood. In these respects these studies have a great deal in common with outcome 
studies. The inadmissible evidence in these cases may be true or false and has been 
purposely introduced in an attempt to bias the jurors (subjects) who are aware that they 
should try to avoid this bias. In these tasks subjects have clear logical reasons for ignoring 
this information and yet this information still influences judgements of the guilt of a third 
party. Whilst these studies show the inability of subjects to ignore any information deemed 
as relevant to the required decision, the bias in these cases does not specifically relate to 
outcome information. 
In a study relating to actual outcome information Lipshitz (1989) has shown that 
judgements of the correctness of the actions of others are strongly biased by the outcomes of 
these actions. This study presented subjects with descriptions of the actions of officers of 
the Israeli defence forces in which the officer made a decision either to obey or disobey 
orders. The subsequent description of events included outcome information in terms of 
either success or failure of the mission in question. Subjects evaluating the decision made by 
the officer were influenced more by the eventual success or failure of actions based on the 
decision than by the decision itself In this case it is clear that the decision maker could not 
know the final outcome at the time the decision had to be made and thus in order to be 
impartial subjects should ignore this information. In judging the quality of the decision by 
its outcome subjects overestimate the knowledge of the decision maker. In this study there 
was some possible justification for the bias shown by subjects as it was clear from the 
experimental descriptions of events that the officer in question had a great deal more 
information at his disposal than was presented to the subjects. Under these conditions it was 
possible that the officer was in a better position to judge the outcome of his decision and that 
subjects'judgements reflect this belief Therefore, it could still be argued that hindsight bias 
is simply an inability to ignore relevant information even though the effect shows a gross 
exaggeration of the importance of this information relative to any other relevant factors. 
There are however a small number of studies which have demonstrated that outcome 
information which has no logical relevance to the judgement task will still influence 
judgements. Mitchell and Kalb (1981) have shown that a supervisors' evaluation of a 
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nurses' performance is influenced by the outcome of the nurses' actions. In this study 
exactly the same action by a nurse was presented as either having a benign outcome (no 
harm to the patient) or a negative outcome in which the patient was harmed. Results showed 
that subjects with outcome knowledge rated given outcomes as more probable in all cases. 
In the case of negative outcomes supervisors not only evaluated the nurses' performance as 
worse but also held the nurse more responsible for the behaviour. Baron and Hershey 
(1988) reported five studies in which subjects rated the quality of decisions made by others. 
The rated decisions were based on either medical matters or monetary gambles. In each case 
subjects rated the decision maker as more competent and their thinking as better when the 
outcome of the decision was favourable, despite the fact that when asked, subjects felt that 
they should not consider the outcome when making these evaluations. 
In both the above studies the outcome information was not relevant to the judgement 
being made yet still had a significant influence on that judgement. Baron and Hershey 
(1988) refer to this direct effect of outcome infomiation on the evaluation of decisions as 
"outcome bias" (page 569) and see it as a separate effect working in addition to hindsight 
bias; they suggest that this effect "does not operate on a judges assessed probabilities of 
outcomes" (page 570) and as such it is distinct from hindsight bias. However, as we have 
seen from Fischhoffs (1975) studies, hindsight effects include more than a simple 
exaggeration of assessed likelihood. In these studies outcome information also affected the 
perceived relevance of factors supporting the given outcome; thus even from this early stage 
of the research there is evidence of a more pervasive effect in which subjects bias more than 
simple estimates of likelihood. 
In all probability "outcome bias" is simply hindsight bias seen from another point of 
view. In outcome bias the subjects' biased viewpoint is attributed as being available to the 
decision maker before the outcome is known. Thus the issue is whether the decision maker 
could have reasonably been expected to predict the given outcome beforehand. Surely this is 
exactly the effect seen in standard hindsight paradigms; an overesiimation, given the 
outcome, of the prior predictability of that outcome. This overestimation of prior 
predictability remains the same whether it is reflected in the belief that your own prior 
estimate was different, or the belief that another persons' prior estimate should have been 
78 
different; an "I knew it all along and they should have known it all along too' effect. A very 
similar effect has already been described by Fischhoff (1975) in the condition where subjects 
were asked to respond in the way they expected previous subjects who had not been given 
outcome informadon would have responded. In this condition the hindsight bias had the 
effect of overestimating the knowledge attributed to others in exactly the same way as is seen 
in these outcome bias studies. 
The differendal influence of positive and negative outcomes in these studies is also 
mirrored in eariy hindsight studies. As described earlier Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) 
demonstrated that hindsight bias also works in the opposite direcfion; lower probabilifies 
were remembered for those outcomes believed not to have occurred. 
3.3.1 Outcome information as feedback 
The concern that any form of outcome information may supply useful feedback on 
some aspect of the given problem was explored by Hoch and Lowenstein (1989) who 
analysed the extent to which outcome feedback is information in its own right. They suggest 
"people can extract diagnostic information from feedback despite overestimating what they 
would have known in foresight" (page 605). In these studies feedback was shown to 
facilitate accurate performance on a series of difficult trivia questions (no effect was found 
for medium or easy quesuons) by enabling subjects to assess general item difficulty. 
However this facilitation of the accuracy of judged probabilities of correct or incoirect 
answers did not preclude the additional presence of hindsight bias. Also this facilitation was 
not present in experiments using insight problems where the strength of hindsight bias 
effects overwhelmed any effect of information feedback. 
It should be noted that this feedback facilitadon effect can only occur where outcomes 
tire given for a consistent series of repeated questions of a particular type and difficulty. In 
outcome bias studies where a single judgement is made on the basis of the outcome of one 
set of events this feedback effect would not be possible. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
note the possibility that gross overesfimation of the diagnostic value of a single outcome 
could be a contributory factor in outcome bias effects. A judgement which is unreasonable 
when based on a single outcome would be perfectly reasonable if based on a large number of 
79 
similar outcomes; this could be seen as an extreme case of subjects failing to apply the law of 
large numbers. 
3.4 P R A C T I C A L R E L E V A N C E OF HINDSIGHT BIAS EFFECTS 
Recently Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) have called into question the 
practical significance of hindsight bias. In a meta-analysis of hindsight studies, mosfly 
using the standard piiradigms, they report a consistent but small (r = . 17) effect of hindsight 
bias. (See Appendix 7 for a definition of the measure of effect sizes used in this study and 
also used in the present experimental results.) They also argue that 'the use of "almanac" 
questions can generate an unusually large hindsight effect' (page 147). This leads to the 
impression that in real life only a small proportion of decisions are influenced by hindsight 
bias. However, this meta-analysis does not consider the more ecologically valid outcome 
bias studies as a separate case from studies using the standard hindsight paradigm, although 
in these cases outcome bias persists in evaluations of others' decisions even when the 
outcome information is not relevant to the original decision. These effects may be a great 
deal more pervasive and of a much greater practical significance than the effects seen in the 
standard hindsight paradigm and may have been lost in the process of averaging across a 
large number of different studies. Unfortunately, there are no direct measures of effect sizes 
in any of these reported outcome bias studies and thus they cannot be direcdy compared with 
the effects related to the standard hindsight paradigm. However, there is evidence that 
motivation and memorability severely limit the size of hindsight effects in the memory 
paradigm (Hell et al., 1988, as reported in section 3.2), therefore it is likely that effect sizes 
would be significantly larger in outcome bias paradigms. Indeed in all the outcome bias 
studies described above, outcome information had a large enough effect for it to be the major 
determinant of subjects' final judgements. 
At a practical level the nature of the outcome alone made the difference between 
promotion or disciplinary action for officers in the Lipshitz (1989) study. In addition, it 
seems probable that the perceived importance or utility of a particular outcome may increase 
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the size of any resulting bias. This is suggested in the Baron and Hershey (1988) study 
where subjects strongly defended the importance of outcomes in a condition where a 
doctors' decision may result in the death of the patient. However, analysis of outcome 
salience has not been reported in the literature so far. 
3.5 R E L A T E D E F F E C T S 
Effects relating to the presence of outcome information have a number of parallels in 
other reseai-ch areas; these will be briefly enumerated here but only discussed in full at a later 
stage in the theoretical discussion of the results of the subsequent experiments. 
Research relating to overconfidence where subjects consistently rate their own 
judgements to be better thiin they actually are has obvious similarities to hindsight effects 
where subjects consistently rate their own judgements to be belter than they actually were. 
In both these cases the biases serve to support a view of the world in which the subject 
performs belter than is actually the case. This view is also supported by reconstructive 
remembering where subjects alter their memories of past events to fit in with their current 
beliefs. This can be seen as a form of post-hoc rationalisation in the same way as subjects 
attribute higher relevance to those factors supporting known outcomes in hindsight. Another 
effect which serves to support a biased view of the world is the Halo effect. In this effect 
subjects attribute greater skill or intelligence to people they rate as more physically attractive. 
The Halo effect can also be seen as an inability to ignore any form of irrelevant information 
which parallels the inabihty to ignore any form of inadmissible evidence seen in courtroom 
based hindsight studies. 
81 
3.6 S U M M A R Y OF CHAPTER T H R E E 
Chapter 3 reviewed literature related to hindsight and outcome biases. This review 
showed that effects associated with the presence of hindsight information go beyond the 
commonly recognised 'knew it all along' effect. This well known effect has most often 
been demonstrated in a memory paradigm. In this paradigm subjects' memories of 
likelihood judgements made in foresight ai-e shown to be biased in hindsight after the actual 
outcome is known. This hindsight bias leads subjects to overestimate the likelihood they 
originally assigned to what they now know to be the true outcome (and to underestimate the 
likelihood they originally assigned to any false outcomes). 
Other related effects which have been discussed include overestimation (in hindsight) 
of judgements of the relevance of information supporting a given outcome. The persistence 
of these effects is shown by subjects' inability to ignore relevant outcome information, 
despite direct instruction and strong motivation. Reverse hindsight effects have also been 
discussed. These seemingly paradoxical effects occur in certain specific cases where, in 
hindsight, subjects underestimate their earlier likelihood estimates. Comparisons were 
drawn between these effects and the effects seen in outcome bias studies and an explanation 
of these effects in terms of subjects' motivation was suggested. 
In the second part of Chapter 3 outcome bias studies were reviewed. Effects described 
as outcome bias were shown to generally relate to value judgements of the actions of others, 
made after the outcome of these actions was known. A number of direct parallels were 
drawn between these effects and hindsight bias effects and it was suggested that hindsight 
bias might be a specific case of a more general and all inclusive outcome bias. Some 
important differences between the paradigms used in hindsight and outcome bias studies 
were also noted. It was shown that the more ecologically valid paradigms used in outcome 
bias studies generally resulted in larger biases than those reported in hindsight paradigms. 
In addition, the size of these effects and whether they were positive or negative was shown 
to depend to some degree on the specific nature of the outcome information provided. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Studies showing the effects of outcome information on judgements of the 
quality of sampling procedures 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The two initial studies reported in Chapter 2 demonstrated a number of practical 
problems associated with designing Psychology experiments. In the first study a pervasive 
lack of critical evaluation of putative experimental designs was demonstrated. The second 
study confirmed that failures of statistical evaluation were not limited to the design process 
but were also present when subjects were specifically directed to evaluate existing designs. 
This second finding ruled out the possibility that deficiencies in the design process were due 
to some form of satisficing or errors of oversight and implied a general inability to accurately 
evaluate as the causal factor. In addition. Experiment 2 demonstrated that judgements of the 
quality of a sampling procedure are strongly biased towards favourable outcome 
information. 
In the light of these results Chapter 3 described hindsight bias and focused on a 
number of effects specifically associated with the presence of outcome information. This 
research implied the possibility that using salient outcome information in an on-line paradigm 
would result in biases consistently larger than the average reported hindsight bias. The 
practical importance of this potential bias in the evaluation of existing experimental designs 
lies in such areas as the peer review of journal articles or the examination of Ph.D. theses 
which may be largely influenced by the presence of positive or negative experimental 
outcomes. 
The experiments presented in this chapter were designed to explore the extent to which 
different experimental outcomes influence judgements of the quality of experimental design. 
In addition to the practical importance of making reviewers and examiners aware of potential 
sources of bias, the use of experimental results as outcome information also creates a 
particularly useful paradigm. In previous outcome bias studies subjects judged the actions 
or decisions of a third party after the event when the outcome was known. In these previous 
studies subjects should ignore the outcome information as it was not available to the third 
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party in question at the time the action or decision was made. Thus in these cases biased 
judgements based on outcome information imply 'they should have known it all along'. 
However, in these experiments the nature of the outcome was inevitably relevant to the 
judgement being made and this relevance weakens the argument that the inclusion of 
outcome information is a true bias. In all these experiments subjects were given a brief 
description of a previous event clearly containing less information than would be available to 
the third party acting in the real world. Thus it could be argued that it was reasonable for 
subjects to assimilate this information in any judgement of the actions of a third party where 
they could assume that the third party was privy to more information. Thus the effect 
becomes 'they should have known it all along because they had more information than I 
have'. 
The use of an experimental design paradigm where the outcome information is the 
subsequent experimental result precludes this more reasonable explanation of outcome bias 
for two reasons. Firstly, in an experiment, the result (initial outcome) may be significant or 
non-significant and either of these results may truly reflect the state of the worid. Thus the 
statistical result alone has no relevance to the quality of the experimental design; a well 
designed experiment might have either result depending on whether an effect exists in the 
worid or not. The taith or otherwise of this initial result can never be guaranteed but the 
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probability of it reflecting the true state of the worid can be refined by replication. Thus 
replication suggests four possible "long-term outcomes"; true significant or non-significant 
results or false significant or non-significant results. Secondly, the probability of each of the 
false results (Type 1 and Type 2 errors) is defined by the design factors within the 
experiment. Thus a subject who is aware of these factors can be certain that they have 
exactly the same informadon as that available to the original designer of the experiment. 
Therefore the present paradigm utilises outcome information irrelevant to the judgement 
being made and in addidon ensures all possible relevant information is available to the 
person making the judgement. 
Where long term outcomes (replication information) are available the judge has more 
information than the original designer and thus it cannot be argued that the designer should 
have 'known it all along'. However, this information is also not directly relevant to the 
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initial design quality. Having accepted predetermined probabilities of Type 1 and Type 2 
errors the designer has specified the likelihood of a false outcome; it would therefore be 
unreasonable to treat the chance occurrence of a false outcome as a design fault. 
The following studies presented subjects with descriptions of sampling procedures 
including either initial outcome information alone or both initial outcome and long term 
outcome information. The inclusion of long-term outcome (replication) information enabled 
an exploration of the relative influences of positive and negative outcomes which was 
unavailable to previous outcome bias studies as the initial outcome can either be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by subsequent replication information. 
4.2 EXPERIMENT T H R E E 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This experiment was designed to further explore the effects of outcome information on 
judgements of the quality of experimental sampling procedures first demonstrated in 
Experiment 2. 
In the design of this experiment a number of potential problems first identified in the 
discussion of Experiment 2 (Section 2.3.4) were addressed. Firstly the definition of what 
the experimenters had meant by "quality of the experimental design" had not been 
sufficiently clear to prevent subjects from including the quality of the outcome in their 
judgements. Secondly it was possible that these effects were specific to the statistical nature 
of the task; either subjects may have attempted (and failed) to make specific statistical 
calculations rather than intuitive judgements, or subjects may have been put off by the 
apparent statistical complexity of the task. Thirdly it was possible that the specific research 
methods or statistics teaching which these students had received had in some way influenced 
the results and that they may have chosen a specific strategy of error minimisation regardless 
of cost. 
It was decided therefore to run an experiment with more detailed instructions, clearly 
defining quality. The definition presented to the subjects emphasised that a sampling 
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procedure of high quality was one which had a high probability of determining a true result 
without incurring excessive cost (see appendix three). In order to prevent the potential 
problems associated with the statistical nature of the task this experiment utilised a task based 
on a beuing scenario in which all explicit references to statisdcal concepts were removed. 
Nevertheless, the sampling procedure described in this betting scenario was a direct 
equivalent of the experiments described in the previous study with the exception of the 
presentadon of percentage differences instead of pre-set significance levels. Direct reference 
to slatisdcal significance levels was therefore removed from sampling descripdons. The 
effects of this Vciriation will be addressed in the discussion secdon. In addition the sixteen 
descriptions in the quesUon booklet were made shorter and more concise in order to make 
the task less confusing and more emphasis was put on the cost of large samples to cue the 
need for cost-benefit judgements. The need for consideration of cost was mentioned in both 
the scenario and formally stated in the definidon of quality. 
4.2.2 Method 
Subjects and task 
Subjects were 90 first year psychology undergraduates at the university of Plymouth. 
The experiment took place at the beginning of their first year before any research methods or 
statistics lectures had been completed. 
Materials and design 
Materials comprised an instrucdon sheet and a question booklet. The instrucdons 
contained an introducdon followed by a scenario descripdon (See Appendix 3). Having read 
the instructions subjects were presented with a booklet containing sixteen short descripdons 
of experiments. For half the subjects these descriptions were followed by long term 
outcome information. Subjects were required to make a judgement of the quality of the 
sampling procedure described in each case. 
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Scenario and instructions were as follows; 
Introduction 
The following descripiion and scries of questions are designed to study understanding of 
the concept of quality in experimental sampling. 
Your co-operation in this experiment is greatly appreciated, and the results should be of 
use to you as they will demonstrate general levels of understanding of sampling principles. 
Results and explanations will be made available as soon as possible. 
You do not need to put your name on the answer sheets but please print your name on 
this instruction sheet and hand it back separately at the end. 
S c e n a r i o 
A worker in a roulette wheel factory had been bribed to produce a number of wheels in 
which the slots for even numbers were slightly larger than those for odd numbers. 
It was the intention of a well financed team of fraudsters to bet heavily on even numbers 
on the biased wheels. Half the casinos ordering new wheels had received the biased wheels. 
However due to security measures it was impossible for the team to find out which of these 
casinos received true or biased wheels. 
It was decided that each member of the team would go to a different casino and make a 
number of small bets whilst counting the number of even wins to see whether the new wheel 
was one of the biased ones. Simply standing at the table without betting was regarded as too 
suspicious as casino security consistently video and study behaviour at roulette tables. If it 
was decided that the wheel was biased towards even numbers then the rest of the team would 
return to make a great number of large bets on even numbers. 
Tests involving extensive counting of even wins can be very expensive to run and 
dangerous in terms of alerting the casino to a specific interest in the roulette wheel. The 
potential cost of the larger bets is high. 
Test bets 
In initial tests sampling methods varied between individuals. Different numbers of spins 
were counted and there were also differences in the percentage of even number wins which were 
regarded as sufficient evidence of a biased table. On an unbiased table even numbers have a 
50% probability of winning if zero wins are disregarded; biased tables have a greater probability 
of even wins. Below are a series of descriptions of the tests used by different team members. 
Task 
Your task is to read each description and give an intuitive estimate of the quality of the 
test for a biased roulette wheel by writing a percentage mark (from 0 to 100) in the space 
provided. 
A test of high quality is one which has a high probability of 
differentiating whether a table is truly biased or not without incurring 
excessive cost. 
Please try to use the whole range of marks. 
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A typical example of a sampling procedure description for the group not given long 
term outcome information is shown below. 
In the Monte Carlo Grand casino 300 spins of the rouleue wheel were counted. The team 
member involved decided to regard anything higher than 56% even wins as sufficient evidence of 
a biased table. A bias lo even numbers was found. 
Descriptions of sampling procedures remained constant across the different quesdons 
with only the casino name, the number of spins (300 or 700) and the percentage even wins 
(54% or 56%) varying in each case. For subjects receiving long term outcome information 
each descripdon was followed by a description of an outcome. 
For complete details of all quesdons see Appendix 3. 
Design and procedures 
The experimental design and procedures were roughly equivalent to the previous 
experiment. Two levels of sample size were presented with either 300 or 700 spins of the 
roulette wheel being counted. Two levels of even number wins regarded as significant 
evidence of bias were presented (56% or 54%). The use of percentage values in this case 
meant that the calculadon of equivalent significance levels was now interactive with sample 
size. 
As in experiment two subjects were presented with either one or two levels of outcome 
information. In this case the initial result was whether a bias to even numbers was found or 
not. The long term outcome information again reflected whether the initial sampling result 
was subsequently shown to be correct or subsequently shown to be false. As before the 
dependent variable was the subjects' intuitive judgement of the quality of each test; however 
this was now defined cleariy in the instructions. 
Thus three experimental factors (each with two levels) were varied on a within subjects 
basis. These factors were: number of spins (700 or 300), percentage even wins regarded as 
significant evidence (54 or 56) and initial result (bias found or no bias found). The 
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counterbalancing of these four factors within a standard experimental description created 
sixteen different sampling procedures presented to the subjects. 
As in experiment two the presence of long-term outcome information was manipulated 
as a between subjects factor (45 subjects receiving long term outcome information and 45 
receiving only the initial result). For those subjects receiving long-term outcome the 
interaction of long term outcome information with the initial experimental result created four 
different possible overall outcomes. These long-term outcomes were presented as follows: 
Outcome : Subsequent large bets confirmed this wheel to be biased. The wheel has made large 
profits for the team. 
Outcome : Subsequent belting by customers confirmed this finding. The table was not biased. 
Outcome : Subsequent large bets by the team however showed no evidence of bias. A 
significant amount of money was lost. 
Outcome : The team did not go ahead with large scale bets. However subsequent betting by 
customers did show a bias towards even numbers and the wheel was eventually replaced. 
As in experiment 2 it was possible to utilise an overall five factor analysis in which the 
presence of long-term outcome information was a between subjects factor. This meant that 
the nature of long-term outcome (experimental result subsequently shown to be correct or 
subsequently shown to be false) was analysed as a within subjects factor but was a mock 
factor for the group of subjects not receiving this information. 
A normative analysis of the probability of the results of these sampling procedures to 
be due to Type one error gave the following results: 
300 spins with 54% even wins - p = 0.836 
300 spins with 56% even wins - p = 0.019 
700 spins with 54% even wins - p = 0.017 
700 spins with 56% even wins - p = 0.0007 
The sampling procedures used in the experimental tasks were designed specifically to 
produce this range of normative results. The sampling procedure with 300 spins and 54% 
wins has an unacceptably large probability of Type 1 error; thus this finding should not be 
relied on as evidence of a biased wheel. Both the sampling procedures with 300 spins and 
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56% wins, and those with 700 spins and 54% wins, have acceptable probabilities of Type 1 
error; either of these results constitutes acceptable evidence of a biased wheel. The sampling 
procedure with 700 spins and 56% wins has a very low probability of Type 1 error and thus 
is acceptable evidence of a biased wheel. However, it should also be remembered that 
procedures using 700 spins have higher sampling costs than those using 300 spins. In 
addidon procedures with lower sample sizes and/or higher percentage differences will result 
in higher probabilities of Type 2 error. As the size of the bias in biased wheels (the effect 
size) is not defined in this model it is not possible to calculate exact values for the probability 
of Type 2 errors. 
4.2.3 Results 
A number of subjects handed in incomplete question booklets and these could not be 
included in the analysis; this left 73 subjects overall, 29 in the long term outcome condition 
and 44 in the no long term outcome condition. As in the previous experiment an overall five 
factor Anova was performed. 
4.2.3.1 Influences of all factors 
A five factor Anova was performed with four within subjects factors (subject numbers, 
pre-set significance level, inidal result and long term outcome) the fifth factor the presence or 
absence of long-tenn outcome information being between subjects. As in the previous 
experiment effect sizes for main effects were calculated following the recommendations of 
Cohen (1988) and are quoted in square brackets. 
In this overall analysis both number of spins (F = 24.4, p = 0.0001) [r = 0.22] and 
percentage even wins (F = 29.4, p = 0.0001) [r = 0.22] had significant influences on quality 
ratings. Sampling procedures with higher sample sizes were rated as having higher quality; 
as were those with higher percentage wins. 
In this overall analysis the experimental result had no significant effect on quality 
ratings (F = 0.6, p = 0.8). However, there was a strong effect of long-term outcome 
information (F = 25.5, p = 0.0001) and a significant interaction between the inidal result and 
long-term outcome (F = 12.5, p = 0.0007). As in Experiment 2 the influence of these 
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effects was masked by the fact that in this overall analysis the nature of long-term outcome 
infonnation was a mock factor for one subject group. In order to gain a clearer picture of 
the influences of these factors it was necessary to perform separate analyses of the two 
different subject groups (those receiving and those not receiving long-term outcome 
information). iMeans for all the factors in the overall analysis are shown in Table 4.1. 
The complete Anova table can be seen in Appendix 3. 
Table 4.1 
Means table for overall analvsis - Experiment 3 
(Standard deviations in brackets) 
300 Spins 700 Spins 
56% 54% 56% 54% 
difference diffensnce difference difference 
True Bias found 4 6 . 9 43 .4 57 .0 5 3 . 9 
Result (20.7) (21.4) (22.8) (23.4) 
No (Mock No bias 4 3 . 3 4 0 . 1 5 2 . 4 4 9 . 7 
outcome factor) found (16.9) (16.5) (21.6) (21.2) 
information False Bias found 46 .0 4 2 . 7 5 9 . 3 54 .2 
given Result (19.7) (21.4) (23.8) (22.1) 
(Mock No bias 47 .1 3 9 . 3 53 .0 5 1 . 9 
factor) found (17.4) (17.6) (22.0) (21.0) 
Bias found 67 .2 5 7 . 5 69 .1 6 5 . 3 
True (16.4) (21.0) (17.0) (18.5) 
Result No bias 62,4 53 .1 70 .1 6 1 . 9 
Outcome found (16.0) (15.5) (15.1) (20.7) 
information Bias found 47 .0 40 .1 5 0 . 8 41 .0 
given False (21.0) (23.7) (26.1) (22.1) 
Result No bias 55 .1 45 .2 6 0 . 5 51 .2 
found (I8.I) (18.5) (16.0) (19.2) 
4.2.3.2 Analysis for subject group receiving experimental result only 
An Anova was performed on the data for those subjects who did not receive long-term 
outcome information (N = 44) this had three within subjects factors (number of spins, 
percentage even wins and initial result). 
In this analysis (as in the overall analysis) both number of spins (F = 23.3, p = 
0.0001) and percentage even wins (F = 12.0, p = 0.00 i) had significant influences on 
quality ratings. Sampling procedures with higher sample sizes were rated as having higher 
quality; as were those with higher percentage wins. 
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The effect of experimental result failed to achieve significance (F = 3.0 p = 0.08). 
However it should be noted that the factor "experimental result" could only be analysed for 
the subject group not receiving outcome information (n = 44). Thus, this analysis had 
limited experimental power and given that the potendal effect of this factor might be small 
there is a strong possibility that this result is a Type 2 error. There were no other significant 
differences. (See Appendix 3 for full Anova table) 
4.2.3.3 Analysis for subject group receiving experimental result and long-
term outcome information 
An Anova was performed on the data for those subjects who did receive long-term 
outcome (replication) information (n = 29); this had four within subjects factors (number of 
spins, percentage even wins, initial result and long-term outcome). 
In this analysis (as in both previous analyses) both number of spins (F = 6.0, 
p = 0.02) and percentage even wins (F = 14.2, p = 0.0008) had significant influences on 
quality ratings. As before sampling procedures with higher sample sizes were rated as 
having higher quality; as were those with higher percentage even wins. 
For those subjects given long term outcome information experimental result alone did 
not significandy influence quality radngs (F = 1.6, p = 0.21). However there was a 
significant main effect of long-term outcome (F = 21.1, p = 0.0001) [r = 0.37] with 
experimental results which had been replicated attracting higher quality radngs than those 
which were not replicated. The interaction between experimental result and long term 
outcome was also significant (F = 8.5 p = 0.006). This interacdon can be seen graphically 
in Figure 4.1. The interaction shows that the highest quality radngs were associated with 
those cases where a bias was found and this result was subsequently shown to have been 
correct. The same initial result subsequently shown to have been false attracted the lowest 
quality raUngs. Where no bias was found initially the long-term outcome had considerably 
less differential effect. 
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Figure 4.1 












Bias found No Bias 
Initial Result 
N.B. The terms correct and incorrect refer to the nature of the long-term outcome information 
(either confirming or discomfirming the initial result) 
4.2.4 Discussion of Experiment Three 
Experiment 3 showed parallel results to those of Experiment 2 despite the changes in 
instructions and task and despite the stadstical naivete of the subjects. In both cases sample 
size was a strong influence on quality ratings. There was an effect in Experiment 2 of 
subjects giving higher ratings to experiments with smaller significance levels. Although this 
factor was not present in Experiment 3, a similar strategy can be seen in relation to subjects' 
higher ratings of experiments with larger effect sizes. In both these cases these choices are 
consistent with a desire to minimise probabilides of error without reference to potendal 
costs. This su-ategy has persisted in Experiment 3 despite clear cues to the importance of the 
cost of samphng in the scenario and direct instructions to consider cost in the definition of 
quality. The details of this apparent strategy and its implicadons will be discussed further in 
the overall discussion at the end of this chapter. 
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The effects of initial and long-term outcome information in Experiment 3 are directly 
comparable to those in Experiment 2 and appear largely unchanged despite the task 
differences. 
4.3 E X P E R I M E N T FOUR 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Experiments 2 and 3 had used subjects drawn from subsequent first year psychology 
courses at Plymouth University. Although these subjects had different levels of statistical 
training the effects of outcome information were the same for both groups. These results 
were therefore open to the criticism that they were due to either statistical naivety or specific 
failures in teaching in the psychology department. It was decided therefore to perform a 
partial replication of Experiment 3 using experienced second and third year statistics students 
as subjects. These subjects had received entirely separate training in research methods 
(taught by different staff) to either of the previous subject groups and were considerably 
more expert in statistics. As there was a small number of available subjects for this 
experiment it was decided to run them all in the long-term outcome condition. This enabled 
results to be comparable with the previous long-term outcome groups and lost very little 
other information. 
4.3.2 Method 
Subjects and task 
Subjects were 40 second and third year mathematics and statistics undergraduates at 
the University of Plymouth. The experiment took place at the start of a combined statistics 
lecture. A l l subjects were volunteers. 
Materials and design 
The experimental materials, design and procedures were exactly the same as those for 
the outcome group in the previous experiment. (See Section 4.2.2) 
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4.3.3 Results 
A l l subjects were given long term outcome informadon. An Anova was performed on 
the data. There were four within subjects factors (number of spins, percentage even wins, 
inidal result and long-term outcome). In this analysis number of spins (F = 22.2, 
p = 0.000l)[r = 0.28] had a significant influence on quality radngs. As before, sampling 
procedures with higher sample sizes were rated as having higher quality. However, in this 
case the effect of percentage even wins failed to achieve significance (F = 0.4, p = 0.55)[r = 
0.09] . 
As in the long-term outcome group of Experiment 3; experimental result alone did not 
significandy influence quality ratings (F = 10.1, p = 0.76). Again there was a significant 
main effect of long-term outcome (F = 23.3, p = 0.0001) [r = 0.32] with experimental 
results which had been replicated attracdng higher quality ratings than those which were not 
replicated. The interacdon between experimental result and long-term outcome was also 
significant (F = 4.7, p = 0.03). This interacdon can be seen graphically in Figure 4.2 and is 















B ias found No Bias found 
Initial result 
N.B. The terms correct and incorrect refer to the nature of the long-term outcome information 
(either confirming or discomfirming the Initial result) 
4.3.3.1 Additional comparative analysis 
As Experiments 3 and 4 had exactly the same instructions and tasks (in the outcome 
condition) it was possible to compare their results on a between subjects basis. An Anova 
was performed on the data from both these groups using the different subject groups as a 
between subjects factor. This analysis showed no significant differences between the 
statistically naive subjects (Experiment 3) and the statistically expert subjects (Experiment 4) 
for the effects of number of spins, or for the initial result / long term outcome interaction. It 
was not the intention to draw the inference that these groups were the same from a failure to 
achieve significance in this analysis. However, it was necessary to check for the possibihty 
that the effects of outcome information would be significantly reduced by statistical 
expertise. There was one difference in the way in which these two groups used the 
information presented in the tasks, this was demonstrated by a significant interaction 
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between the percentage differences and the subject groups, F = 4.88, p = 0.03. The graph 
of this interaction is shown in Figure 4.3. (For complete Anova table see Appendix 3) 
Figure 4.3 


















From this graph it can be seen that the statistically naive psychology subjects utilise the 
percentage of even wins as a strong indicator of the quality of a sampling procedure. The 
more statistically expert subjects are considerably less influenced by this factor. It is difficult 
to find a logical reason for this difference in strategy. The normative analysis shows the 
probability of error in these procedures to be based on the interaction of sample size (number 
of spins) and the percentage even wins. (See section 4.2.2) This would suggest that the 
statistically naive subjects might be using a more appropriate strategy as they at least take this 
important factor into account. However, as the results of Experiment 3 have shown their 
overall strategy is simply additive with both higher sample sizes and higher percentage wins 
attracting higher quality ratings. Thus, although this strategy favours minimum probability 
of eiTor, it takes no account of the cost of sampling. 
It should be remembered, however, that despite this apparent difference in strategy the 
effects of long term outcome information are still the overriding influence in both cases. 
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4.3.4 Discussion 
Experiments 2, 3 and 4 showed clear and consistent influences of both levels of 
outcome information. Where only the initial result was given, subjects were biased in 
favour of positive results and against negative results. When subjects were also given long 
term outcome information this effect was replaced by a main effect of long term outcome, 
subjects were biased in favour of results which were subsequently proved correct. 
A comparison of the graphs of these results for the first three experiments (Figure 2.1, 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2) shows these effects to be consistent across all three experiments 
and thus unaffected by changes in task, increasingly explicit task instructions, clear 
definition of quality and differing levels of statistical expertise. This bias towards significant 
results in the no-outcome condition and positive outcomes in the long term outcome 
condition would appear to be clear evidence of hindsight bias. Subjects appeai* to believe 
that the designer of the experiment should have 'known it all along' and should have done 
something to avoid these results. 
However it is not possible to immediately assume a purely hindsight explanation. 
Firstly there is some justification in the view that an experiment finding a significant result 
can at least be expected to have been powerful enough, whilst a non-significant result may 
mean either that there is no effect or that the experiment lacked power. However if this was 
the case then there should be evidence of an increasing tendency to favour significant results 
in those scenarios where sufficient experimental power is in question; as compared to those 
with high power. This would lead to an interaction between experimental result and sample 
size, there was no evidence for this trend in the results. 
Secondly, and more importandy, all three experiments showed a similar interaction 
between the two levels of outcome information. The tendency to favour significant initial 
results remained present in the long term outcome condition; a significant result subsequently 
proved to be true was consistently rated higher than a non-significant result subsequently 
proved to be true. In this case both these results have been shown in hindsight to be correct. 
However, this situation was reversed when the long term outcome showed the original result 
to have been false. In this case a positive original result subsequently shown to be false 
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consistently atu-acted lower quality ratings than a negative original result shown to be false. 
This is the opposite to what would be expected from a logical analysis of outcome. A false 
positive result (Type 1 error) can be seen as an unlucky event, the probability of which has 
been determined by the pre-set significance level and is known beforehand. A false negative 
result (Type 2 error) does, however, imply an experimental design which lacks power; 
therefore the logical response would be to rate a false negative as having less quality than a 
false positive all other things being equal. Thus, this pattern of results cannot be explained 
by a logical use of outcome information to imply experimental quahty. Similarly, this 
consistent pattern of interaction between initial results and long-term outcomes cannot be 
explained by the presence of hindsight bias along with an additional bias to positive results. 
In this case, as in the logical analysis, a false negative would be rated as having less quality 
than a false positive 
This pattern of results can, however, be explained in terms of hindsight bias when the 
financial implications of different outcomes are taken into account. The true positive result 
which attracted the highest quality ratings reflected the most financially rewarding outcome 
in each scenario. Conversely the false positive result which attracted the lowest quality 
ratings reflected the most financially punitive outcome. Where the initial result was negative 
there is no great financial gain or loss with either long-term outcome. Therefore one would 
expect the hindsight effects to be generally smaller as is the case. Within these smaller 
effects if an initial negative result was subsequently proved to be false this implies a failure 
to realise a potential financial gain and thus this condition would be rated lower than an initial 
negative result subsequently proved true which implies a negligible financial loss. This 
hypothesis implies that subjects utilising hindsight information see the financial outcome to 
be more indicative of quality of an experiment than either the relevant statistical design 
factors or the nature of the result. An interesting feature of this hypothesis is that the 
financial salience of a given outcome not only influences the direction of hindsight effects 
(either increasing quality ratings where money is made or reducing quality ratings where 
money is lost) but also influences the size of the bias which appears to be related to the 
amount of money involved. 
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4.4 EXPERIMENT FIVE 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Experiment 5 was designed to test the hypothesis that both the size and direction 
(positive or negative) of outcome bias seen in the previous experiments was dependent on 
the financial implications of the differing experimental outcomes. This hypothesis was 
based on observation of the specific patterns found in the interactions between initial and 
long-term outcomes in the previous experiments. In these interactions both the size and 
direction of bias varied with particular outcomes. This consistent pattern of results could not 
be explained by the nature of these outcomes alone but was consistent with their respective 
fintincial implications. 
This potential factor "outcome salience" can be defined as the relative importance of the 
impHcations of an outcome from the point of view of the subject. Thus outcome salience 
relates to the subjective utility of a given outcome and can vary in size in both positive and 
negative directions. In terms of outcomes with financial implications the situation is 
relatively clear. Positive or negative outcome salience would be related to gains or losses of 
money and their sizes would vary with the amounts of money in question. In terms of more 
general outcomes it is harder to assign specific values to outcome salience; nevertheless it is 
generally clear whether a given outcome is at least positive or negative from the point of 
view of the subject and some gross estimate of relative importance is usually possible. That 
the size of a given bias might be dependent on outcome salience has been tentatively 
suggested in the review of previous outcome bias studies (Chapter three. Section 3.3.1). 
Certainly the direction of a bias can be influenced by the subjects' perception of an outcome; 
this effect can be seen in reverse hindsight studies (Section 3.2.2) and in some outcome bias 
studies where a particulariy bad outcome leads to punitive judgements ( Section 3.3, Mitchell 
and Kalb, 1981). 
In order to test for the predicted effects of outcome salience this experiment sought to 
vary the financial implications of a given outcome whilst keeping the task and the actual 
nature of the outcome constant. In order to achieve this it was decided to utilise the same 
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task presented in the previous experiment but to change the perspective for half the subjects. 
Thus, half the subjects in this experiment would receive the same scenario, tests and 
outcomes used in Experiments 3 and 4 (the Traudsters' perspective). As before these 
subjects would receive a scenario in which a team of fraudsters were attempting to win large 
amounts of money from identifying biased roulette wheels. For the remaining subjects there 
would be a minor change in the scenario description which would cause subjects to consider 
the results of the same sampling procedures from the perspective of manufacturers of 
roulette tables (the 'manufacturers' perspective). In this case the manufacturers of roulette 
wheels would be attempting to identify ones which are biased in order to prevent losing hirge 
amounts of money. 
Both these groups have the task of using sampling procedures to accurately determine 
whether a given wheel is biased or not. These tests lead to the same pattern of initial results 
and long-term outcomes, however, the financial implications of these results are different 
from each perspective. For example, for a test initially finding a biased wheel where this 
result subsequently proves to be true; the fraudsters perspective implies large profits and the 
manufacturers perspective implies a small loss (the replacement cost of the table). Thus it 
was predicted that this simple change in perspective would have the effect of reversing 
quality judgements if these judgements were truly based on outcome salience. 
Contingency tables showing the financial implications of each possible outcome from 
both points of view are shown below in Table 4.2. This table includes estimated values of 
outcome salience for each possible outcome (in brackets). These estimates roughly follow 
the financial implications of each outcome although small variations have been made to 
include other factors thought to be relevant as described below. Values for outcome salience 
are on a scale from minus one to plus one; where a positive value indicates a good result and 
a negative value indicates a bad result. Larger values in either direction reflect better or 
worse outcomes from the point of view of the subject. Outcome salience may also be seen 
as a fonn of goal relevance and similarities between these factors will be discussed later. 
Whilst these estimates of outcome salience were largely based on the financial 
implications of each outcome it was necessary to differentiate between financially equal 
outcomes which had other less well defined positive or negative attributes. For example, 
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from the fraudsters' point of view an initial result finding no bias leads to no significant 
monetary gains or losses whether this result is subsequently proved to be true or false. 
However, if this result is subsequently shown to have been false the fraudsters have missed 
the opportunity to make a large profit and this situation could cleariy be construed as a worse 
outcome than if their initial result had been correct. In experiments 3 and 4 this implication 
of missed opportunity was presented to subjects as part of the experimental outcome 
description and the results of these experiments have shown small yet consistent differences 
between mean quality ratings for these two outcomes in line with this difference in subjective 
utility. From the manufacturers' perspective a similar situation occurs where a false positive 
result implies unnecesstiry replacement costs as compared to a true positive result where the 
same replacement cost is warranted. Thus estimates of outcome salience were adjusted to 
take these factors into account. As the whole point of the manufacturers running tests was to 
discover biased wheels and replace them; the outcome salience of the true positive result was 
given a small positive value despite its overall negative financial implications. The outcome 
salience of the false positive result was given a small negative value due to the associated 
unnecessary cost outlined above. 
These estimated values will allow for subsequent specific analysis of the experimental 
hypothesis and have been arranged so that their overall totals sum to zero. In the case of the 
fraudsters' perspective these values were consistent with the pattern of results found in the 
previous experiments. Indeed they were created from an analysis of these results in terms of 
the experimental hypothesis that the size and direction of quality judgements arising from 
outcome bias is mediated by outcome salience. From the manufacturers' perspecfive the 
estimated values of outcome salience predict a quite different pattem of outcome bias which 
reflects the specific predicfions of the experimental hypothesis. 
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Table 4.2 
Financial implications and outcome salience estimates (in brackets') for outcomes of sampling 
procedures from each perspective 






No bias found 
No gain or loss 
(+ 0.1) 
Missed opportunity 
of large profit 
(- 0.3) 
Manufacturers' Doin i of v i e w 
True result False result 
Bias found 
Necessary replacement cost 
of wheel 
(+ 0.3) 
Money wasted on unnecessary 
replacement of wheel 
(-0.1) 






Subjects and task 
Subjects were 61 third year psychology undergraduates at the University of Plymouth. The 
experiment took place during third year option group lectures. A l l subjects were volunteers. 
Design and procedures 
As in the previous experiment all subjects were given long term outcome information. 
For half the subjects (31) the experimental design and procedures were exactly the same as 
those for the outcome group in the previous experiment. In this condition roulette wheels are 
tested for bias from the perspective of a team of fraudsters who hope to make large profits 
on biased wheels. 
The remainder of the subjects (30) were given the same experimental description 
except for a small change in the wording of the scenario section. This change shifted the 
perspective to that of the roulette wheel manufacturers who fear large losses from biased 
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wheels. The instructions and scenario for the manufacturers was as follows; 
Intrpduction 
The following description and series of questions are designed to study understanding of the 
concept of quality in experimental sampling. 
Your co-operation in this experiment is greatly appreciated, and the results should be of use 
to you as they wil l demonstrate general levels of understanding of sampling principles. Results 
and explanations will be made available as soon as possible. 
Scenario 
A worker in a roulette wheel factory had been bribed to produce a number of wheels in 
which the slots for even numbers were slightly larger than those for odd numbers. It was the 
intention of a well financed team of fraudsters to bet heavily on even numbers on the biased 
wheels. Half the casinos ordering new wheels had unknowingly received the biased wheels. 
Acting on a rumour the roulette wheel manufacturers employed a team to go to individual 
casinos and test each wheel, hoping to quietly replace the biased wheels without damaging their 
reputation or t>eing sued for damages by casinos losing large amounts of money. 
It was decided that each member of the team would go to a different casino and make a 
number of small bets whilst counting the number of even wins to see whether the new wheel 
was one of the biased ones. Simply standing at the table without betting was regarded as too 
suspicious as casino security consistently video and study behaviour at roulette tables and the 
company did not want to alert casinos to possible problems. 
Tests involving extensive counting of even wins can be very expensive to run and dangerous 
in terms of alerting the casino to a specific interest in the roulette wheel. The potential cost of 
missing a biased wheel is high. 
Test 
In initial tests sampling methods varied t>elwecn individuals. Different numtxirs of spins 
were counted and there were also differences in the percentage of even number wins which were 
regarded as sufficient evidence of a biased table. On an unbiased table even numtiers have a 509c 
probability of winning if zero wins are disregarded; biased tables have a greater probability of 
even wins. Below are a series of descriptions of the tests used by different team members, 
l a s k 
Your task is to read each description and give an intuitive estimate of the quality of the test 
for a biased roulette wheel by writing a percentage mark (from 0 to 100) in the space provided. 
A test of high quality is one which has a high probability of 
differentiating whether a table is truly biased or not without incurring 
excessive cost. 
Please try to use the whole range of marks. Thank you for your co-operation. 
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This subject group received the same task questions with the exception that the section 
entitled 'outcome' was described from the manufacturers' perspective. This manipulation 
had the effect of varying the outcome salience of each of the four possible long-term 
outcomes depending on which perspective was presented. Al l four possible outcomes for 
the manufacturers were as follows: 
Outcome : Subsequent large bets confinned this wheel to be biased. The wheel was quietly 
replaced at some cost. 
Outcome : Subsequent betting by customers confirmed this finding. The table was not 
biased. 
Outcome : The wheel was quietly replaced at some cost. However, subsequent factory tests 
showed no evidence of bias. The wheel had been replaced unnecessarily. 
Outcome : The team did not replace the wheel. However subsequent betting by customers 
did show a bias towards even numbers and the company paid considerable damages to the casino. 
4.4.3 Results 
A n Anova was performed on the data. There were four within subjects factors 
(number of spins, percentage even wins, initial result and long-term outcome) and one 
between subjects factor (perspective). 
Effects of experimental factors 
Overall, as in previous experiments number of spins had a significant influence on 
quality ratings (F = 14.8, p = 0.0003) [r = 0.28]. The effect of percentage difference 
accepted was also significant (F = 11.1, p = 0.001) [r = 0.15]. As in experiments three and 
four larger sample sizes and larger percentage even wins attracted higher quality ratings. 
Effects of outcome information 
Overall there was no significant effect of initial outcome (F = 0.03, p = 0.9). For all 
subjects long-term outcome information did significantly influence quality ratings (F = 36.8, 
p = 0.0001) [r = 0.31]. The three-way interaction between initial result, long term outcome 
and subjects' perspective was significant (F = 28.9, p = 0.0001). The nature of this three-
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way interaction can be best explained and compared with previous results by analysing the 
different effects of outcome information on the different subject groups. 
Separate analyses were calculated for each subject group. Subjects given the 
"fraudster" perspective (the same as Experiments 2 and 3) demonstrated a significant main 
effect of long term outcome information (F = 19.8, p = 0.0001) [r = 0.33] and a significant 
interaction between initial result and long term outcome (F = 24.9, P = 0.0001). Figure 
4.4 shows the interaction between initial and long-term outcome information for those 
subjects with the 'fraudster' perspective. These effects of outcome are directly comparable 
to those of Experiments 3 and 4 shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 respectively and once again 
replicate these results. 
Figure 4.4 
The interaction between initial and long-term outcome information for those subjects with the 
Traudsier' perspective. Including financial implications of each outcome (in brackets). 
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(Large profil) O Correct 
• Incorrect 
(Small loss) 
(Small loss and 
missed opportunity) 
(Large loss) 
Bias found No Bias 
Initial Result 
N.B. The terms correct and incorrect refer to the nature of the long-term outcome information 
(either confirming or discomfirming the initial result) 
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Subjects given the "manufacturer" perspective also demonstrated a significant main 
effect of long term outcome information (F = 17.8, p = 0.0002) [r = 0.28] and a significant 
interaction between initial result and long term outcome (F = 4.8, P = 0.04). Figure 4.5 
shows the interaction between initial and long-term outcome information for those subjects 
with the 'manufacturer' perspective. When compared with Figure 4.4 it can be seen that the 
change in perspective has had the hypothesised effect of changing the quality judgements for 
each particular outcome. In both these graphs the relative financial outcomes have been 
included and it can be seen that the relative quahty judgements follow these outcomes in 
every case. (See Appendix 4 for complete Anova tables.) 
Figure 4.5 
The interaction between initial and long-term outcome information for those subjects with the 
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N.B. The terms correct and incorrect refer to the nature of the long-term outcome information 
(either confirming or discomfirming the initial result) 
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When the above interaction graphs demonsu-aling the effect of outcomes on qualit)' 
ratings for each of the subject groups are compared it can be seen that the overall three-way 
interaction is due to differences in the effects of specific outcomes for subjects with different 
perspectives. To make this comparison easier this effect can be seen in Figure 4.6 which 
demonstrates the nature of the overall three-way interaction between initial result, long-term 
outcome and perspective. This graph was created by overlaying the graphs of the two-way 
interactions between initial result and long-term outcome for each perspective (Figures 4.4 
and 4.5) and clearly shows that the change of perspective has had the effect of reversing the 
direction of these two-way interactions. 
Figure 4.6 



















N.B. The terms correct and incorrect refer to the nature of the long-term outcome information 
(either confirming or discomfirming the initial result) 
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The specific predictions of the influences of outcome salience were tested in two 
planned comparisons. These were based on the estimates presented in the introduction 
(Section 4.4.1, Table 4.2). For subjects given the fraudster perspective there was a 
significant effect of outcome salience (F = 74.4, p = 0.0001) such that quality ratings 
differed from the mean in the pattern predicted. For subjects given the manufacturer 
perspective there was also a significant effect of outcome salience (F = 83.0, p = 0.0001) 
again quality ratings differed from the mean in the pattern predicted from this perspective. 
Correlations between predicted viilues of outcome salience and mean quality ratings for each 
outcome were 0.98 for the fraudster perspective and 0.93 for the manufacturer perspective. 
(0.94 overall) For complete details of this analysis see Appendix 4. 
4.4.3.1 Comparative results of Experiments two, three, four and five 
Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5 demonstrated consistent influences of experimental and 
outcome factors on subjects' judgements of the quality of sampling procedures. In each case 
the relative influences of each factor were similar; the individual sizes of these effects and the 
overall mean effect sizes are shown in Table 4.3. This table shows long-term outcome to 
have the largest influence on quahty ratings in every case. Next largest are the influences of 
sample size followed by those of effect size. Two of these experiments presented subject 
groups with an initial result alone; in these cases there was a relatively small effect in which 
subjects preferred significant results. That these relative influences are of a consistent size 
across different experiments is shown by the small standard deviations related to each of the 
mean values. 
It should be noted that these measures of effect size only relate to main effects and do 
not reflect the effects of the significant interactions between initial results and long-term 
outcomes. The differences between cell means in these interactions reflect the influences of 
specific outcomes and were larger than the differences between main effect means in every 
case. Thus the conclusion that outcome information has the largest effect on subsequent 




Effect sizes for each factor across Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
Experiment 
Factor 
Expt. 2 Expt. 3 Expl. 4 Expt. 5 Mean 
(S.D.) 
Effect size 
(Significance level in Expt.2) 




Sample size 0.34 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.28 
(0.05) 
Initial result (For groups 
without long-term outcome) 
O.I 1 0.1 1 — N A — — N A — 0.11 
(0) 
Long-term outcome 0.27 0.37 0.32 0.31 0.32 
(0.04) 
4.4.4 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 5 were entirely consistent with the results of Experiments 2, 
3 and 4 in terms of the influences of the relevant experimental factors on judgements of the 
quality of sampling procedures. As in these previous experiments, both larger sample sizes 
and larger effect sizes attracted higher quality ratings. Large influences of outcome 
information were also demonstrated in Experiment 5. Again long-term outcome was the 
most influential factor in determining subsequent quality ratings. (For relative influences of 
all factors see Table 4.3 above) 
In this experiment it was possible to differentiate between the nature of varying 
outcomes and their outcome salience from a given perspective. When subjects' points of 
view were taken into account the results strongly supported the view that subjects' quality 
judgements were largely biased in favour of positive financial outcomes and against negative 
ones. This basic result was shown by the significant interaction between outcome 
information and subjects' perspective (See section 4.4.3). Graphical representations of the 
different pattem of results from each perspective can be seen in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 and 
these differing results can be compared in the overlay graph; Figure 4.6. These figures 
show the effects of outcome information on mean quality ratings to be roughly consistent 
with differences in the financial implications of these outcomes from the subjects' 
perspective. 
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Further detailed analysis utilising prior estimates of outcome salience showed this 
hypothetical factor to be an excellent predictor of both the direction and the size of outcome 
biases. As described in the introduction (Section 4.3.1), estimates of outcome salience were 
largely based on differing financial implications. Yet, as monetary values alone did not 
completely reflect differences in subjective utility for every outcome, these estimates were 
adjusted to include the negative influence of missed opportunities or unnecessary costs. The 
resulting estimated values for this factor showed a significant fit with the specific pattern of 
results and very high correlations with mean quality ratings for each possible outcome from 
both perspectives. This is not particularly surprising in the case of the fraudster perspective 
as the estimates of outcome salience used for this analysis were consistent with the patterns 
of results seen in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 and this perspective replicated those experiments. 
However, for the manufacturer perspective there was a new pattern of outcome bias results 
and it is the very accurate prediction of these results which gives strong support to the 
experimental hypothesis that the subjective utility of each outcome as defined in outcome 
salience was the defining factor in outcome bias. 
4.5 O V E R A L L DISCUSSION 
This discussion will focus on the results of Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects 
were asked intuitively to estimate the quality of viirious sampling procedures. In all cases 
four basic factors were manipulated. Descriptions of sampling procedures varied in temis of 
two relevant experimental factors; sample sizes and either significance levels or effect sizes. 
Secondly two levels of outcome information were included in these descriptions; the initial 
result of any sampling procedure and the long-temi outcome (i.e. whether the initial result 
was subsequently replicated). The first three experiments have shown that subjects' 
judgements of experimental quality were consistently biased by outcome information. 
Experiment 4 has shown that the size and direction of this bias was dependent not on the 
panicular outcome itself, but rather on the salience of that outcome from the perspective of 
the subject. 
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The focus of these experiments was on the effects of the presence of irrelevant 
outcome information on subjects' subsequent quahty judgements. Even with Httle statistical 
knowledge it should have been possible for subjects to recognise the need to ignore this 
information and focus solely on the relevant experimental factors. There may be some 
defence of subjects' inclusion of outcome information in the view that a replicated 
experimental result implies a better experiment than one which failed to replicate. However, 
there is little that is defensible in the view that an experiment which happened to lead to the 
subjects' preferred outcome regardless of its actual result is a better experiment. 
Although these experiments have shown outcome information to be the largest 
influence on quality judgements in every case, subjects'judgements were also influenced to 
a large extent by the relevant experimental factors. These influences followed a pattern 
which appeared to be unchcinged across subject groups with differing statistical knowledge. 
Thus this overall discussion will first address subjects' use of relevant experimental factors 
cind then go on to address their use of outcome information. 
4.5.1 Influences of experimental factors 
These tasks are difficult. It would be unreasonable to expect subjects to be able to 
intuitively calculate a normative analysis of the probabilities of Type I and 2 error for these 
descriptions of sampling procedures. To make a rational judgement of the quality of a given 
sampling procedure the probability of these errors would then have to be balanced against 
the potential costs of these errors and the potential costs of sampUng in each case. Given 
that some of the subjects in these experiments had little statistical training, comparisons of 
their performance with a normative model were neither necessary nor warranted. Despite 
this fact some basic expectations of subjects' performance on these tasks seems reasonable. 
For example, it would not be difficult for subjects to adopt a strategy which at least relies 
exclusively on changes in the relevant factors. 
In Experiment 1, given equal outcomes, quality judgements were based on an additive 
combination of the largest sample size and the most stringent significance level. In terms of 
sample size subjects favoured more powerful designs apparently completely ignoring 
considerations of experimental cost. The choice of more stringent significance levels was not 
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consistent with judgements based on maximising experimental power and thus reducing 
Type 2 error. However, this strategy may have reflected a desire to reduce the possibility of 
a false positive result (Type 1 error). These results may be seen as reasonable judgements in 
a scenario which was based on drug companies testing new products. In this scenario it was 
reasonable to assume the potential benefits (or losses) might be large enough in each case to 
outweigh considerations of sampling cost and necessitate retaining the least probability of 
Type 1 error. In this scenario a Type 1 error would lead a company to market a drug which 
does not work. A Type 2 error in this case implies a failure to market a drug which does 
work, which whilst it implies financial losses may not be seen as such a serious mistake. 
Another possible interpretation is that there was little understanding of statistical 
principles and the choice of significance level was based on a feeling that a result at the level 
of p < 0.01 was somehow better than one at p < 0.05. There is some evidence for ihis latter 
view from the interaction between significance level and experimental result shown in 
Experiment 2 (See Figure 2.2). In this experiment the set significance level of p < 0.01 only 
had a positive influence on quality ratings when it was known in hindsight that the sampHng 
procedure had achieved a positive result at this level. Thus, this would seem to be more an 
outcome bias effect (not only a significant result but a very significant result) than one due to 
considerations of statistical implications. Notably this significant interaction is not present in 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 where the scenario and the use of percentage values makes this 
relationship much less obvious. 
In Experiments 3, 4 and 5 the factor of pre-set significance levels was replaced by a 
measure of effect size expressed as a percentage. In this case subjects preferred sampling 
procedures which only accepted larger effects as evidence of significant differences. As 
before subjects also preferred larger sample sizes. This strategy has the same implications as 
that used by the subjects in Experiment 2 in that it minimises the probability of Type 1 error 
regardless of considerations of power or cost. Again this may not be an unreasonable 
strategy given that, in these scenarios from the fraudsters' perspective, a Type 1 error 
implied losing a large amount of money betting on a roulette wheel that you believed to be 
biased in your favour when it was not. A Type 2 error is less serious from this perspective 
as it only imphes a missed opportunity to make a large amount of money and no real losses. 
114 
However, Experiment 5 also included a different (manufacturers') perspective. From this 
perspective a Type 1 error implied only the small unnecessary cost of replacing a wheel 
which was not in fact biased, whilst a Type 2 error implied large losses. If it were true that 
subjects' strategies were based on an analysis of the relative costs of Type 1 and Type 2 
errors, this group should change their responses. In order to minimise Type 2 errors this 
group should favour the use of smaller percentage differences as evidence of biased tables. 
There was no evidence of this difference in the results. 
Overall the most likely explanation for these results is one in which subjects faced with 
the very difficult task of making a quick intuitive estimate of the quality of a sampling 
procedure adopt a simple additive strategy without recourse to any form of formal calculation 
or cost benefit analysis. This strategy could be described as a sort of biggest is best 
approach; favouring larger sample sizes and more highly significant results or larger effects. 
To minimise Type I error regardless of cost and power involves the simplest analysis of 
these experimental factors and can be seen as reasonable in most scenarios. That this 
strategy remained unaffected by the introduction of clear definitions of quality and cues 
about sampling costs is not surprising as neither of these factors serve to make the task any 
simpler. Indeed a normative analysis of these sampling procedures performed intuitively in 
the time given to these subjects would be beyond the powers of any but the most expert 
statisticians. Given this task difficulty, it was not surprising that this strategy did not vary 
between subject groups with differences in statistical expertise. Thus, the overall picture is 
one of the use of a simple strategy in the face of a very difficult task and this would be a 
perfectly reasonable response were it not for the pervasive influences of irrelevant outcome 
information. 
4.5.2 Influences of outcome information 
The results of Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5 showed outcome information to be the largest 
influence on subjects' quality judgements in every case. This effect was unchanged despite 
clear definitions of quality and varying statistical expertise. Not only did subjects fail to 
ignore this information but its influence overshadowed influences of the relevant 
experimental factors. The previous section discussed subjects' use of the relevant 
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experimental factors in generating quality judgements. The resulting strategy had some 
merits and could be seen as reasonable in the light of task difficulty. However, this strategy 
cannot be seen in isolation combined as it was with large influences of outcome information. 
These results have important practical implications which are not evident from 
previous studies of hindsight effects. In the present studies where no long term outcome 
information (and thus no financial implication) was given, outcome effects were quite small 
with an average r = 0.11; in this case quality judgements were mostly influenced by 
considerations of sample size. This reflects the small and not particularly influential 
hindsight bias reported by Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991). (See Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4) Notably, the studies used in this meta-analysis were mostly of the standard 
hindsight paradigm in which the hindsight information has no particular salience to the 
subject. 
However, when long term outcome information (and its financial implications) was 
introduced in these experiments the size of hindsight bias effects increased to an average r = 
0.32 and became the most influential factor in influencing quality judgements. This result 
mirrors the practically important findings of Mitchell and Kalb (1981) where evaluations of 
nurses' performance were biased in hindsight given the particularly salient outcome of injury 
to patients. In the present experiments, the introduction of a salient outcome increased the 
size of outcome bias in quality judgements and this effect was also shown to be almost 
completely dependent on the implications of a given outcome from the point of view of the 
person making the judgement. Experiment 5 has shown that by changing subjects' 
perspectives, and thus the relative salience of particular outcomes, both the size and direction 
of resulting outcome biases are changed. In this experiment the introduction of estimates of 
outcome salience showed that this factor was an excellent predictor of the nature of resulting 
biases. 
This result presents a somewhat different view of hindsight influences to that normally 
reported. The actual outcome of a given event appears to be of little importance without 
consideration of the salience of that outcome from the perspecdve of the subject. That a small 
and consistent bias towards positive (or confirming) results was present was shown by the 
bias towards significant results seen in the groups which did not receive long-term outcome 
116 
information. This effect would be the equivalent of the effects generally seen in experiments 
using the standard hindsight paradigm where the result has little or no salience to the subject. 
This effect is completely overshadowed, or even reversed, by the inclusion of the personal 
implications of an outcome. The effect of outcome salience is all the more impressive when 
it is considered that within these experiments subjects readily conform to a perspective 
suggested in the instructions and that a small change in wording is all that is needed to 
change this point of view. This implies that in real life where a strongly held personal 
conviction is at stake hindsight bias would be an extremely influential factor. 
The present paradigm therefore has some clear advantages over the standard hindsight 
paradigm. The sort of judgements of quality which are made every day are generally salient 
to the person making the judgement. Judges have a point of view and different outcomes 
will be more or less favourable depending on that point of view. It will be the personal 
salience of these outcomes rather than the outcomes per se which influence judgements when 
hindsight information is available. The inclusion, and manipulation, of personal salience of 
outcomes demonstrates the presence of a much larger and practically important hindsight 
bias than has previously been seen using the standard paradigm. 
Further advantages of the present paradigm include the fact that the outcome 
information is clearly not relevant to the judgement required. This is important because it 
refutes the theory that hindsight bias is based on the rational inclusion of available relevant 
information or the inability to ignore relevant information. (See Chapter 3, Sections 3.2.1, 
3.3 and 3.3.1) In this paradigm all the relevant information required to make the judgement 
was available to the subjects in the form of sample sizes and significance levels or effect 
sizes. It could be argued that the initial result and long-term outcome of a sampling 
procedure may contain some relevant information even though it is patently clear that this 
information would be unavailable unfil after a sampling procedure was designed and run. 
However, there was no evidence in these experiments that this information was being used 
rationally. Indeed by manipulating the subjects' perspective a particular outcome can be 
given a positive or a negadve outcome bias. The direction and size of outcome bias was 
clearly seen to be dependent not on the nature of the outcome but rather the salience of that 
outcome. Given this fact the view that these biases may be based on some form of rational 
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analysis of available relevant information is no longer tenable. 
Given that the size of the resulting bias is largely dependent on outcome salience and 
can overshadow all other factors relevant to the judgement where this salience is high, this 
factor warrants serious consideration. For example, it may be possible to account for the 
differing effects seen in previous hindsight and outcome bias studies by an analysis of the 
outcome salience related to the tasks used in these studies. In addition the inclusion of the 
importance of a subjects' point of view may also have implications for other biases. These 
theoretical issues will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
4.6 S U M M A R Y O F C H A P T E R F O U R 
Chapter 4 has described three experiments based on a scenario in which subjects were 
required to judge the quality of sampling procedures from a particular point of view. The 
basic scenario was one in which the subject was a member of a team of fraudsters who were 
testing roulette wheels to try to discover which of them were biased. This scenario served to 
answer a number of possible criticisms arising from the design of Experiment 2. Using this 
scenario it was possible to present subjects with a task closely related to that of judging the 
quality of scientific experiments without cueing the specific statistical nature of the problems. 
More importantly it was possible to manipulate the salience of particular outcomes from the 
point of view of the subjects in terms of their financial implications. In addition, these 
scenarios presented a specific definition of experimental quality and emphasised the need for 
subjects to take account of sampling costs. 
The first of these experiments. Experiment 3, produced results directly comparable 
with those of Experiment 2 despite these changes in presentation. Again, outcome 
information had the greatest influence on subjects'judgements of quality. Experiment 4 
replicated the long-term outcome condifion of Experiment 3 using a more statistically expert 
subject group than that used in either of the previous experiments. This made no appreciable 
difference and again the same pattern of results was reported. The specific influences of the 
interaction between initial and long-term outcome infonnation in both these experiments 
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were discussed. It was suggested that this persistent pattern of results could not be 
explained by differences in the nature of each possible outcome alone. It was hypothesised 
that both the size and direction of these outcome biases were mediated by the salience of each 
outcome from the point of view of the subject. 
Experiment 5 tested this hypothesis by the introduction of a perspective change. In 
this experiment one group of subjects were given the fraudster perspective used in the long-
term outcome groups of Experiments 3 and 4. Another group of subjects were given the 
same problems presented from a manufacturers' perspective. This manipulation had the 
effect of presenting exactly the same problems and outcomes, whilst altering the salience of 
each given outcome for the different subject groups. Results for the group given the 
fraudster perspective again replicated the pattern of results seen in the long-term outcome 
groups of Experiments 3 and 4. The group given the manufacturer perspective showed a 
different pattern of results related to the influences of the interacdon between iniual and long-
term outcome information. As predicted, these results showed the size and direction of 
outcome biases to be largely dependent on outcome salience. 
In an overall discussion, both the influences of experimental factors and the influences 
of outcome information on judgements of quality were discussed. 
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5,1 C H A P T E R INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 consists of two additional studies which served to clarify a number of issues 
arising from the previous experimental research. The first of these studies, Experiment 6, 
explored the belief system underlying the outcome bias seen in previous experiments. In 
this experiment subjects rated the relevance of experimental and outcome information to 
potential judgements of quality. It was hoped that the results would clarify whether the 
outcome bias seen in previous experiments arose from the logical application of a false belief 
in the relevance of outcome information, or was truly a subconscious bias. A manipulation 
of subjects' point of view was included in this rather simple rating study in order to test the 
possibility that subjects' relevance ratings would themselves be influenced by outcome 
salience. 
The second experiment presented in this chapter. Experiment 7, was designed to 
strengthen the theoretical links between outcome and hindsight effects. Hindsight bias has 
tradifionally been demonstrated as a bias of memory, whereas outcome bias has always been 
demonstrated in on-line paradigms as a bias of judgement. Experiment 7 explored the 
possible existence of a memory bias coincident with outcome judgements. This experiment 
ufilised a design similar to that of Experiments 3,4 and 5, with the exception that long-term 
outcome information was presented some time after an original quality judgement and at this 
later time subjects were required to recall their earlier judgements. This change made the 
design compatible with the majority of hindsight studies which utilise the memory of earlier 
judgements. 
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5.2 EXPERIMENT SIX - PERCEIVED R E L E V A N C E OF EXPERIMENTAL 
AND O U T C O M E FACTORS 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Exp)eriments 2, 3, 4 and 5 have shown judgements of experimental quality to be biased 
by the presence of outcome information. The size and direction of this outcome bias effect 
was shown to be dependent on outcome salience; a measure of the subjective utility of a 
given outcome. Whether this effect is a true bias or simply an error of judgement is 
dependent on subjects' beliefs about the relevance of outcome infonnation to the judgement 
they are required to make. 
Firstly, subjects may be well aware that outcome information (and particularly 
information on the utility of a particular outcome) is not relevant to the quality of the original 
experimental design. In this case the bias would reflect unconscious influence on 
judgements of quality and would present great difficulty in terms of debiasing. This 
situation is suggested by the fact that emphasising and clarifying the definition of quality in 
these experiments has no apparent debiasing effect. Also the bias remains equally influential 
for more statistically experienced subjects who should have a greater understanding of the 
irrelevance of this information to the quality of the original design. 
Secondly, it is possible that outcome bias stems from a false belief that outcomes and 
the utility of those outcomes are relevant to the quality of the design. In this case the 
resulting influence on quality judgements can be explained as a logical application of what 
were (falsely) believed to be relevant factors. If this were the case then debiasing could be 
achieved simply by explaining to subjects that outcomes and utilities were not relevant to the 
judgement being made. In this scenario it might also be possible to explain the differenUal 
effects of outcome salience in terms of resulting beliefs in the relevance of salient factors. 
Altogether, over all the previous studies, six factors were varied; sample sizes, effect 
sizes, pre-set significance levels (in experiment two only), initial results, long term outcomes 
and the financial implications of those outcomes. The present study was designed to explore 
subjects' belief in the relevance of these factors to judgements of experimental quality. It 
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would have been possible to simply ask subjects to rate these factors according to their 
relevance to judgements of experimental quality, however, as quality judgements were 
influenced by outcome salience there was every possibility that relevance ratings would also 
be influenced by similar considerations. Thus in the present experiment it was decided to 
include a variation in the perspective from which a prospective judgement was being made. 
This manipulation had the effect of presenting the subject, either as the judge of someone 
else's experiment, or as the author of an experiment to be judged by someone else. 
It was predicted that neither subject group would express a strong belief in the 
relevance of outcome informadon in general and that relevance scores would be particularly 
low for financial outcome information. However, if there were a tendency to believe in the 
relevance of outcome information, it was predicted that this would be greater for subjects 
who had the perspective of judging the experiments of others rather than those whose own 
experiments were being judged. These predictions were made for two reasons. Firstly, if 
outcome salience does affect beliefs about relevance, then an outcome which was potentially 
financially beneficial to the subject would be rated as more relevant than one which was not. 
Thus it was expected that this influence would be demonstrated specifically in the case of 
judgements of the relevance of financial outcomes. Secondly, the potential effect of these 
different perspectives would reflect the difference between the difficulty judges have in 
ignoring outcome information and the ease with which outside observers recognise this 
information as irrelevant. These perspective related differences are already clearly visible in 
both hindsight and outcome bias studies when the differences between the subjects of these 
studies and readers of subsequent articles are considered. Hindsight bias has been 
classically described as the 'I should have known it all along effect'. By comparison, earlier 
in this thesis the outcome bias effect was described as a 'they should have known it all along 
effect' referring as it does to judgements of the performance of others. (Chapter 3, Section 
3.3) As there is an element of unreasonable overestimation of one's own abilities in 
hindsight biased memories, there is an element of unfair underestimation of others abilities in 
outcome biased judgements. From the perspecfive of an outside observer (either an 
experimenter or a reader of the article) judgements biased by outcome information seem 
clearly unreasonable and yet the subjects of these experiments continue to utilise this 
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information. It may be the case that subjects in these experiments also see these biases as 
unreasonable but are unable to prevent their occurrence. On the other hand, from the point 
of view of the judge the use of outcome information may appear reasonable. 
It was decided not to include a definition of experimental quality in the scenario of this 
experiment in order to give subjects the widest possible range of interpretation of this 
concept. The use of a rigid statistical definiuon has been shown to make no difference to 
levels of bias in the previous experiments. In addition, if subjects believe outcome 
informafion to be irrelevant to undefined quality judgements they would be unlikely to find it 
relevant where quality was defined statistically. Thus, leaving quality undefined gives 
subjects every possibility to rate outcome factors as relevant. 
5.2.2 Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 36 first and second year Psychology undergraduates. A l l subjects were 
volunteers. 
Materials and Design 
Subjects were presented with one of two scenarios related to the reviewing of an 
experimental study submitted for publication in a joumal. The two scenarios reflected 
different points of view. In one case subjects were told that they were reviewing a study 
submitted by someone else. In the other case subjects were told that someone else was 
reviewing a study submitted by them. In both cases they were asked to rate the relevance of 
six pieces of information about the study. 
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The subject instructions and scenario from the perspective of you reviewing someone 
else's experiment was as follows: 
Below is a lisi of six pieces of infonmaiion about an experimeni. 
Imagine that you were reviewing an experinienia! study submitted for publication in a journal 
and this study contained an experiment to which these six pieces of information were related. 
If you were asked to judge the quality of the experiment in this study, how relevant would each 
of the pieces of information be to your judgement ? 
Please estimate the relevance of each piece of information using a scale from 0 to 9. 
Where a piece of information which would not influence your judgement scores 0 
and a piece of information which would strongly influence your judgement scores 9. 
I N F O R M A T I O N S C O R E 
(0 T O 9) 
The number of subjects used in the experiment 
The significance level set in the experiment 
Whether the experiment found a significant result or not 
The size of the experimental effect 
Whether the result of the experiment was replicated by later 
experiments 
The amount of money which you personally stood to gain 
or lose as a result of the experimental findings 
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The subject instructions and scenario from the perspective of someone else reviewing 
your experiment was as follows: 
Below is a lisi of six pieces of information about an experiment. 
Imagine that you had submitted an experimental study for publication in a journal and this 
study contained an experiment to which these six pieces of information were related. 
If the person reviewing the study was asked to Judge the quality of your experiment, how 
relevant should each of the pieces of information be to their judgement ? 
Please estimate the relevance of each piece of information using a scale from 0 to 9. 
Where a piece of information which should not influence their judgement scores 0 
and a piece of information which should strongly influence their judgement scores 9. 
I N F O R M A T I O N S C O R E 
(0 T O 9) 
The number of subiects used in the experiment 
The significance level set in the experiment 
Whether the experiment found a sijrnificani result or not 
The size of the experimental effect 
Whether the result of the experiment was replicated by 
later experiments 
The amount of money which the reviewer stood to gain or 
lose as a result of your exjxjrimenial findings 
Subjects were randomly allocated to one of the two perspective condidons. The 
resulting design had two independent variables. The factor being rated had six levels (see 
above) and was within subjects. The subjects' perspective had two levels (you reviewing 
anothers' study or another reviewing your study) and was between subjects. The dependent 
variable was subjects' ratings of relevance. 
Procedure 
The instructions, scenario and task was presented to subjects who completed ratings 
alone in their own time. 
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5.2.3 Results 
There were significant main effects of both experimental factors. There was a 
significant difference between the two perspective groups (F = 4.5, p = .04). The subject 
group who had the perspective of reviewing someone elses' experimental study produced 
higher mean overall ratings of relevance than the group with the perspective of having their 
own study reviewed by another. There were also significant differences between the factors 
rated (F = 425.1, p = .0001). The details of these ratings for each factor can be seen in 
Table 5.1. A follow up analysis of this main effect showed the financial outcome to be rated 
as significantly less relevant than all other factors. The factors related to effect size, the 
initial experimental result and replication (long-term outcome) information were all rated as 
significantly less relevant than the factors related to subject numbers and significance level. 
(For Anova table and follow up analysis see Appendix 5.) 
Table 5.1 
Mean ratings of the relevance of each factor 
Factor Mean relevance 
rating (S.D.) 
The number of subjects used in the experiment 7.1 (1.2) 
The significance level set in the experiment 6.5 (1.8) 
Whether the experiment found a significant result or not 5.4 (2.6) 
TTie size of the experimental effect 5.8 (1.8) 
Whether the result of the experiment was replicated by later 
experiments 
5.5 (2.4) 
The amount of money which the reviewer stood to gain or 
lose as a result of your experimental findings 
2.4 (2.5) 
There was also a significant interaction between relevance ratings for different factors 
and the perspective from which these ratings were made (F = 3.9, p = 0.002). This effect 
was specifically due to the differences between ratings for the financial factor across the 
different perspectives. No significant differences across perspective were shown for any of 
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the other factors. The nature of this interaction can be seen in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 








You review They review 
Perspective 
5.2.4 Discussion 
This experiment was designed to answer the question 'Do subjects believe that 
outcome information is relevant to judgements of the quality of experimental design ?'. The 
results suggest that the answer is more complicated than a straight yes or no. Both initial 
and long-term outcome information were rated as less relevant than the experimental factors 
of sample size and significance level. This difference should not be interpreted without 
reference to the mean ratings for these factors; ail of which were above the mid-point of the 
relevance scale. Thus, subjects appear to believe that all these factors are to some degree 
relevant to judgements of experimental quality, with experimental factors being slighdy more 
relevant than outcome information. 
What is clear from these results, is that subjects believed that the financial implications 
of an outcome should be the least important factor in judgements of the quality of 
experimental designs. However, as predicted the strength of this belief was dependent on 
the subjects' point of view. The interaction between the factors rated and subjects' 
perspective shows the presence of bias in these radngs. Whilst subjects clearly felt it was 
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unreasonable for reviewers lo utilise financial outcome when judging the quality of the 
subject's own studies^ they were not prepared to be so scrupulous in their own judgements 
of others' studies. Notably the opposite occurs with judgements of the relevance of 
significance levels. Subjects felt that their own studies should be judged on the basis of the 
significance of their results, but believed it was not so important for them to use this factor 
when judging the studies of others. This effect can hardly be described as an instance of 
outcome bias as there is no real outcome in this experiment, and yet it is an example of self-
centred information processing which has a lot in common with outcome bias effects and is 
clearly in line with the predictions based on outcome sahence which were made in the 
introduction. 
These results are interesting when seen in terms of the results of the previous studies. 
A compiu-ison between the mean relevance ratings shown in Table 5.1, and the actual use of 
these factors shown in the previous judgement studies, shows a sharp contrast between what 
subjects believe they would do and what they actually do when judging experimental quaJity. 
In Experiments 3, 4 and 5 long-term outcomes and their financial implications have been 
shown to be the largest factor influencing quality judgements. These factors are rated as the 
least relevant in the present study. 
Thus, the results of the present experiment uphold the view that outcome bias is an 
unconscious bias in that explicit judgements of relevance of information are in opposition to 
the use of this information in actual quality judgements. Subjects were aware that this 
information was the least relevant and yet the previous studies have shown it to be the most 
influential factor in actual quality judgements. This finding supports the view that 
judgements are the result of implicit Type 2 processes. In addition, the manipulation of 
perspective in this experiment has shown that even apparently straightforward relevance 
ratings were influenced by subjects' points of view. In the light of these results it may be 
necessary to re-evaluate both hindsight and outcome effects in teniis of a potentially more 
general and wide reaching effect of self-centred information processing. This possible 
theoretical approach will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.3 EXPERIMENT SEVEN - INFLUENCES OF O U T C O M E 
INFORMATION ON M E M O R Y 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The standard hindsight bias paradigm involves subjects making a judgement of the 
hkeiihood of a particular outcome given certain information. At a later time these subjects are 
given further (hindsight) information (described as the actual outcome) and asked to recall 
their original judgement. Hindsight bias is demonstrated when the hindsight information 
biases this memory in favour of the actual outcome. Through numerous replications this 
paradigm has shown consistent if not particularly large effects. A number of genenil 
criticisms have been levelled at this research. (See section 3.4) These include the claim that 
as effect sizes are small hindsight bias is unlikely to have much influence on actual 
decisions. Also it has been claimed that as hindsight information is relevant to the original 
judgement it is reasonable to incorporate this additional information in judgements. 
In Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5 biases relating to outcome information were 
demonstrated using a paradigm which to some extent answered these criticisms. By 
manipulating levels of both positive and negative outcome information presented at the same 
time as the task information, it was possible to demonstrate large and highly influential 
biases in judgements of quality. Unlike biases seen in the original paradigm, these biases 
were not mediated by the ability to remember an earlier judgement. In addition, they were 
related to real Ufe decisions (of experimental quality) and were based on outcome 
information which was not relevant to the judgement in question. The results of these 
studies have shown quality judgements to be largely dependent on the subjective utility of 
the outcome presented. 
The relationship between these results and the generally accepted form of hindsight 
bias is not immediately clear. In the original hindsight paradigm the bias was due to the 
influence of subsequent outcome information on the memory of an earlier judgement. In the 
present research bias was due to the influence of irrelevant outcome information on an 
original judgement. In both cases subjects fail to treat the outcome as irrelevant to the task 
in hand. In the hindsight paradigm the outcome is relevant to the original judgement but not 
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to the memory of this judgement. In the present research the outcome is not relevant to the 
original judgement (quality of the design); firstly because outcome information was not 
available to the designer and secondly because the experimental result may be due to chance 
(Type 1 or Type 2 error). Despite these apparent differences, one of the contentions of this 
thesis was that hindsight bias and outcome bias were essentially the same effect seen from a 
different point of view. The point of view in question being the particular paradigm used to 
explore the effect. (See section 3.3) This contention implies that there is one underlying 
biasing effect related to the presence of outcome information (outcome bias) and that the 
effect traditionally known as hindsight bias is simply one form of this bias. 
The findings from the present series of experiments show outcome salience to be the 
most important factor in determining the size and direction of biases related to outcome 
information. These experiments have used an on-line paradigm where the outcome is 
presented along with other relevant information. If this outcome bias effect is pervasive 
there is no reason not to suppose that any judgement required of subjects would be biased by 
salient outcome information whatever this judgement relates to. From this point of view, the 
traditional hindsight bias effect could be seen as an outcome bias effect where the judgement 
required is a memory of an earlier probability estimate. In this case whether outcome 
information biases judgements made at the time or memories of earlier judgements depends 
only on whether outcomes are presented at the time of the required judgement or at some 
later time. 
In this scenario the outcome salience relevant to traditional memory based hindsight 
effects is not immediately apparent. Although there would inevitably be a positive salience 
related to the belief that one had 'known it all along' a number of other factors specific to the 
study in question might also influence outcome salience. The positive aspects of having 
'known it all along' would include motivational factors such as self justification and an 
increased sense of control. These factors would result in a potential outcome salience in the 
in the traditional hindsight paradigm which would not be particularly strong relative to the 
outcome salience of most outcome bias paradigms. This fact serves to support the above 
contention as hindsight bias effects are generally much smaller than those found using 
outcome bias paradigms. 
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This view predicts that where outcome information is presented after the event, the 
memory of any number of factors may be biased. Where subjects were asked to recall an 
original likelihood estimate this would create a 'hindsight' effect. If subjects were asked to 
recall other relevant factors there is no reason to suppose that these memories would not also 
be biased in hindsight. 
The present experiment tested these predictions by presenting subjects with four 
descriptions of experiments. These descriptions varied in terms of the number of subjects 
used, the significance level set and the initial result (significant or non significant). In a 
similar paradigm to that used in Experiments 3, 4 and 5, subjects were required to make a 
judgement of the quality of these experimental designs. However, this experiment also 
contained a second stage which reflected the type of paradigm normally utilised in hindsight 
experiments. This second stage consisted of a lime delay, after which subjects were 
reminded of the earlier experimental descriptions and were given long-term outcome 
infonnation (whether the original study was replicated or not). They were then required to 
remember their original quality judgements. In addition, they were also asked to recall the 
numbers of subjects and the significance levels used in these studies. It was predicted that 
memories of original judgements would be biased in line with the nature of the long-temi 
outcome information. Thus, where an experiment had been replicated, memories would 
overestimate earlier quality judgements; this would be the similar to the effect normally 
reported in hindsight bias studies. Where an experiment had failed in replication it was 
predicted that memories would underestimate earlier judgements. 
It has been suggested earlier that outcome bias effects may be extremely pervasive. If 
this is the ciise then it is possible that memories of any other relevant factor will also be 
biased in a direction which supports the subjects' (biased) view of the quality of that 
experiment. Thus, in the present study it was also predicted that memories of the other 
experimental factors (subject numbers and significance levels) would be biased in line with 
the nature of the long-tenn outcome. This would result in memories of increased subject 
numbers and smaller significance levels where outcome information showed experiments to 
have been replicated and memories of reduced subject numbers and larger significance levels 




Subjects were 60 second and third year psychology undergraduates. A l l subjects were 
paid £1.50 for participation. Subjects were allocated to experimental conditions by random 
distribution of question sheets; ensuring only that equal numbers of each type of question 
sheet were distributed. A l l responses were anonymous. 
Materials 
Each subject received an initial instruction sheet and four brief experimental 
descriptions which they were asked to rate for quality. These descriptions were given 
somewhat su-iking tides and subject matter to enable subjects to clearly differentiate them in 
the memory stage of the experiment. Subjects were then presented with a filler task 
consisting of a number of questions in which they were required to estimate the frequency of 
various features in the environment; this task had no relevance to the experimental 
descriptions or tasks. In the second part of the experiment, subjects were given new 
instructions containing reminders of the original descriptions with additional outcome 
information and a series of questions relating to their memory of the initial experimental 
descriptions and their initial responses. 
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An example of the inifial subject instructions and task is shown below; 
I N S T R U C T I O N S 
You wil l be presented with four descriptions of experiments. You should read each 
description carefully and then make a judgement of the quality of each experimental design. 
An experiment of high quality is one which has a high probability of 
finding an effect if one exists without incurring excessive cost. Quality 
judgements should be recorded by marking an X at the relevant point on the line under each 
description. 
When you have completed this part of the experiment there will be a short break in 
which you will be set other tasks. After these are complete you will be given a question sheet 
to test your memory of the four experimental descriptions. If you have any questions please 
ask the experimenter before you start the task. 
Drug test 
Stephens and Bell (1989) perfomied an experiment in which the drug 'Epsadrinc" was 
predicted to reduce blood pressure in human subjects. The subjects (twenty eight volunteers 
from Chicago inedical school) were split into an experimental group and a control group. The 
experimental group were each given a Tive millilitrc dose of the drug intravenously. The 
control group recieved a placebo. Subsequent blood pressure measures were taken two hours 
later. A significance level of p < 0.01 was set. A i test showed a significant difference 




An experiment was reported in which Goodburn, Jones and Larch (1991) tested the 
hypothesis that children who owned teddy bears would more readily talk to an adult if their 
teddy bear (an object of safety) was present. A total of forty two pre-school children (aged 
between three and four) were tested by means of a structured inter\'iew. Half the children were 
interviewed with their teddy bears present. The other half acted as a control group and were 
interviewed without their teddy bears. A significance level of p < 0.05 was set. A t test on 
the number of answers given was significant; supporting the hypothesis that children with 




Naesmith and Barton (1972) performed an experiment on the acquisition of motor 
skills. They tested the hypothesis that regular cyclists would learn the skills required for a 
complex balancing task faster than non-cyclists. Subjects were thirty four psychology 
undergraduates (half cyclists, half non-cyclists). Measurement involved the number of attempts 
(up to a maximum of ten) needed for the successful coinpletion of the balancing task. A 
significance level of p < 0.01 was chosen. A t test showed no significant difference in task 




A study by Whittaker et al. (1988) tested the effects of a behavioural regime on 
clinically depressed patients. Subjects were thirty eight adult patients in the long slay ward of 
a Manchester hospital. A l l subjects had been clinically depressed for more than two months. 
The regime was given to half the subjects and involved positive reinforcement for a number of 
positive social behaviours. The other half of the subjects acted as a control group. A 
significance level of p < 0.05 was chosen. A t test showed no significant difference between 




An example of subject instructions and tasks for the second (memory) phase of the 
experiment is shown below; 
Part 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
On this sheet are brief reminders of the four experiments which were presented earlier. 
And some additional information on the long term outcome of these studies. 
You should try in each case to remember your original judgement of quality and mark 
an X at the same point on the line under each description. Please also try to answer the 
questions from memory. If you cannot remember please make your best guess. It is important 
to answer every question. 
If you have any questions please ask the experimenter before you start the task. 
Bicycle Riding 
Nacsmith and Barton (1972) found no significant differences when testing the 
hypothesis that regular cyclists would learn the skills required for a complex balancing task 
faster than non-cyclists. Although the hypothesis was not supported subsequent replications of 
this experiment have shown this original result to have been false. There was an effect which 
this experiment missed. 
What was your original Low High 
quality judgement ? Quality Quality 
How many subjects were used in this experiment ? 
What level of significance was set ? 
Teddy bears 
Goodburn, Jones and Larch (1991) found a significant result supporting the hypothesis 
that children who owned teddy bears would more readily talk to an adult if their teddy bear (an 
object of safety) was present. However subsequent replications of this experiment have shown 
this original result to have been false. There was no effect. 
What was your original Low High 
quality judgement ? Quality Quality 
How many subjects were used in this experiment ? 
What level of significance was set ? 
Depression 
A study by Whittakcr ct al. (1988) found no significant improvement in depression 
when testing the effects of a three month behavioural regime on clinically depressed patients. 
The hypothesis was not supported and subsequent replications of this experiment have shown 
this original result to have been correct. There was no effect. 
What was your original Low High 
quality judgement ? Quality Quality 
How many subjects were used in this experiment ? 
What level of significance was set ? 
Drug tesl 
Stephens and Bell (1989) performed an experiment in which the drug 'Epsadrine' was 
shown to significantly reduce blood pressure in human subjects. The hypothesis was supported 
and subsequent replications of this experiment have shown this original result to have been 
correct. There was an effect. 
What was your original Low High 
quality judgement ? Quality Quality 
How many subjects were used in this experiment ? 
What level of significance was set ? 
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Design 
in the first pan of the experiment, four experimental descriptions were rated by the 
subjects in terms of their quality. These ratings were made were made by marking a point 
on a line with a range from low quahty at one end to high quality at the other. This change 
to an analogue response was made to prevent the second memory stage becoming too easy. 
As in Experiments 3, 4 and 5 quality was rigidly defined in the experiment instructions (see 
above). The fictitious experimental descriptions presented to subjects varied in terms of 
three independent variables: 
1. Pre-set significance level - With two levels (0.05 and 0.01) 
2. Subject numbers - With four levels (28,32, 38 and 42) 
3. Experimental result - With two levels (Significant or not significant) 
Levels of these factors were varied across question type using a greco-latin square 
creating four different quesdon presentations, one example of which is shown above. A 
fully balanced design would have required sixteen questions and this would have made the 
memory stage of the experiment excessively difficult. 
The second (memory) stage of the experiment consisted of brief reminders of the 
original experimental descriptions. Reminders consisted of the original experimental title 
followed by a description of the experiment including the names of the experimenters, the 
hypothesis which they had tested and the original result. To this was added outcome 
information describing whether the original experimental result had been replicated or not. 
This outcome information created a fourth independent variable; replication, with two levels 
(replicated and not replicated). This factor was also counterbalanced across quesrion type. 
There were four dependent variables. In the first stage; the initial quality judgements. 
In the second (memory) stage; the remembered quality judgements, the remembered 
significance levels and the remembered subject numbers. 
Procedure 
After a brief introduction explaining that the experiment was in three parts subjects 
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were presented with the first instruction sheet and task. Subjects were given five minutes to 
read the descriptions and complete the four quality judgements. They were informed when 
they had one minute remaining. At the end of this time the instruction and description sheets 
were removed. Quality ratings were recorded on the task sheets by marking a cross on a line 
the extremes of which were low quality at one end and high quality at the other. 
Subjects were then presented with a filler task and told they had ten minutes to 
complete it. At the end of this time these sheets were removed and the part two instructions 
and question sheets were presented. There was no time limit for this section. Subjects were 
reminded that it was important to fill in all the sections on the sheet and left to complete it in 
their own time. Remembered quality ratings were recorded by marking a cross on a line 
idenliciil to that in the first pan of the experiment. 
Subsequent scoring of quality judgements was by measuring the distance of crosses 
along each line and converting to a 0 to 100 point scale. Blind scoring was achieved by 
scoring remembered quality judgeirtents without reference to original judgement scores 
which could only be compared by matching question types and answer sheet and question 
sheet identifying codes. 
5.3.3 Results 
Initial stage 
In the first stage of the experiment subjects were required to judge the quality of the 
fictitious experiments. An analysis of the effects of pre-set significance level, subject 
numbers and experimental result on these judgements of experimental quality was 
performed. An analysis of variance showed only initial outcome information (experimental 
result) to have a significant effect on quality judgements (F = 9.43, p<0.01). Where the 
fictitious experiments were described as having achieved a significant result, they were rated 
as having higher quality than those described as having no significant result. This difference 
is shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 
Mean initial quality judgements 
(Standard deviations in brackets) 
Initial outcome Mean quality 
Significant result 56.6 (25.9) 
No significant result 46.5 (24.9) 
Memorv stage 
Three analyses were completed on the data from the memory stage of the experiment. 
In order to analyse differences between subjects' remembered significance levels and 
the actual levels, values were categorised and actual levels were subtracted from 
remembered levels. This created a scoring scheme where an actual level of 0.05 
remembered as 0.01 would score +1. An actual level of 0.01 remembered as 0.05 would 
score -1, and a correct remembered level would score 0. Analysis of these scores against 
both initial experimental result and hindsight information (replication) showed no significant 
effects. 
Memory for the numbers of subjects described in the fictitious experiments was also 
analysed against both initial experimental result and long-term outcome information. In this 
case the difference between the number of subjects remembered and the actual numbers of 
subjects described in the fictitious experiments was the dependent variable. The main effect 
of long-term outcome information was significant (F = 4.21, p < 0.05)[r = 0.12]. Where 
subjects were told in hindsight that an experiment had been replicated they remembered the 
experiment to have had a higher number of subjects. This difference is shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 
Mean difference between remembered and actual subject numbers 
(Standard deviations in brackets) 
Long-term outcome Mean difference 
Replicated + 4.5 (16.2) 
Not replicated + 0.7 (15.0) 
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The differences between original and remembered quality judgements were also 
analysed against both initial experimental result and long-term outcome information. Again 
the main effect of long-term outcome information was significant (F = 8.32, p < 0.01)[r = 
0.16]. Where subjects were told in hindsight that an experiment had been replicated they 
remembered their original quality judgement to have been higher than it was. When an 
experiment was not replicated they remembered a lower quality rating. This difference is 
shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 
Mean difference between remembered and actual quality Judgements 
(Standard deviafions in brackets) 
Long-term outcome Mean difference 
Replicated + 1.4 (5.1) 
Not replicated - 0.6 (6.9) 
For all Anova tables and complete tables of means see Appendix 6. 
5.3.4 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 7 demonstrated that the effects of outcome information on 
quality judgements were still present in a memory based paradigm. In addition it was shown 
that outcome information biased not only memories of subjects' original judgements but also 
biased memories of other relevant factors in hindsight. These findings strongly supported 
the predictions made in the introduction (Section 5.3.1) based on the view of outcome bias 
as a pervasive effect of which hindsight effects are a sub-set. 
The analysis of subjects' quahty judgements of the initial experimental descriptions 
showed a biasing effect of the experimental result. This was a small effect and mirrored the 
effects of initial experimental results seen in the earlier experiments. Unlike the earlier 
experiments, in this analysis none of the relevant experimental factors (subject numbers and 
significance levels) had a significant influence on quality judgements. This was not 
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surprising in the case of subject numbers. In previous experiments differences in sample 
sizes were large. In this experiment these differences were much smaller in order to prevent 
the memory stage of the experiment from being too simple. In the case of the different 
significance levels presented in the fictional experimental descriptions, there was no clear 
reason why this factor should have failed to have any significant influence on subjects' 
original quality judgements. However, this initial stage of the experiment was not fully 
counterbalanced within subjects and as a consequence the resulting analysis was not 
particularly powerful. 
In the memory stage of the experiment the predicted effects of outcome information on 
the memory of earlier quality judgements were demonstrated. Where outcome information 
was positive (replication) eariier judgements were overestimated in a similar manner to 
traditional hindsight bias. Where outcome information was negative (failure to replicate) 
earlier judgements were underestimated. Thus, the 'I knew it all along" effect was polarised 
into 'I knew it was good all along' or 'I knew it was bad all along' depending on the nature 
of the long-term outcome information. These biases of memory are all the more notable 
when it is remembered that subjects only had a time delay of ten minutes before the recall 
task. 
These effects were smaller than those seen in the on-line outcome bias paradigm used 
in Experiments 3, 4 and 5. This difference in effect size is consistent with the proposed 
mediating influence of outcome salience (see Section 4.5.2). In these earlier experiments 
there were high levels of outcome salience clearly stated in financial terms. In contrast in the 
present experiment there was no clearly stated outcome salience beyond subjects' desire to 
be seen as correct in their judgements. This is comparable with the majority of hindsight 
bias studies; as are the smaller effect sizes. 
Subjects' memories of their own earlier judgements were not the only factor to be 
biased in hindsight. Memory for sample sizes was also influenced by the nature of long-
term outcome information. Where an experiment was shown to have been replicated 
subjects remembered it as having had larger subject numbers. Thus it seems that subjects 
reconstruct their memories in line with their current knowledge; if an experiment was good 
then it must have had a large number of subjects. Again this suggests more widespread and 
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pervasive effects of outcome information than those originally reported in outcome bias 
studies. A similar effect of reconstructive remembering of the scientific literature has been 
noted by Vincente and Brewer (1993), potential links between these effects will be discussed 
in Chapter 6. 
There was no such effect for subjects' memories of significance levels. This was not 
surprising as only the two standard levels, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 were used in the fictitious 
experimental descriptions. This made the memory stage of the experiment rather simple. In 
a more extensive study it would have been possible to present various exact levels (such as p 
= 0.037) in which case the memory task would be difficult enough to demonstrate an effect. 
5.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER FIVE 
Chapter 5 reported two experiments which served to clarify a number of questions 
arising from outcome bias effects seen in the previous experiments. Experiment 6 explored 
subjects' beliefs about the relevance of information to prospective quality judgements. The 
results demonstrated that subjects were cleariy aware that information relating to 
experimental factors was more relevant than that relating to outcomes when judging the 
quality of experiments. Further, they were aware that financial outcomes should not be 
relevant to these judgements. This result supported the view that the effects of outcome 
information seen in earlier experiments, were due to an unconscious bias in which subjects 
were unable to ignore information that they knew to be irrelevant. 
This experiment also included a manipulation of subjects' point of view. In one case 
subjects were asked how relevant factors would be to their judgements of the quality of 
someone else's experiment. In the other case subjects were asked how relevant factors 
should be to someone else's judgement of the quality of their experiment. This difference in 
perspective had a marked influence on subjects' ratings of the relevance of financial outcome 
information. Subjects cleariy believed that others should not use financial outcome 
information to judge their experiments. When subjects were judging the experiments of 
others they were not so adamantly against the use of financial outcome information. It was 
suggested that this effect was based in some form of self-centred information processing 
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which might also be the underiying cause of outcome biases. 
Experiment 7 hnked the on-line paradigms used in outcome bias studies with the 
memory based paradigms usually associated with hindsight studies. In this experiment 
initial outcome information (experimental result) was presented along with fictitious 
descriptions of experiments. Subjects were required to judge the quality of these 
experiments. After a time interval subjects were reminded of the original experimental 
descriptions and given long-term outcome (replication) information. They were then 
required to remember their original quality judgements and the number of subjects and the 
significance level associated with the former experimental descriptions. 
Results showed outcome bias related to the on-line initial outcome information and 
hindsight bias related to the long-term outcome information. This hindsight effect was 
shown to be dependent on the nature of the long-term outcome information. Positive 
information led to overestimation of earlier quality judgements whilst negative information 
led to underestimation of earlier quality judgements. This effect mirrored the dependency of 
outcome bias effects on the nature of the related outcome information seen in Experiments 3, 
4 and 5. 
The memory stage of this experiment demonstrated other effects beyond those usually 
reported in hindsight bias studies. Memory for sample sizes was also shown to be biased by 
the nature of long-term outcome infonnation presented in hindsight. Where a study was 
shown to have been replicated subjects remembered it as having used a higher number of 
subjects. These results confirmed the pervasive effects of outcome information, not only on 
original judgements, but also on associated memories where the outcome was presented in 
hindsight. 
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C H A P T E R SIX 
Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter begins with a review of the results of the present research followed 
by a discussion of some of the direct practical implications of these findings. Specific 
implications for the design process are discussed as are more general implications for any 
judgements which are made in the presence of outcome information. It is shown that the 
present findings also allow for quite specific predictions relating to areas in which future 
research would be most beneficial. 
Unlike previous hindsight and outcome bias research the present research is able to 
directly demonstrate the influences of motivational factors in biases related to the presence of 
outcome infonnation. A definition of these motivational factors in terms of outcome salience 
is presented and its role as the determining factor in the size and direction of the resulting 
biases is discussed. 
The results of the present research suggest an account in which the previously separate 
fields of hindsight and outcome bias are unified. To this end an overview of hindsight and 
outcome biases is presented. In the light of the present results and by accounting for 
methodological differences, this ovei-view argues that hindsight effects are a sub-set of 
outcome bias effects. 
In addition to unifying these previously separate research fields this account is also 
able to clarify previously unexplained effects from the hindsight literature. The next section 
analyses these effects in terms of the concept of outcome salience generated by the present 
resccirch. The differences explained in this section include variations in effect size across 
different paradigms, the differential effects of negative hindsight information and reverse 
hindsight effects. 
Potential relationships between the concept of outcome salience and the concepts of 
Subjective Expected Utility and relevance are discussed. The following section considers 
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the wider theoretical impHcations of the present experimental results. The imphcations of 
these results for theoretical accounts of reasoning in general and hindsight bias in particular 
are explored. 
6.2 A S U M M A R Y O F T H E P R E S E N T R E S E A R C H 
The first experiment in this series was a prospective study of the design of psychology 
experiments. Subjects experienced in the design of psychology experiments were given the 
task of designing experiments to test a variety of hypotheses and their subsequent verbal 
protocols were recorded. It was the intention of this experiment to explore the extent and 
nature of subjects' evaluations of the quality of their putative designs. The results showed 
the clear failure of subjects to consider explicit evaluation factors during the design process. 
Despite the fact that Experiment 1 demonstrated a lack of exphcit evaluation in the 
design process, it was clear that researchers do routinely make evaluations of the quality of 
experimental designs in published research. Thus, researchers must be capable of some 
form of design evaluation even if this evaluation is not explicit in the design process. 
Experiment 2 was designed to explore the factors influencing these judgements of existing 
designs. A number of descriptions of experiments were presented to subjects. These varied 
in terms of the number of subjects used and the pre-set significance level. As experimental 
results are necessarily present in published research, the experimental results were also 
presented in these descriptions. The inclusion of this outcome information led to the 
probability that subsequent quality judgements would be biased in line with this outcome. To 
further explore the effect of outcome information half the subjects were given long-term 
outcome information in terms of replication (or non-replication) of the initial result. In 
addition this group also received financial outcome information. The results of Experiment 2 
showed little understanding of the statistical principles of good design. Long-term outcome 
was the most influential factor in judgements of quality. 
This extremely influential form of outcome bias was further explored in subsequent 
experiments. Given the possibility that the results of Experiment 2 were influenced by the 
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obvious statistical complexity of the task, Experiment 3 presented subjects with an 
equivalent task based on a different scenario. This scenario was based on a team of 
fraudsters who were testing roulette wheels to try to discover which of them were biased. 
Thus subjects were presented with a task closely related to that of judging the quality of 
scientific experiments without cueing the specific statistical nature of the problems. In 
addition this scenario presented a specific definition of experimental quality and emphasised 
the need for subjects to take account of sampling costs. Experiment 3 produced results 
directly comparable with those of Experiment 2 despite these changes in presentation. 
Again, outcome information had the greatest influence on subjects'judgements of quality. 
Experiment 4 replicated the long-term outcome condition of Experiment 3 using a more 
statistically expert subject group than that used in either of the previous experiments. This 
made no appreciable difference and again the same pattern of results was reported. The 
experimental paradigm used in Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated consistent and high levels 
of outcome bias. This pai adigm had a number of advantages over the paradigms in which 
hindsight and outcome biases had been previously reported. Most importantly the outcome 
information had no direct relevance to the judgement required, unlike all previous hindsight 
studies. Also in this paradigm, all the information which was relevant to the judgement was 
available to the subjects. The presence of bias under these conditions argued strongly against 
the theory that hindsight bias was based on the rational inclusion of any relevant information 
which becomes available. 
In Experiments 2,3 and 4 the interaction between initial and long-term outcome 
information led to a specific pattern of results. This persistent pattem could not be explained 
by differences in the nature of each possible outcome alone. It was hypothesised that both 
the size and direction of these outcome biases were mediated by the salience of different 
outcomes from the point of view of the subject, particularly in terms of their financial 
implications. Experiment 5 tested this hypothesis by the introduction of a perspective 
change. In this paradigm it was possible to manipulate the financial salience of particular 
outcomes by changing the point of view of the subjects In this experiment one group of 
subjects were given the fraudster perspective used in the long-term outcome groups of 
Experiments 3 and 4. Another group of subjects were given the same problems presented 
146 
from a manufacturers' perspective. This manipulation had the advantage of differentiating 
between the actual nature of a given outcome and its financial implications from the point of 
view of the subject. Results for the group given the fraudster perspective again replicated 
the pattern of results seen in the previous experiments. The group given the manufacturer 
perspective showed a different pattern of results related to the influences of the interaction 
between initial and long-term outcome information. As predicted these results showed the 
size and direction of outcome biases to be largely dependent on outcome salience. Unlike 
previous outcome bias studies this result clearly demonstrated the role of motivational factors 
in this form of bias. 
It was suggested that one of the advantages of the experimental paradigm used in 
Experiments 3,4 and 5 was the irrelevance of the outcome information (and its financial 
implications) to the judgement required. However, the conclusion that subjects' responses 
are based on an unconscious bias depends on whether subjects believe this information to be 
irrelevant to their decision. Experiment 6 explored subjects' beliefs about the relevance of 
this information to prospective quality judgements. The results demonstrated that subjects 
were clearly aware that information relating to experimental factors was more relevant than 
that relating to outcomes when judging the quality of experiments. Further, they were also 
clearly aware that financial outcomes were the least relevant factor in these judgements. 
Overall subjects' ratings of relevance for the factors which had been varied in the earlier 
experiments were diametrically opposed to subjects' actual use of these factors in their earlier 
quality judgements. This result supported the view that the effects of outcome information 
seen in earlier experiments were likely to be the result of implicit Type 1 processes in which 
subjects were unaware of the specific influences of information on their judgements. 
This experiment also included a manipulation of subjects' point of view. Subjects 
were either asked how relevant factors would be to their judgements of the quality of 
someone else's experiment, or subjects were asked how relevant factors should be to 
someone else's judgement of the quality of their experiment. This difference in perspective 
strongly influenced subjects' ratings of the relevance of financial outcome information. 
Whilst subjects believed that others should not use financial outcome information to judge 
their experiments, they were not so averse to using this information when judging the 
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experiments of others. Again personal motivation was shown to influence judgement. 
The outcome bias demonstrated in the earlier experiments was a result of on-line 
presentation of outcome information. Both the size of the effect and its direction were 
shown to be dependent on the salience of the outcome from the point of view of the subject. 
It was proposed that this outcome bias was pervasive and would affect any related 
judgement or memory. Thus the only difference between this effect and the effect 
traditionally described as hindsight bias was that in hindsight bias studies outcome 
information was presented after the event and the task was to remember an earlier 
judgement. Experiment 7 tested this hypothesis. In this experiment subjects were required 
to judge the quality of four fictitious experiments. After a time interval they were given 
long-term outcome (replication) information and were required to remember their original 
quality judgements. They were also asked to remember the numbers of subjects and the 
significance level in the former experimental descriptions. 
Results showed the predicted hindsight effect, the direction of which was dependent 
on the nature of the long-term outcome information. Positive information led to 
overestimation of earlier quality judgements whilst negative information led to 
underestimation of earlier quality judgements. This effect mirrored the dependency of 
outcome bias effects on the nature of the related outcome information. This experiment also 
demonstrated more general effects of outcome bias on memory. Where a study was shown 
to have been replicated subjects remembered it as having used a higher number of subjects. 
These findings supported the hypothesis that hindsight effects were a particular subset of 
outcome effects. 
6.3 P R A C T I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S O F T H E P R E S E N T R E S E A R C H 
The present experimental results include a number of findings which have not 
previously been demonstrated in this research field. The paradigm used in this research was 
able to demonstrate that the presence of irrelevant outcome information will influence 
judgements of the quality of experimental designs. Also an irrelevant outcome presented in 
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hindsight was shown to influence the memory of earlier judgements. This differs from 
previous hindsight and outcome research in which the outcome information presented to 
subjects was relevant to their memory or judgement task. In addition the present research 
has demonstrated that the size (and direction) of the resulting bias will depend on the salience 
of the outcome from the point of view of the subject. Overall the effects of the presence of 
outcome information were shown to be extremely pervasive and inevitably linked to 
motivational factors. These findings have important practical implications. 
One of these implications is that the bias demonstrated in a laboratory setting will 
always be smaller than a bias resulting from a real life situation. As the effect demonsu-ated 
in a given experiment depends on the salience of the outcome information used, its size will 
always be limited by the hypothetical nature of the scenario. For example, in the present 
research, telling subjects that they would gain a large amount of money from a particular 
outcome generated effect sizes twice as large as those resulting from presenting outcome 
information alone. These effects would presumably be even larger if the subjects had 
actually received the money. Actual success or failure would necessarily produce stronger 
motivation than the hypothetical case. These results completely refute the arguments of 
Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) who suggest that hindsight bias is of no practical 
significance. (Section 3.4) Their argument is based on an average effect size generated from 
a meta-analysis of hindsight studies in which the sahence of outcomes was not considered. 
The present findings enable the prediction of situations in which the effects of outcome 
information will be very large. 
Tt has also been argued that the fact that people believe that they "knew it all along" 
merely creates a feeling of overconfidence which has few damaging practical implications. 
The present results have shown biases in judgements which go far beyond the simple "knew 
it all along effect". For example, biases in on-line quality judgements have been 
demonstrated at the same time as additional biases in the memory of those quahty 
judgements and biases in the memory of factors relating to those judgements. This creates a 
situation in which a biased judgement will be supported after the event by a biased view of 
the facts. 
This tendency to bias the memory of experimental details in line with a current 
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viewpoint explains the mechanism behind the reconstructive remembering reported by 
Vincente and Brewer (1993). When a researcher refers to a famous experiment from the 
literature, the memory of the details of that experiment will be biased in line with the belief 
that it was an experiment of high quality. 
6.3.1 Implications for the design process 
In general the effects of outcome bias demonstrated in the present research imply a 
situation in which researchers will be unable to learn effective experimental design from 
experience. The results have shown outcome information to be the overriding factor in 
judgements of design quality. Where initial outcome information was present these 
judgements were biased in favour of significant results. Where subsequent long-term 
outcome information was present judgements were biased in favour of desirable outcomes. 
Judging the quality of research studies by their long-term outcomes, although 
unreasonable in individual cases, will lead to an accurate view of correct quality criteria over 
time. Over a large number of experiments the long-term outcomes will tend to reflect the 
true quality of the experimental designs. However, long-term outcome (replication) 
informadon is very rarely available and judgements based on the initial experimental result 
will be erroneous. In an individual case the experimental result may be the result of Type 1 
or Type 2 error or may truly reflect the state of the world. Given that there is no objective 
measure of the truth of a given hypothesis; there is no way to tell whether a significant or a 
non-significant result reflects the truth or experimental error. This would suggest that 
outcome bias in experimental design will affect the ability of designers to learn accurately to 
judge quality even if they have extensive experience. Outcome bias results in the continuing 
belief that the only good experiment is one with a significant result. This belief can be seen 
in the literature where experiments with non-significant outcomes are almost never 
published. Thus the literature itself presents a biased range of experiments. This leads to a 
situation where the effects of insufficient experimental power in design (which inevitably 
leads to non-significant results) will not be reflected in this literature. This biased 
presentation of experiments will create a belief that experimental power is not an important 
issue as every example in the literature has sufficient power. This effect can be seen in 
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Experiment 1 where there was little or no consideration of power. It is also entirely 
consistent with the generally inadequate power of experiments reported by Cohen (1962) 
and Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989) (See Section 1.8.5). 
One of the most important of the present findings is that outcome bias is not dependent 
on the nature of the outcome itself (in this case replication or non-replication of the initial 
experimental result). Rather it depends on the salience of the outcome from the point of 
view of the subject. This does not imply particular problems in terms of the design of 
psychology experiments where the designers are not generally subject to financial 
motivations, although any design fault which leads to increased possibilities of successful 
outcome (such as biased sampling) may be less likely to be noted. However, this finding 
does suggest the probability of severe biases in those design areas where either the designer 
or the final iirbiter of design quality is subject to financial motivations. A similar outcome 
bias effect in these cases would lead judges to conclude that the design which was most 
financially beneficial to them was in fact the design with the highest quality. In ai'chitecture 
or civil engineering, for example, this potential bias would lead to the acceptance of designs 
for relatively cheap buildings or bridges which were potentially inadequate. It should be 
noted that this would not be a cynical conscious decision by designers to line their own 
pockets at the expense of adequate quality. This self-motivated outcome bias is unconscious 
and, as such, all the more difficult to deal with. The present research demonstrates that a 
change of perspective will in some cases reverse the effects of outcome bias and thus it may 
be possible to debias subjects by requiring them to consider a number of different points of 
view before making a quality judgement. The problem with this potentiiil debiasing 
approach is that the personal salience of a hypothetical perspective would always be 
considerably less than the salience of a real financial outcome. Thus in real life situations the 
only possibility for removing bias is to ensure an independent judge of quality who has no 
personal interest in the outcome. 
6.3.2 Implications for quality judgements where outcomes are known 
From the present research and from the outcome bias literature it would appear that any 
relevant judgement made after an outcome is known will be influenced by that outcome. A 
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number of cases have been highlighted in the literature where this form of outcome bias has 
potentially damaging effects. These include judgements of the blame atuibuted to victims 
(Janoff-Bulman et al. 1985), the quality of consumer goods (Mazursky and Ofir, 1990), the 
appropriateness of others' decisions (Lipshitz, 1989), evaluation of performance (Mitchell 
and Kalb, 1981) and the quality of monetary gambles and medical decisions (Baron and 
Hershey, 1988) to name but a few. 
The present findings show that the nature of the influence of a known outcome will be 
dependent on the personal salience of that outcome. Thus the amount of bias present in any 
of these situations will depend on the personal motivations of the judge. This factor has not 
been direcfly manipulated in previous research. The present findings enable the prediction of 
quite specific situations in which outcome bias will have a major influence, for example, 
judgements of the quality of investment decisions which have a direct financial result. It is 
also possible to predict more biased medical decisions where the decisions have financial 
consequences for the judge, for example, where a doctor is responsible for a medical budget 
or idternatively is paid for specific treatment. These predictions cleariy suggest areas in 
which further research will be most beneficial. 
Practical methods of reducing bias are also suggested by the present research. Clearly 
where it is not possible to conceal the outcome from the judge until after the judgement has 
been made, the best method of debiasing is the introduction of an independent judge who 
could be told the facts without being told the outcome. Where neither of these solutions is 
possible bias can still be reduced by ensuring that a judge has the minimum of personal 
motivation to favour any particular outcome. 
6.4 M O T I V A T I O N A L FACTORS AND O U T C O M E SALIENCE 
The present research differs from previous hindsight and outcome research in two 
important ways. Firsfly, the outcome information presented to subjects was not relevant to 
the required judgement and all the information necessary for the judgement was presented in 
the task. Secondly, a potential motivational factor, the financial implication of the outcome, 
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was made explicit and systemadcally varied within the experiment. This manipulation 
enabled a differentiation to be made between effects which were due to the nature of the 
outcome and those which were due to the implications of that outcome. These differences 
led to results which showed that even when subjects are aware that the financial implications 
of outcome information are the least relevant factor they still have the greatest influence on 
their judgements. 
Subjects' point of view was found to be easily manipulated. Although subjects were 
not able to ignore irrelevant outcome information, they were seen to reverse the effects of 
this information when another point of view was suggested to them. By manipulating 
subjects' points of view in this way it was possible to separate the nature of an outcome 
from its financial implications. Thus, the size and direction of the resulting bias was shown 
to depend largely on the implications of the given outcome from the point of view of the 
subject. These findings clearly demonstrate the central role of modvadonal factors in 
hindsight and outcome biases; a position which had been suggested by previous research but 
never directly tested. In the light of this important finding it is necessary to discuss general 
motivadonal accounts and the present motivational factors in some detail. 
6.4.1 Motivational accounts of hindsight bias 
Mouvational accounts of hindsight bias are not in competiUon with information 
processing accounts. Rather, they should be seen as an attempt to define the adaptive 
advantages which are served by the type of information processing which leads to bias. The 
present research, by expUciUy defining motivational factors, has demonstrated their 
overriding importance in determining the size and direcdon of biases relating to outcome 
information. Previous hindsight and outcome bias studies have not explicifly defined these 
factors, nevertheless, their influence may sull be inferred from previous research. 
Campbell and Tesser (1983) describe motivational accounts as those in which 
hindsight bias serves to satisfy some basic human needs. They suggest two basic types of 
motive which may be influendal; the predictability motive and the moUve to maintain self-
evaluation. In a correladonal study they report posidve associations between measures 
related to both these modves and the amount of hindsight bias exhibited. 
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The predictability motive derives from a basic human desire for control in one's 
interactions with the environment. (White, 1959, Wortman, 1976) This basic need is 
reflected in numerous psychological effects. Campbell and Tesser (1983) quote; "the desire 
for certainty (Brim and Hoff, 1957), the need to know and to be able to predict the 
environment (Kelly, 1971, Kelly, 1955, Pervin, 1963) and the need to experience an 
integrated and meaningful world (Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe, 1955)" (Page 607) In support 
of these examples is the whole literature on the illusion of control. Discussing the illusion of 
control Langer (1975) reports "While people may pay lip service to the concept of chance, 
they behave as though chance events are subject to control". This has been a familiar 
phenomenon in gambling research since both Goffman (1967) and Henslin (1967) reported 
subjects' apparent belief in their ability to control random events whilst gambling. These 
influences lead to a position where people are reluctant to believe that chance has influenced 
an outcome, particularly where the consequences of the outcome are severe (Lemer and 
Miller, 1978). This not only suggests a motivation to believe in hindsight that the given 
outcome was predictable, it also explains the increased effect sizes in outcome bias studies 
where the consequences of outcomes are severe (present research, Mitchell and Kalb, 1981). 
The need to maintain public or private self-evaluation is also a possible motivational factor in 
hindsight bias. Fischhoff (1975) recognises this factor when he points out that it is flattering 
to the subject to believe that they knew it all along. Both the concept of predictability and 
that of self-evaluation are vague. Whilst predictability is based on the need for conu-ol it may 
also reflect elements of just world theory. This would be particularly applicable in outcome 
bias studies where there might be a tendency to believe that a "good" outcome must have 
resulted from good causes and vice versa. This is to some degree suggested by studies in 
the outcome bias literature where the attribution of blame is exaggerated by su-ong negative 
outcomes (Mitchell and Kalb, 1981, Janoff-Bulman and Timko, 1985). 
Up to now the evidence linking these forms of motivation with hindsight bias has been 
correlational. In addition, the majority of these proposed motivational factors are vague and 
cannot be easily quantified. The present research has added the factor of financial gain to 
these motivational influences, and by manipulating this factor has experimentally 
demonstrated its influence as a defining factor in subsequent bias. 
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6.4.2 The role of outcome salience 
Outcome salience was first defined in Section 4.4.1 as "the relative importance of the 
implications of an outcome from the point of view of the subject". It was noted that outcome 
salience was related to the subjective utility of a given outcome and could vary in size in both 
positive and negative directions. In those experiments where outcomes had direct financial 
implications, positive or negative outcome salience was strongly related to these gains or 
losses of money. Although, in these experiments, financial outcome was the major factor 
influencing outcome salience, other motivational factors relating to outcome information 
must also be taken into account. Motivational accounts of hindsight bias have previously 
focused on factors relating to the personality of the subject. The more commonly proposed 
motivational factors were reviewed in the previous section, these factors are concerned with 
the need to maintain public or private self-evaluaUon and the need for a sense of control. 
Outcome salience must include these factors where a judgement based on the implications of 
a given outcome will serve to support these motivational needs. 
In the present experiments subjects were given a hypothetical role (Fraudster or 
roulette wheel manufacturer) which was related to a clear hypothetical goal, to make (or 
avoid losing) money. This manipulaUon artificially created a motivational factor to which the 
outcome information was directly relevant. This creation of a hypothetical goal may not 
have been entirely necessary to demonstrate the influence of the resulting outcome salience. 
The adoption of this goal without the need for role definition was shown in Experiment 2. 
This experiment had a scenario based on drug companies testing new drugs. In this case 
subjects were not given a particular role but simply asked to judge the quality of the 
sampling procedures these companies had used. Even from the point of view of an objective 
outsider, subjects were still biased in favour of procedures which had made money for the 
companies. This result suggests that subjects will adopt a goal of success in general, even 
where no personal success is implied. In these experiments the hypothetical implications of 
the outcome can be seen to interact with the subjects' personal motivations. From the 
subjects' point of view, the outcome now presents a measure of personal success or failure. 
In this case a personal motivation such as the need for control in general would be reflected 
155 
in the need to control your own (hypothetical) success. A motivation for successful self-
evaluation could also be reflected in this direct measure of hypothetical success or failure. 
By manipulating this form of goal relevant outcome information in the experimental 
paradigm, the present experiments have shown the resulting outcome salience to have a 
systematic and therefore predictable influence. This finding implies a model of bias in which 
the extent to which outcome information satisfies goals based on a subject's motivation 
(outcome salience) determines the relevance and the weighting of that informadon in the 
subsequent judgement. Thus, this motivational influence may serve to explain previously 
unexplained differences in the literature. The next section explores some of the factors 
related to outcome salience and reviews previous hindsight research taking these factors into 
account. 
In order to maintain an overall view of subjects' behaviour in these experiments it is 
necessary to remember that there will be a percentage of subjects whose judgements are 
either not biased or only biased to a small degree. The bias ai'ising from outcome salience is 
only related to those motivations which are influenced by the presence of outcome 
infomiation. Other motivations which act in opposition to these biasing motivations will 
also be present in any experimental paradigm, for example, motivations to form correct and 
fair judgements. 
6.4.3 Factors relating to outcome salience 
The present results have shown that the size and direction of a given bias is largely 
dependent on the salience of the outcome from the point of view of the subject. Following 
these findings, if outcome salience can be reliably estimated in any given study, the nature of 
the resulting bias can be predicted. Unlike the present research, in the majority of hindsight 
and outcome studies the implications of outcome information are not presented explicitly. 
Despite this there is no reason to suppose that the effects of outcome bias are limited to those 
studies which explicitly define the implications of outcomes. Outcome salience has been 
defined as "the relative importance of the implications of an outcome from the point of view 
of the subject". Using this definition it is possible to form a gross estimate of outcome 
salience in any experiment by considering the implications of a given outcome in respect of a 
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subject's motivations. 
A typical hindsight bias experiment provides an example where implications are not 
explicitly defined. In this type of experiment the subject is required to remember an earlier 
likelihood judgement after being told the 'real' outcome. There is no clear benefit or loss in 
the content of this memory task, nevertheless in the experiment as a whole, two contrasting 
motivational factors can be predicted based on the motivational accounts presented in Section 
6.4.1. Where the earher judgement can't be remembered accurately (and these experiments 
are specifically designed to make the memory tasks difficult to avoid ceiling effects) there is 
a certain amount of leeway in responses. In this case a subject who biases their responses in 
favour of the 'true' outcome achieves a number of benefits. The biased subject is able to 
believe that they are usually right when predicting future events, resulting in a positive sense 
of self-evaluation. In the case of almanac questions a bias towards true outcomes enables 
the subject to believe that they are knowledgeable. Also in the case of real life events correct 
prediction will also support a world view that in general events are predictable. This belief 
will support a subject's motivation for a sense of control in their environment. Conversely 
an unbiased subject has to cope with the conclusion that they are less knowledgeable than 
they thought or that events in the world are less predictable than they supposed. 
The motivational factor of a sense of control over the environment can also be seen in 
the light of just world theory (Lemer and Miller, 1978). It is clear that people prefer to 
believe in a world where chains of cause and effect are predictable and that consequences are 
not random. This belief is ecologically necessary in the drive to explain the world; a person 
who believed that events occurred at random would have no modvation to practice inductive 
or deductive reasoning. There is also the related question of the reversibility of cause and 
effect. It seems to be the case that people believe firstly, that any effect must have a 
definable cause (can't be random) and secondly, that if the effect is beneficial the cause must 
have been good. Note the drive to explain why when any significant event happens and the 
need to attribute blame when any bad event happens (Walster, 1967; Janoff-Bulman et 
al.,1984). 
By estimaUng the implications of a given outcome in tenns of motivational goals an 
approximate measure of outcome salience can be generated. The next section utilises these 
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estimates of outcome salience in a comparison of hindsight and outcome biases. This form 
of analysis derived from the present findings serves to produce a unified account of these 
two bia.ses and to explain previously unexplained effects from the hindsight literature. 
6.5 HINDSIGHT AND O U T C O M E BIAS IN T H E LIGHT OF T H E 
PRESENT R E S E A R C H 
6.5.1 A comparison of hindsight and outcome effects 
This thesis adopts the viewpoint that there is no fundamental difference between 
hindsight and outcome biases and, as was first argued in Section 3.3, that outcome bias is a 
pervasive effect within which hindsight bias is a special case. In this account it is proposed 
that the presentation of outcome information will influence any subsequent related 
judgement. This is supported by the fact that outcome bias studies using on-hne 
presentation of outcome information have demonstrated influences on a wide range of 
different judgements (See Section 6.3.2). In the present studies outcome information has 
been shown to be the largest influence on judgements of the quality of experimental design. 
Notably, in Experiment 7 when the same outcome information was presented at a later time 
subjects' memories of their earlier judgements of experimental quality were biased in 
hindsight. These hindsight effects were not limited to subjects' memories of earlier 
judgements; subjects' memories of the sample sizes in the original experimental descriptions 
were also biased. These results strongly suggest the pervasive influences of outcome 
information on any related judgement, whether the outcome is presented on-hne or in 
hindsight. 
In order to make a clearer comparison between hindsight and outcome biases it is 
necessary to take a closer look at differences in methodology in these studies. Before a 
theoretical account of either of these biases can be proposed the differences between within 
and between subject designs must be considered. In general within subject designs rely on 
a memory component. In these cases the judgement task is usually described as a memory 
task. The differences between these memory tasks and the more direct on-line judgement 
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tasks usually associated with between subject designs must also be considered. 
6.5.2 Within and between subject designs 
In any hindsight study using a within subjects design, the subjects have to make an 
initial judgement without outcome information. It is then necessary for the experimenter to 
introduce a time gap in order for the subjects to forget these judgements, they then repeat a 
similar judgement having been given outcome information. In a between subjects design 
one group of subjects makes a judgement having been given outcome information whilst 
another group makes the same judgement without outcome information, in this case there is 
no need for a time delay. 
Because of the use of within subjects methodology hindsight bias is traditionally seen 
as a bias of memory. In hindsight bias studies it is usually accepted that the memory of an 
earlier judgement (usually likelihood) is biased by outcome infomiation presented at some 
later fime. In this paradigm two judgements are made. The first judgement is made without 
outcome information. The second judgement is made some time later when the outcome is 
known. In this experimental paradigm this second outcome judgement is then compared, 
within subjects, to the earlier no outcome baseline. 
In contrast, the outcome bias paradigm is generally a between subjects design. In this 
case comparisons are made between subject groups, with and without (or with different) 
outcome information. If the variations in judgement tasks are ignored, the only difference in 
this paradigm is that subjects don't act as their own controls. The paradigm used in present 
research was an exception to this rule as it enabled on-line outcome effects to be compared 
within subjects for the first time. Thus, the reason that it is difficult to make a clear 
distinction between hindsight and outcome paradigms is that if a hindsight bias study was 
run between subjects, rather than within subjects, it would become an outcome bias study. 
In both cases the comparison is between a judgement made without outcome information and 
the same judgement made with outcome information. Notably, if this methodological 
difference is used to define whether a given effect is hindsight bias or outcome bias, then the 
seminal studies reported by Fischhoff (1975) are in fact outcome bias studies. In the three 
experiments he reported, effects were all based on differences between subjects who had 
159 
been presented with different on-line outcome information (or no outcome information). 
The first study to actually use a memory based hindsight paradigm was that of Fischhoff and 
Beyth (1975). It should be noted that in this experiment the time interval between the initial 
judgements and the "memory" of these judgements was anything from 2 weeks to 6 months. 
A direct comparison of between subjects and within subjects methods is available in 
the hindsight literature. In a study principally designed to test motivational effects in 
hindsight bias, Campbell and Tesser (1983) used both methods with the same subject 
groups and with counterbalanced tasks. The results of this study show significant levels of 
hindsight bias in both Memory and Hypothetical judgements. However, the between 
subjects 'Hypothetical' condition produced a bias four times larger than the bias in the within 
subjects 'memory' condition. It seems extremely likely that this difference in effect size is 
due to subjects' ability to recall their earlier judgements in the 'Memory' condition, 
particularly when it is considered that the time delay before recall was only 30 minutes. 
Nevertheless, there is still a significant hindsight bias in this memory condition, even if it is 
small. Thus it can be seen that in the within subjects paradigm the size of the resulting bias 
is reduced by subjects' ability to remember their earlier judgements. 
For the purposes of argument, if the first judgement is ignored then this second 
judgement can be seen as no different from any on-line outcome judgement. By treating 
these two judgements as separate, this description of the hindsight bias paradigm assumes 
there is little or no influence from subjects' memories of their earlier judgements. If this is 
the case then the difference between the hindsight effect and the outcome effect is only a 
difference in methodology. It is, therefore, necessary to assess the role of memory in within 
subjects hindsight bias studies in some detail and to clarify the effects of the different tasks 
involved in within and between subjects designs. 
6.5.3 Differences in judgement tasks and the effects of memory 
As described above the within and between subjects designs lead to different 
judgement tasks. Comparison between studies using these different methodologies is 
limited by the belief that in each case the subject groups with outcome information are 
making different judgements. In the between subjects outcome bias paradigm, the subjects 
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with outcome information are making an original one-off judgement. In the within subjects 
hindsight bias paradigm subjects are insuiicted to try to recreate their earher judgement after 
receiving outcome information. The clear difference being that in one case the task is to 
make an original judgement and in the other the task is to remember. 
For this reason hindsight bias is often described as a memory effect. There is 
considerable evidence to suggest that this view is wrong. In fact it is more Hkely that the 
opposite is true, the effect will only occur where the original judgement has been forgotten. 
Where this is the case the second judgement with outcome information is as much a new 
judgement as that in the between subjects outcome paradigm. When subjects are requested 
to recall their earlier judgements, if these judgements have been forgotten, the only way they 
can complete the task is to recreate the judgement. No hindsight studies have given subjects 
the option to say they have forgotten, for example, Fischhoffs (1977) instructions actually 
tell subjects to either "remember (or reconstruct if you have forgotten) your original 
responses" (Page 350). 
This proposal, that subjects who exhibit hindsight bias are the ones who are 
reconstructing rather than remembering, is strongly supported by those studies which have 
shown that the effect is reduced by the ability to recall the earlier judgement. Hell et al. 
(1988) showed an effect of memory in a within subjects study of hindsight which used 
almanac questions. For a group of subjects with no particular motivation to recall their 
original judgement (as is normally the case in hindsight experiments) hindsight bias was 
doubled when the time at which outcome information was presented was increased by a 
week. They also reported that, overall, 35% of their subjects correctly recalled their original 
responses and thus demonstrated no hindsight bias. Unfortunately the percentages of 
correct recall related to the different times of presentation of outcome information were not 
reported. Nevertheless, these findings show that a significant proportion of subjects do not 
demonstrate any bias, and that increasing the time gap between the initial judgement and the 
hindsight judgement increases the size of the overall bias. This leads Hell et al. to state "We 
can, therefore, safely conclude that a prerequisite for a hindsight bias to occur is a weak 
memoiy trace of the original response" (Page 537). 
That some subjects fail to remember their original responses is not surprising if within 
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subjects hindsight studies are considered as if they were memory tasks. For example, in the 
most difficuh condition of the Hell et al. (1988) experiment outlined above, subjects would 
have to remember 88 numeric responses for one week. Fischhoffs (1977) almanac study 
required a memory of 75 probability judgements for one hour. In contrast, Fischhoff and 
Beyth's (1977) study, based on real life events, required a memory for fewer items 
(approximately ten probability judgements) but the time delay was between two weeks and 
two months. As a final example, in the memory condition of the Campbell and Tesser 
(1983) experiment reported earlier, subjects would have to remember 80 judgements for up 
to 45 minutes. Despite the difficulty of this task, correct recall reduced the hindsight bias by 
a factor of four in this condition. It would be an extremely difficult task to recall one's 
earlier judgements in any of these experiments, even if one knew in advance that recall 
would be required and which factors would need to be recalled. Given that subjects are not 
told to remember anything in the origind phases of these experiments, it is clecir that these 
potential memory tasks are beyond the ability of the experimental subjects. This is not an 
accident, within subjects hindsight experiments are designed to ensure these tasks are 
difficult in order to avoid ceiling effects. Hindsight biases only operates under uncertainty; 
where you have clear memory you have no bias. 
Even considering the difficulty of accurate recall, the within subjects hindsight 
paradigm consistently produces smaller effects than the between subjects outcome bias 
paradigms. A l l other things being equal, this suggests that in the hindsight paradigm the 
effect is being attenuated by, either the ability for a few subjects to clearly recall and 
reproduce some of their earlier judgements, or the ability of a number of subjects to vaguely 
recall their earlier judgements and thus limit their responses to a smaller range. 
6.5.4 Conclusions for hindsight and outcome effects 
As shown above, accurate or partial recall attenuates the effects of outcome 
information in within subject paradigms. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the mechanism 
underlying hindsight bias is one in which trace memories are adjusted by the assimilation of 
new outcome information. If this were the case then even subjects with strong trace 
memories would be biased to some extent. Campbell and Tesser (1983) have shown this 
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not to be the case when they report 35% of subjects demonstrating no bias. As hindsight 
bias is only demonsu-ated by those subjects with little or no recall, then it can be concluded 
that the judgement made in hindsight is a re-judgement rather than one of adjusted recall. In 
addition, i f hindsight bias were based on the reconstruction or adjustment of existing 
memory traces, then it would not occur in any of the between subjects experiments. The 
hypothetical hindsight studies (where subjects are asked to respond as if they had not been 
given outcome information) and the on-line outcome bias studies, do not rely on the attempt 
to recall or reconstruct an earlier judgement. 
None of the remaining information processing accounts (see Section 6.3.1) 
differentiates between the influences of outcome information presented on-line with the 
original information, or presented at some later time than the original information. These 
remaining accounts are based on the way in which outcome information is combined with 
other relevant information to create a unitary judgement. In these accounts any relevant 
judgement based on the available information will be biased by the presence of outcome 
information. This enables the consideration of one comprehensive theoretical account to 
explain all effects related to the presence of outcome information. This account should relate 
to both within and between subject designs. Clearly, however, to cover the within subjects 
hindsight condition any theoretical account needs to allow for the effects of residual memory 
traces of the original judgement as an additional factor influencing the subsequent 
judgement. 
This view leaves us with an account of hindsight bias in which it is a specific form of 
outcome bias. Outcome bias implies the fact that the presence of irrelevant outcome 
information will bias any subsequent judgement. Where this judgement is the recreation of 
an earlier (largely forgotten) judgement, or where this judgement is an esfimate of what 
might have been judged if the outcome wasn't known, this effect is usually deemed 
hindsight bias. 
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6.6 A RE-ANALYSIS OF HINDSIGHT EFFECTS IN TERMS OF 
O U T C O M E SALIENCE 
The present research has demonstrated both hindsight and outcome effects within the 
same experimental paradigm (Experiment 7). This finding supported the hypothesis that 
hindsight bias was a special case of a more pervasive outcome bias effect. In the light of this 
result the previous section has discussed hindsight bias as a form of outcome effect and has 
argued that these biases have only previously appeared as separate effects because of 
methodological differences. Given this unified approach the dependency of outcome bias 
effects on outcome salience will also apply to hindsight bias effects. Thus by analysing the 
outcome salience present in previous hindsight studies this section attempts to clarify all the 
previously unexplained effects present in the hindsight literature. 
6.6.1 Variations in effect size 
There are a number of consistently reported differences in effect size in the literature 
which may be explained in terms of differences in outcome salience. Overall outcome bias 
studies demonstrate much larger biases than hindsight studies (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). 
This general finding is clearly in line with differences in outcome salience. In hindsight bias 
studies outcome salience depends on the implications of the outcome in terms of the 
subjects' personal motivational factors alone. In outcome bias studies these personal 
motivational factors are also present and, in addition, motivational goals and outcome 
implications are explicit in the task content. This additional factor will serve to increase 
outcome salience. 
Another commonly reported effect size difference is between different types of 
hindsight study. Those studies using almanac questions result in unusually large hindsight 
biases (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990, Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991) As has been 
noted outcome salience in hindsight studies is entirely dependent on personal motivations. 
The use of almanac questions will enhance the motive of need for self-esteem. In this case a 
subject is aware that their general knowledge is being tested and that their responses are a 
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measure of their personal ability. Under these conditions this enhanced motivation would 
create an increased outcome salience and thus an increased effect. 
6.6.1.1 The effect of negative outcome information 
In hindsight bias studies negative outcomes always generate smaller biases, 
Cristensen - Szalanski and Willham (1991) recognise the existence of smaller effects in those 
cases where in hindsight subjects were told that an event did not occur. In these cases 
subjects reduced their earlier likelihood judgements. It should be noted that this is not 
reverse hindsight bias; the bias is still in the same direction; confirming the outcome. 
Subjects still 'knew it all along' the difference being that they knew it wouldn't happen 
(when told that it didn't) rather than knowing it would happen (when told that it did). The 
present studies demonstrate that this asymmetry between positive and negative outcome 
information is not limited to hindsight studies. In the on-line outcome bias studies presented 
here negative outcome information has always produced smaller relative effects than positive 
information. (Experiments 2,3,4 and 5). 
Fischhoff (1977) proposed an explanation of this reduction in hindsight bias (when 
subjects were told that an effect did not occur) in terms of the cognitive difficulty involved in 
processing negative information. The difficulty of processing a negative outcome is clarified 
from the outcome salience viewpoint. With a positive outcome (an event has happened) 
there is a direct relationship between the outcome information and motivational goals. Here 
the implications of the outcome support the goals and thus outcome salience is clear. A 
subject only has to bias their likelihood judgement in line with the outcome to satisfy 
motivational goals. Where there is a negative outcome (an event did not happen) this results 
in a negative outcome salience associated with that outcome. This negative outcome salience 
cannot be used to satisfy motivauonal goals directly. Here rather than trying to achieve their 
goals directly, subjects are trying to avoid failing in their goals more than is necessary. In 
order to do this subjects must infer that two negatives will make a positive; where outcome 
salience is negative, a bias against that particular outcome will result in a positive influence in 
terms of motivational goals. This is clearly a more complex process. In the case of outcome 
bias studies, where the implications of the outcome are explicit, there is the added factor that 
165 
subjects have already failed in their main goal. When the outcome is negative their 
motivation is now a form of damage limitation. 
6.6.2 Reverse hindsight effects 
Reverse hindsight bias involves subjects biasing their memory of likelihood 
judgements in the opposite direction to the known outcome i.e. '1 never thought that might 
happen'. This is a completely different case to the effects of negative outcome information 
outlined above. This is a contentious effect which some observers consider to be caused by 
methodological irregularities (Mark and Mellor, 1990) and very few clear cases of reverse 
hindsight exist in the literature. These studies were initially described in Section 3.2.2, but 
are worth looking at in more detail in terms of the outcome salience associated with the 
experimental designs in each case. 
Mazursky and Ofir (1990) claimed a reversal of hindsight bias in three rather unusual 
experiments. Rather strangely for a hindsight study none of these experiments had a 
foresight condition, pre-exposure quality judgements (which the authors misleadingly term 
recall) were constructed in hindsight from a post-exposure questionnaire in which subjects 
were asked what their initial quality judgement might have been. Clearly in this case the 
outcome salience usually associated with hindsight judgements does not apply. There is no 
motive for self evaluation or for sense of control where an initial (pre-exposure) judgement 
has not been made. Therefore there is no associated outcome salience. Incidentally, in all 
these studies post-exposure quality judgements were biased in line with the outcome of the 
actual exposure. Thus the outcome salience of the actual exposure had the usual effects seen 
in outcome bias studies. 
Another study claiming reverse hindsight bias is that of Verplanken and Pieters 
(1988). who had completed a study of attitudes to nuclear power plants before the 
Chernobyl disaster. After the disaster they asked the subjects to recall their earlier 
judgements of the probability of this type of accident. Remembered probabilities were lower 
than they had been before the disaster in direct opposition to the usual hindsight effect. This 
result may also be explained in terms of outcome salience. The potential outcome salience 
where the outcome is a major disaster will be different from that in normal hindsight studies. 
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In this case the outcome itself is an extremely negative event and the implications of the 
outcome are all negative. If the motivations for self-evaluation and sense of control are 
satisfied the results are unpleasant. Enhanced self-evaluation and sense of control in this 
case lead to the suggestion that the disaster was predictable and that you knew it was going 
to happen. A motivation for "It was nothing to do with me" would be more appropriate 
when the outcome is a disaster. These reversed motivations would lead to a negative 
outcome salience which in turn would reverse the direction of the bias in exactly the way that 
has been reported. 
6.6.3 Conclusions from hindsight studies 
The present research suggests that motivational factors cannot be ignored in any 
account of hindsight or outcome bias. The concept of outcome salience derived from the 
present research has served to elucidate the previously unexplained effects in hindsight 
research. This concept implies the existence of an underlying drive based on the 
implications of outcome information for motivational goals. This does not mean that 
motivation is necessarily a causal factor, only that in any model of cognitive processing 
motivational goals must be considered. When discussing a variety of influences of outcome 
infomiation Fischhoff (1977) noted "Detailed information about how these biases work in 
their most general form should improve our understanding of how information is stored, 
altered and retrieved" (Page 350). This remains true even if a motivational account is 
accepted. The following section considers the concept of outcome salience in terms of 
theoretical accounts of information processing. 
6.7 O U T C O M E SALIENCE AND POTENTIALLY R E L A T E D CONCEPTS 
This thesis has described outcome salience as a motivational factor involved in 
hindsight and outcome biases. By definition outcome salience is a measure of the utility of a 
given outcome from the point of view of the subject. As such this approach may have a 
great deal in common with the concept of subjective expected utility which has been used to 
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explain choice behaviour. 
A second, and quite different, approach explains the utilisation of information in 
decision making in temis of relevance. A relevance account based on personal goal driven 
measures of relevance would also have a number of similarities to the concept of outcome 
salience. 
This section attempts to clarify the position of outcome salience in terms of these 
potentially related concepts. 
6.7.1 Outcome salience and Subjective expected utility 
Outcome salience is in part a measure of the utility of outcome information in terms of 
personal goals. In this respect it has a great deal in common with the concept of subjective 
utility. Subjective expected utility theory was initially formulated as a theory of choice 
behaviour. Normative decision theory, as described by Von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
(1986) describes an approach to selecting goals and the actions required to attain them. This 
approach is based on maximising subjective expected utility (SEU) in choices. In this 
approach choice preferences based on individual goals -dre rated in tenns of their subjective 
utility and the probability of their possible outcome. SEU is then calculated by summing the 
various outcomes and their probabilities using the following formula; 
SEU = l i Si Ui 
where Sj represents the subjective probability of the ith outcome and Ui represents it's 
subjective utility. The calculation of SEU is, therefore, the probability of a given outcome 
multiplied by its subjective utility, summed over all possible outcomes (the range of i). In 
order to make the innumerable unconscious everyday choices that allow human beings to 
cope with their environment this formula would have to be the basis of a very rapid and 
complex implicit processing system. 
If S .E.U. theory does describe choice behaviour, it should be possible to adapt this 
theory to explain the use of information in judgement. As choice depends on the respective 
subjective utilities of available actions, then judgement would depend on the respective 
168 
subjective utility of available information. In this case the probability of an outcome 
occurring has no meaning. Therefore, this term could been replaced by believability; a term 
reflecting the probability that a piece of information is true. Given these changes, it is 
possible to generate the following model of subjective expected utility of information 
[SEU(i)]. 
SEU(i) = i:,b,.U., 
where b^ represents the subjective believability of a piece of information and Uz represents 
its subjective utility in relation to the zth goal . The calculation of SEU(i) is, therefore, the 
summation of believability multiplied by goal relevance over all personal goals (the range of 
z). 
In order to differentiate between these two different SEU calculations, the calculation 
relevant to choice behaviour will be termed SEU(c) and that relating to the utility of 
information SEU(i). There is a possible difference in these two descriptions if the view is 
taken that in choice behaviour only one final choice is selected from many possibilities. 
Thus the choice with the highest SEU(c) is acted upon and all the others are discarded. This 
is not the case in judgement where any number of pieces of information may be included in 
the final judgement. In this case it is necessary to consider the calculation of SEU(i) as a 
means of generating a hierarchy of information which can then be utilised in weighting the 
influences of individual sources. Given the necessary generation of an SEU hienu'chy in 
judgement, it is also possible that in choice a hierarchy of preferred choices may be 
generated from this form of processing. This intuitively seems a better view, in a situation 
where the preferred choice became unavailable there would be an immediate alternative. 
This situation would allow for more flexible response and remove the need for unnecessary 
re-processing of SEU(c). 
Whilst this seems an acceptable general model, in the case of outcome bias 
experiments this calculation has an unusual result. If it is assumed that subjects believe the 
information they are presented with, then the believability factor will always have a value of 
1.00. This effectively removes this factor from the formula. In this case the subjective 
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expected utility of a piece of information is equal to the sum of the subjective utilities of that 
information for each goal. Thus, in the case of outcome information the SEU(i) is equal to 
the sum of the implications of the outcome in respect of a subjects' (motivational) goals. 
This is, of course, exactly the same as the definition of outcome salience. 
Given this correspondence between the SEU(i) of outcome information and outcome 
salience, the present experimental results have implications for this potential model. It has 
been seen that outcome salience influences subsequent judgements in both positive and 
negative directions. Therefore, the range of possible SEU(i) values must also include 
negative values where a piece of information will have a negative influence on a subsequent 
judgement. Thus, the SEU(i) value of a piece of information can be used not only to 
determine if that information is relevant to a judgement but also the way in which it is 
relevant to that judgement. 
As believability is not relevant in most experimental paradigms this produces a special 
case in which considerably less processing is required. This ease of processing may also 
have implications in the hindsight bias paradigm. From the point of view of hindsight the 
selection of relevant information would seem obvious as the SEU(i) calculation is easy (you 
have been told the outcome). In order to see from the point of view of someone without 
outcome information it would be necessary to ignore this knowledge and reconstruct 
hypothetical outcomes. It would then be necessary to estimate their believability without 
being influenced by what we know, and proceed with the calculation of SEU(i) based on our 
hypothefical estimates. As this calculation utilises the full model (by including hypothetical 
believability values) the processing involved would be more complex than that required 
when the outcome is known and accepted, li is easy to see why subjects might avoid this 
more complex processing task, especially when it would rarely serve any goal that could be 
described as useful in terms of personal motivations. 
This is not an argument for or against SEU theory. This rather simplistic 
reinterpreiation of the basic theory serves only to clarify the concept of outcome salience in 
terms of utility. In doing so no account is taken of exisUng research on epistemic utility 
which is considered beyond the scope of the present discussion. Nevertheless, the picture 
of SEU created by this limited consideration of the selection and use of information in 
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judgement raises a number of interesting factors not usually considered in choice related 
SEU models. In attempting to explain the differential use of the implications of information 
the concept of negative utility has to be considered. A piece of information with a high 
negative SEU(i) is as important as one with a high positive SEU(i) to the subsequent 
judgement. This case is not usually considered in the case of choice behaviour where the 
choice in a given situation depends only on maximising SEU. Yet it seems reasonable that 
in choice situations people would not only be aware of the best choice in terms of 
maximising the probability of achieving their goals, they would also be aware of the need to 
avoid those choices which will have disastrous results. In fact an awareness of these 
potentially disastrous choices would have a considerably higher survival value. 
In discussing the limitations of SEU theory, Simon (1983) notes that it necessitates a 
view in which "the decision maker contemplates, in one comprehensive view, everything 
that lies before him" (Page 13). Simon also reports, "the SEU model finesses completely 
the origins of the values that enter into the utility function; they are simply there" (Page 14). 
These concerns are reiterated by Evans and Over (1996) who note the impossibility of 
including all potential outcomes in a calculation of SEU. However, this problem remains 
even if SEU theory is discarded. Whatever system of processing is used to determine choice 
or judgement there must be some method of selecting relevant information from the infinite 
number of possibilities available before subsequent processing takes place. This question of 
relevance is discussed in the next section. 
6.7.2 Outcome salience and relevance 
The question of how relevant information is selected from the myriad sources available 
has become an area of increasing interest in decision making. It is not intended that this 
section will present an account of relevance in decision making. It will focus only on the 
implications of the present research findings for any potential account of relevance. In the 
experimental paradigms used in this research the influences of relevance related choices are 
severely curtailed. Within these experiments a very limited amount of information was 
presented. To some extent the presence of this information will suggest to subjects that it is 
relevant. Sperber and Wilson (1986) argue, in line with Grice's (1975) maxim of relevance, 
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that in any form of goal-directed communication relevance is implied by content. This 
presents a conflict in hindsight studies where subjects are presented with outcome 
information which is relevant to their decision and then instmcted to ignore it. Similarly in 
outcome bias studies subjects are presented with information which they can logically 
deduce is not relevant to their specific task (although it is relevant to the problem content). 
The clearest finding from both hindsight and outcome studies is that subjects are 
unable to ignore this outcome information. Telling them to ignore the information does not 
work. Telling them to put themselves in the position of someone who did not have this 
information does not work. Telling them to remember what it was like before they had the 
information does not work. Also, as demonstrated in Experiment 6, subjects' ratings of the 
respective releviince of available information to quality judgements is in direct opposition to 
their actual use of this information in quality judgements. 
Using Evans and Over's (1996) dual process theory it is possible to explain why this 
is the case. Explicit beliefs about the relevance of information based on normative analysis, 
or explicit instructions to ignore this information, will only influence explicit Type 2 
processes. Type I processes will be unaffected by this explicit knowledge. This suggests 
that those subjects who are biased by outcome information are relying to a considerable 
extent on Type I processing to derive their judgement. It follows that what is relevant in a 
Type 2 process is not the same as what is relevant in a Type 1 process. 
In the dual process theory a Type 2 process is explicit and reflects the u.se of conscious 
resources such as normative rules. Information would only be relevant to this process 
where it was relevant to the appropriate normative rules. The explicit rating of information 
in Experiment 6 reflects this judgement of relevance to some degree. In this case outcome 
information would not be judged as relevant. Conversely, Type 1 processes involve the tacit 
identification of goals and the formation of inferences based on these goals. In this form of 
processing the relevance of information would depend on its implications in terms of these 
tacit goals. As outcome salience is a measure of the implications of outcome information in 
terms of a subject's motivational goals, salient outcome information would necessarily be 
relevant to Type I processes. This reflects the automatic inclusion of outcome information 
in biased judgements. 
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It has been suggested that the results of Experiment 6 referred to explicit ratings of 
relevance, as such these ratings reflected the relevance of information in respect of nonnative 
rules; i.e. the relevance that relates to Type 2 processes. However, these ratings were in 
themselves a form of judgement and as such they will also be biased by the influences of 
motivational goals on Type 1 processes. This bias was evident in the differential effects of 
subject perspective. That this bias was due to the influences of motivational goals, was 
shown by the fact that only ratings of the relevance of the potential financial benefits of an 
outcome (the outcome salience) were affected to any great extent by perspective change. 
Sperber et al. (1995) suggest the connection between the salience of information and 
its perceived relevance when they define relevance in terms of a trade off between the 
cognitive effect and the cognitive effort resulting from the processing of this information. 
The form of cognitive processing required to determine relevance would necessarily have to 
be the sort of rapid preconscious and tacit process suggested by Evans (1989). If this were 
a complex form of processing this account would only work in experimental environments 
where information is sparse. In complex, information rich environments it is necessary to 
pre-select relevant information to prevent subsequent cognitive processing becoming 
infinitely complex. The nature of these processes is not clear. One of the most interesting 
questions raised by this research is; What detemiines a subject's (implicit) belief in the 
relevance of a given piece of information ? The effects of outcome salience particularly in 
tenns of financial implications suggest that the answer may be based on motivational 
factors, self-interest above and beyond all else. 
6.8 IMPLICATIONS OF T H E PRESENT RESULTS FOR T H E O R E T I C A L 
APPROACHES T O BIAS 
This section considers the most common theoredcal explanations for hindsight and 
outcome biases in relation to the present results. In order to place these theories in a wider 
context the section will begin with a short introduction to theories of rationality and bias in 
human reasoning and a brief outline of the relationship of these theories to outcome effects. 
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Following this the implications of the present results for theoretical accounts of hindsight 
bias will be presented. No theoretical accounts specific to outcome bias are presented 
because, as yet, no theories separate from those used to explain hindsight bias have been 
proposed in the literature. 
6.8.1 Reasoning, rationality and bias 
Before considering theoretical approaches specific to hindsight bias, it is necessary to 
consider some of the more fundamental approaches to reasoning. It is also useful at this 
point to clarify the implications of biased judgement in terms of rationality. In order to do 
this two definitions from Evans and Over (1996) will be adopted. The first of these is a 
definition of bias as, "a departure from an apparently appropriate normative system" (Page 
6). As Evans and Over point out, this definition avoids the pejorative use of the term bias to 
imply error or irrationality. The second definition concerns what the authors refer to as 
personal rationality "rationality]" and impersonal rationality "rationality2" these are defined 
as follows: 
" Rationalityi - Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting in a way that 
is generally reliable and efficient for achieving one's goals. 
Rationality2 - Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acfing when one has 
a reason for what one does sanctioned by a normative theory" 
Evans and Over (1996), Page 11. 
These two definitions of rationality are particularly appropriate when applied to 
examples of outcome bias studies. From the impersonal point of view (that of the 
experimenter), using rationality2, the outcome biiis reported by Mitchell and Kalb (1981) can 
be interpreted as supervisors making irrationally biased evaluations of the performance of 
nurses. These evaluations were based not on the nurse's actions but on the chance outcomes 
of these actions. From the point of view of rationality i , the subjects' point of view, these 
results look quite different. In this experiment the subjects were asked to take on the role of 
a supervisor. The job of a supervisor has a specific goal; to protect patients from harm 
arising from negligence. Given this overriding goal, a supervisor must punish a nurse 
whose actions have led to patient harm, even if the supervisor feels that this nurse has been 
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unlucky compared to a nurse who has made the same mistake without a harmful outcome. 
Punishment in this case is necessary to warn others to be vigilant and to consider the 
possible consequences of their actions, also a supervisor with the goal of keeping his or her 
job would not be successful for long if they took no action when a nurse's negligence led to 
patient injury. In this case outcome bias is irrational from the point of view of rationality2 
but clearly serves the goal directed purposes of rationality i . It should be noted that this form 
of goal directed reasoning typically appears inappropriate when applied to single cases. 
Over a large number of cases this form of reasoning inevitably supports long term goals. 
This distinction is not so clear in the present research. Experiments 2,3,4 and 5 show 
subjects judging the quality of sampling procedures on the amount of money they make 
rather than using the appropriate normative theory. This is clearly irrational from the point 
of view of rationality2. Especially when it is considered that these subjects have all been 
taught the appropriate normative theory and some of them are even studying for a degree in 
this normative theory (B.Sc. Statistics students). Again from the point of view of 
rationality 1 these results look different. In all these experimental scenarios the goal from the 
subjects' perspective was ultimately to make money. Therefore, on the surface it seems 
reasonable to favour those sampling procedures which fulfilled this goal. However, in this 
case, if this strategy was repeated in real life even over a large number of cases it would fail. 
Section 6.3 describes a number of the potentially damaging practical implicadons of the use 
of this strategy. 
In the present experimental scenarios subjects had enough information to determine 
when a good outcome was the result of chance rather than the result of a good sampling 
procedure. In these cases the outcome was clearly irrelevant and this should have served to 
reduce the resulting bias. The fact that this explicit knowledge of the irrelevance of the 
outcome had no debiasing effect is explained by Evans and Over's dual process theory of 
reasoning. 
Evans and Over (1996) contend that human cognition depends on two systems and 
"the...implicit system is primarily responsible for rationality) while...the explicit one mainly 
affects the extent of peoples rationality2" (Page 13). This leads to their view that in good 
practical reasoning the task of identifying a goal and adopting a reliable way of attaining it is 
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accomplished "almost immediately with little awareness on our part of how it is done" (Page 
17). Evans and Over present a dual process theory of reasoning based on this dual 
definition of rationality. In this theory there are two distinct forms of cognitive processing; 
goal directed implicit inferential processes which relate to rationality] (Type I processes) and 
explicit rea.soning processes which relate to rationality2 (Type 2 processes). They suggest 
that these two processes interact in reasoning and decision making tasks. In this theory 
Type 1 processes involve the tacit identification of goals and the formation of inferences 
based on these goals. This process may be extremely computationally complex and is very 
rapid. It is also entirely unconscious and automatic. It is suggested that these "intuitive" 
processes reflect the sort of learning required to achieve everyday goals. Type 2 processes 
are explicit and reflect the use of conscious resources such as normative rules. 
Applying this theory to the earlier contention, that subjects would be less biased by an 
outcome they know to be irrelevant, we see that this explicit knowledge of irrelevance would 
only influence Type 2 processes. In Type 1 processes where identifying goals and 
favouring information which potentially supports these goals is implicit and automatic, then 
explicit knowledge of irrelevance will have little or no debiasing effect. Thus, from this point 
of view outcome biases can be seen as the result of Type 1 processes in which the outcome 
information has been automatically cued as relevant to the judgement. If outcome salience is 
seen as a method of defining Type I goals, then the present findings fit perfectly within this 
description. 
The next section will review some of the main information processing and motivational 
accounts of hindsight bias. In many ways these different approaches to hindsight bias have 
a great deal in common with the dual processes outlined above. The personality based 
motivational accounts of hindsight bias are related to goal directed Type 1 processes. These 
attempts to define a subject's motivation in a given context are no more than an attempt to 
define the goals a subject is trying to achieve in Type I processing. As in rationality i , 
motivational accounts take the point of view of the subjects' personal rationality in a given 
situation. Biases arising from this situation are explained in terms of how they meet the 
needs of the subject. It may also be useful to consider information processing accounts in 
the light of Type 2 processes. These accounts focus on possible mechanisms by which a 
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process o f reasoning based on normative theory couid be influenced by the automatic 
assimilation of outcome information. In this view the resulting bias is due to errors in the 
reasoning process. 
6.8.2 Information-processing and motivational accounts of hindsight bias 
There are two main classes of account which have been proposed to explain the 
processes underlying hindsight bias. These are information processing accounts and 
motivational accounts. Information processing accounts focus on the way that information 
is assimilated, stored and retrieved. In these accounts hindsight bias is explained in terms of 
the influences of subsequent assimilation of hindsight information on one or more of these 
proces.ses. Motivational accounts focus on those factors present in the task which would 
lead subjects to derive some personal benefit from biasing their judgements. (See Section 
6.4.1) 
It has been the tendency for researchers to focus on either one or the other of these 
accounts. This has to some extent created the misapprehension that these accounts are 
mutually incompatible; either subjects are motivated to produce bias or it is the result of 
implicit cognitive processes. This belief may in some part be due to the false impression that 
motivation must be explicit and that subjects consciously form biased judgements. In fact 
when motivations are seen as implicit these two accounts are entirely compatible and wil l fit 
within the sort of dual process theory described above. Nevertheless, the influences of 
motivational factors defined by the present research clearly demonstrate that an account 
based on information-processing alone wi l l not be adequate. The following section re-
analyses information processing accounts in the light of the present results. 
6.8.2.1 Information-processing accounts of hindsight bias 
A n information-processing account was first suggested by Fischhoff (1975) who 
suggested hindsight bias was due to a form of 'creeping determinism'. Fischhoff suggests 
"that on the receipt of outcome knowledge judges immediately assimilate it with what they 
already ki iow about the event in question" (Page 279). This immediate assimilation serves 
to make a coherent whole from all the information available. Creeping determinism is the 
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direct result of using this coherent (biased) description in any subsequent hindsight 
judgement. In this account judges remain unaware of both the assimilation process and its 
subsequent influences. Fischhoff (1977) suggests that this assimilation process "may 
involve both reinterpreting previously held information to make sense out of it in light of the 
reported answer and strengthening associative links with reasons supporting the reported 
answer". (Page 356) Thus this description relies on a theoretical process in which some 
form of coherent memory of an event is automatically revised (updated) upon the receipt of 
subsequent relevant information. This account would need considerable revision in order to 
explain the effects of on-line outcome information and the effects of outcome salience 
demonstrated in the present research. 
Fischhoff (1975) also presented an alternative explanation based on Tversky and 
Kahneman's (1974) anchoring and adjustment heuristic. In this explanation it was proposed 
that on receipt of outcome information a subject assigns this outcome a probability o f 1.00. 
They then look for reasons to adjust this value downwards. In general this type of 
adjustment has been shown to be inadequate (Slovic and Lichenstein, 1971, Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). In the case of judgements based on outcome information, this 
inadequate adjustment would lead to the overesiimation of hindsight probabilities. This 
explanation has since been largely disregarded due to its inability to explain differences in 
hindsight effects (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975 and Fischhoff, 1977). In addition to these 
failures this account cannot explain the differential influences of motivational factors shown 
in the present research. Thus, it seems reasonable to discount anchoring and adjustment as a 
possible explanation. 
There are a number of other possible mechanisms on which an information processing 
account may be based. These mechanisms fall into two basic categories: memory updating 
and re-judgement. Fischhoff (1977) focused mainly on a processing account in which a 
global memory was automatically updated by the automatic assimilation of outcome 
information. This global memory consisted of the memory of an earlier likelihood 
judgement and memories of the factors which were related to that judgement. In this 
account, the adjustment of this global memory included both biasing the memory of 
likelihood in the direction of the known outcome (creating hindsight bias) and increasing the 
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strength o f associative links with evidence supporting the known outcome (creating post hoc 
rationalisation). In order to account for biases produced in between subjects experiments 
where outcome information is presented on-line, the same effect must occur in the creation 
of global memory traces as well as in the updating of existing memory traces. Again there is 
no clear mechanism by which this account could be adapted to allow for the effects of 
variations in outcome salience seen in the present research. 
The other category of information processing accounts involves re-judgement. In 
these accounts it is assumed that on the receipt of outcome information subjects form a new 
likelihood judgement. This new judgement then replaces, or is to some extent integrated 
with, their earlier judgement. Hawkins and Hastie (1990) describe a number of alternative 
strategies on which re-judgement could be based. The first of these theoretical strategies 
involves die availabihty of evidence on which a re-judgement is made. When the new 
judgement is made relevant evidence from the environment and from long-term memory 
must be reviewed. In this case hindsight bias is the result of a reduction in the accessibility 
of information which does not fit the known outcome. Slovic and Fischhoff (1977) imply 
this strategy when they suggest that in hindsight only the stated outcome is used as a cue to 
information retrieval. 
A second theoredcal strategy is based on the evaluation of available information. In 
this strategy it is suggested that once evidence has been selected as relevant further 
processing takes place to combine this evidence with other available evidence. In this further 
processing the implications of raw evidence are assessed in the light of what is known about 
the whole topic. This process is suggested by Fischhoff s (1975) concept of the creation of 
a coherent whole in which a judge attempts to make sense of all the information presented. 
Given the context of a particular outcome, information which can be interpreted in temis of 
causal relations would be easily combined into this coherent whole. This inferential process 
would serve to create a consistent world view in which relevant informadon clearly caused 
the given outcome. In this system any available information which did not fit within the 
context o f the outcome would not be combined within the coherent whole and would thus be 
disregarded. A s Hawkins and Hastie (1990) point out, it is unlikely that this process is as 
easy, automatic or unconscious as Fischhoff s original account suggests, relying as it does 
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on the formation of causal inferences. Nevertheless, they accept that the necessary inference 
processes "could easily occur in the time frame" (Page 322). This form of account is 
considerably more open to the possible inclusion of motivational factors. If the assessment 
of raw evidence was based on its implications in terms of motivational goals, then it is 
possible to account for the effects of outcome salience. However, i f this adaptation is made 
the role o f causal inferences (on which this account was originally based) become 
considerably weaker. 
A third theoretical strategy by which information processing could account for 
hindsight biases is based on the combination of the implications of available information to 
produce a unitary judgement. This account relies on more complex and, thus, less automatic 
cognitive processes. In this case a judge attempts to derive an appropriate response by 
combining the implications of the available evidence. Thus, each piece of evidence must 
first be weighted on some form of quantitative scale and then using these weights the 
implications of the evidence must be summed in order to form a unitary judgement. 
Hawkins and Hastie (1990) suggest the factors used for weighting evidence would be; 
credibility, authority, relevance and importance. They emphasise that in this process 
hindsight bias is a side effect of an adaptive learning process. It is easy to see that in this 
strategy outcome infonnation would inevitably receive a high weighting, given that its 
credibility is usually not in question and that its relevance would always be high. Indeed, if 
you believe that the end justifies the means, the relevance of the outcome overshadows that 
of all other factors. In this potential model the meanings of the factors "authority" and 
"importance" are not so clear. It seems probable that the "authority" of a given piece of 
information would only serve to influence its credibility, thus, this factor could be subsumed 
under the credibility factor. If the term "importance" refers to the importance of the 
information to the final judgement then it is no more than the sum of all the other factors (or 
possibly another 
measure of relevance). If, on the other hand, it refers to the importance of the information 
from the point of view of the judge then the term "personal salience" would be clearer. 
Thus, this information processing account is entirely compatible with the present findings, 
and motivational accounts in general, i f it is assumed that the factors used for weighting 
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information wi l l vary with the subjects' motivation. 
6.9 S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
In this thesis the effects of the presence of outcome information were shown to be an 
important source of bias to judgements under uncertainty. These biases were seen to affect 
on-line judgements, memories of judgements and even memories of facts relating to 
judgements. In the majority of the experiments reported here these judgements were of 
quality, however, it was concluded that there was no reason to suppose these effects are 
limited to a specific type of judgement or memory. The present experiments also 
demonstrated that the size and direction of outcome biases were mediated by a factor 
described as outcome salience. This factor was defined as "the relative importance of the 
implications of an outcome from the point of view of the subject". 
It was shown that the present results had practical implications in terms of 
experimental design where specific failures of designers to learn from experience were 
predicted. Specific predictions were also made relating to areas in which potentially 
damaging biased quality judgements would be expected. 
Fol lowing a discussion of outcome salience it was possible to present an account 
which unified hindsight and outcome biases. A comparison was made between hindsight 
and outcome bias studies based on the present findings and an analysis of the 
methodological differences in these studies. This comparison concluded that the effect 
known as hindsight bias is simply a special case of a more wide ranging and pervasive 
outcome bias effect. In support of this contention previously unexplained variauons in 
hindsight bias were analysed in terms of the potential outcome salience present in these 
paradigms. This analysis supported the view that hindsight and outcome effects arise from a 
common source, and that variations in the size and direction of all biases related to outcome 
information can be explained by outcome salience. The relationship between this concept of 
outcome salience and subjective expected utility was explored. B y adapting S E U theory to 
account for preferential use of information in decision making, the similarity between the 
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resulting S E U values and outcome salience was highlighted. The implications of this rather 
simplistic model in terms of the need to consider negative S E U values were discussed. In 
addition a brief account of the role of relevance was presented in which the similarities 
between outcome salience and relevance were noted. 
In a more general theoretical discussion definitions of bias and rationality and the dual 
process model of thinking, proposed by Evans and Over (1996), were reviewed. This 
theory was shown to provide a good explanatory framework for both the present results and 
outcome bias effects in general. Information processing accounts of hindsight bias were 
also considered in the light of the present results. The concept of outcome salience was 
shown to derive from the implicaUons of outcome information in terms of a subject's 
motivational goals. It was demonstrated that motivational factors such as this must be 
considered in any complete account of biases related to outcome information. 
The present results were in general support of the dual process theory of thinking 
proposed by Evans and Over (1996). Within the general framework of this theory, the 
importance of the implications of motivational goals (for example outcome salience) in Type 
I processing was emphasised. 
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APPENDIX 1 
EXPERIMENT ONE MATERIALS 
Task Instructions 
You will be presented with four problems, in the form of experimental hypotheses. 
Your task, in each case, is to design a study to test the hypothesis. 
Your design should attempt to find the best possible method of testing the given 
hypothesis. 
During the task it is important that you talk aloud describing what you are thinking 
about at that moment. If you fall silent you will be prompted to continue talking. 
You may jot down any notes you need on the question sheet, you will have fifteen 
minutes to consider each question. After the first ten minutes you will be given an answer 
sheet requesting specific information about the study. 
Questions 
A Design a study to test the hypothesis: 
Differences in table height affect writing speed. 
B Design a study to test the hypothesis: 
Physical pain affects reaction time to non painful stimuli. 
C Design a study to test the hypothesis: 
Background noise will increase solution times for quadratic equations 
for more mathematically able subjects, less able subjects will not be 
affected. 
D Design a study to test the hypothesis: 
Faces of close friends in photographs are more readily recognisable 
than faces of people only seen very rarely. 
195 
Answer sheet 
Please read each of the following headings aloud and if they are relevant, briefiy jot down 
any conclusions you have come to in the design of your study, they may be done in any 
order, please continue to talk aloud. 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables, types of measurement 
Subjects (and subject groups) 
Within, between subjects or mixed design 
Numbers of subjects 
Controlled Variables 
Advantages of this design 
Problems with this design 
196 
EXPERIMENT ONE CODING S C H E M E AND CODED RESULTS 
Coding scheme 
Utterances were coded into the following categories: 
Q - Any clarification of the original question 
I - Consideration of the independent variable 
D - Consideration of the dependent variable 
C - Consideration of confounds 
W B - Consideration of within or between subjects design 
S N - Consideration of subject numbers 
S L - Consideration of significance levels 
S G - Consideration of subject groups or subject type 
Po - Consideration of power 
P - Consideration of the practicality of a design 
C O - Consideration of cost 
M - Consideration of materials 
ST - Consideration of statistical analysis 
ET - Consideration of ethics 
E V - Any form of evaluation (Either general evaluation or added to any of the previous 
categories to show which factor is being evaluated) 
* - Any form of decision (Added to one of the previous categories to show which 
factor has been decided) 
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Experiment one - categorical coding of verbal protocols 
First question attempted 
S u b j e c t 3 7 5 6 1 0 4 8 9 
Q u e s t i o r A A B B B C C D 
D 1 Q 1 Q Q Q Q 
C 33 1 Q D 1 33 P 
C W B Q 1 D D 1 D 
1 1 1 1 1 33 W B * 1 
Q P Q P P Q B / P 
1 * 0 Q 1 P 1 P Q 
C C Q W B * 33 33 1 1 
S N * D 1 S N * C C 1 P 
C P 1 D SN P B / C 
W B 1 Q 1 S N * C 33 Q 
(D 0 1 1 SNEV E S G B / C 
W B * W B Q 1 1 E lEV C 
Q C 83 1 1 C B / Q 
P Q 1 W B E C C C 1 
C sr 1 Q W B Q W B * STFEV 
Q sr 33 W B W B E V C C P 
C 1 C C 33 33 DEV 
P SN C W B * D 
M C W B * 1 Q 
C ST D 1 
P B / D 
P ST 1 
CD B / B / 
EV 1 * 
B / P 





Second question attempted 
Sub jec t 4 5 8 3 7 9 6 1 0 
Quest ion A A A B B C D D 
Q 33 Q Q 1 1 1 Q 
C C 1 1 Q 1 D D 
W B * 33 W B E ET W B C D 
P 1 B / 33 Q 1 D D 
1 D B / D 33 P W B * D 
1 * P 1 1 1 D 1 0 
1 1 1 Q W B 33 D P 
33 P C 1 W B * 33 C 1 
D P B / 1 1 33 C D 
D 0 W B E 1 Q C D 
C W B 1 E 33 Q SN 
W B E CD D * D C C W B 
1 33 1 Q C W B W B 
C W B SN C D C 
W B E 1 ET B/ 33 C 
OCE W B ET ST C W B * 
C C S N * ST C STTEV 
C Q 1 STTEV C SNEV 
sr C E f CEV C sr 
0 1 * ET sr C CD 
0 W B * 1 BJ S N * 
D SN BJ P 
D 33 33 
P P C 










Third question attempted 
Sub jec t 9 3 6 7 1 0 4 5 8 
Quest ion B C C C C D D D 
Q Q Q 33 Q 0 1 Q 
Q 1 1 33 Q D D Q 
ET D 1 S G * Q D Q 1 
D D D 1 33 1 1 P 
1 D * 33 W B * 1 Q E P 
P Q C 1 33 P 1 D 
1 33 C D sr P C 1 * 
1 C 1 1 33 C 1 W B * 
P W B P D sr 1 D C 
1 Q 1 D W B D Q P 
sr 33 W B * D 1 Q B / 
C B / 1 C C c P 
D Q W B C 33 C 
1 33 1 D S G B / D 
I C 33 1 sr D 
W B S G * 33 P sr D 
ET C S G * 0 1 P 
P D 1 SGEV lEV 1 
ET 1 1 C W B P 
W B 1 1 C B / C 










Fourth question attempted 
Sub jec t 6 9 1 0 4 8 5 3 7 
Quest ion A A A B B C D D 
1 P Q Q Q 33 Q Q 
C Q C D 1 33 1 1 
D 1 D E 1 1 Q P 
1 D D Q Er sr P D 
WB P C E ET C 1 D 
WB P WB E 33 C C 0 
P D sr 33 ET P Q D * 
1 P 1 1 1 33 1 Q 
C CD WB 33 ET 1 1 WB* 
33 1 0 WB Er E Q Q 
33 WB WB 1 33 1 1 Q 
C G (D D Er 33 D Q 
SN WBEV 1 E 33 P SN 
WB* 1 C 33 Er D 1 
S N * 1 WB 1 33 P D 
1 ST WBEV D 1 D P 
C 0 WB* WB P BJ 
1 * 0 1 33 1 
0 0 CD 1 sr 
p BJ 1 * 33 1 * 
1 C C 1 S N * 
1 33 C 33 S N * 
33 sr C 1 1 
E 33 0 E P 
P C C 1 
33 C C 
C 0 C 
STEV C 




EXPERIMENT TWO MATERIALS and ANAIASES 
Experiment two - Questions (with outcome information) 
1. 
In an experiment to test the effects of the drug Largacil 15 adult subjects were each 
given the standard therapeutic dose. Resulting blood pressure levels were compared with a 
placebo group of 15 subjects, using a t - test. Significance levels were set at 0.01. A 
significant reduction in blood pressure was found. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials confirmed this effect on blood pressure. The drug 
was licenced for clinical use and has made profits for this company. 
Quality score 
% 
The compound Ectarin B was tested for its effect on blood pressure using an 
experimental group of 50 adult subjects who each received a standard dose of the drug. 
Their resulting blood pressure levels were compared with those of a placebo control group of 
50 adults, using a t - test. It was decided to use a statistical significance level of 0.01. The 
results showed a significant reduction in the blood pressure of the experimental group, 
compared to the control group. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials confirmed this effect on blood pressure. The drug 
was licenced for clinical use and has made profits for this company. 
Quality score 
In the March 15th drug trial, Reprobin, a potential hypertension agonist was 
administered to 15 human subjects at therapeutic dose levels, (15 subjects recieved 
placebos). Significance levels were set at 0.05. An analysis of blood pressure 
measurements showed a significant reduction for the drug condition when compared to the 
placebo condition (t - test). 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials confirmed this effect on blood pressure. The drug 
was licenced for clinical use and has made profits for this company. 
Quality score 
% 
Experimental testing of HTF 7 (Hypoteflin) demonstrated a significant reduction in 
blood pressure levels. The trial was conducted using adult subjects 50 in an experimental 
group, who were given HTF 7, and 50 in a placebo group. Blood pressure scores for each 
group were statistically compared using a t - test; the critical significance level had been set at 
0.05. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials confirmed this effect on blood pressure. The drug 
was licenced for clinical use and has made profits for this company. 
(Quality score 
202 
In an experimental trial to determine the efficiency of a new drug to reduce the severity 
of hypertension (high blood pressure), normal dose levels of Hypolax were given orally to 
15 adult subjects; 15 received a placebo substitute. Resulting blood pressure measures were 
compared between these groups; significance was set at 0.01. Statistical analysis (t - test) 
failed to show a significant difference in the blood pressure scores. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials run by a competing company also found no effect on 
blood pressure. The drug was not licenced for clinical use. 
Quality score 
% 
In the first of a potential series of blood pressure trials Minigen was tested for its 
effects on human subjects. The experimental design used 50 subjects in an experimental 
(drug) condition and 50 control (placebo) subjects. The experimental hypothesis was that 
the exp>erimental group would exhibit lower blood pressure at a significance level of 0.01. 
This hypothesis was not proved and the null hypothesis of no difference was accepted. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials also found no effect on blood pressure. The drug 




The initial clinical trial of Trimazole consisted of administration of doses at therapeutic 
levels, (5 mg orally), to 15 adult subjects in an experimental condition (and 15 placebo). 
Resulting blood pressure was compared with levels from a placebo group. Using t - test 
statistical analysis with a pre-set significance level of 0.05 no significant reduction in blood 
pressure was found for the drug condition. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials run by a competing company also found no effect on 
blood pressure and the drug was not licenced for clinical use. 
Quality score 
8 . 
An experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that 10 mg doses of Disigamine 
would significantly reduce blood pressure in human subjects. The experimental procedure 
consisted of either the drug or a placebo being given to two groups of 50 subjects each. The 
resulting blood pressure scores for drug and placebo groups were compared statistically; 
significance levels of 0.05 were chosen. No significant difference was found (t- test). 




In an experiment to test the drug Lessophin, 15 adult subjects were each given the 
standard therapeutic dose. Resulting blood pressure levels were compared with a placebo 
group of 15 subjects, using a t - test. Significance levels were set at 0.01. A significant 
reduction in blood pressure was found. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials however showed there was no effect on blood 
pressure and the clinical licencing application failed at a significant cost. 
Quality score 
10. 
Ectofiigen was tested for its effect on blood pressure using an experimental group of 
50 adult subjects these subjects each received a standard dose of the drug. Resulting blood 
pressure levels were compared with those of a placebo control group of 50 adults, using a t 
- test. It was decided to use a statistical significance level of 0.01. The results showed a 
significant reduction in the blood pressure of the experimental group compared to the control 
group. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials however, showed there was no effect on blood 




In an exploratory drug trial, Restanic, a potential treatment for hypertension was 
administered to 15 human subjects at therapeutic dose levels (15 subjects received placebos). 
Significance levels were set at 0.05. An analysis of blood pressure measurements showed 
a significant reduction for the drug condition when compared to the placebo condition (t -
test). 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials however showed there was no effect on blood 
pressure and the clinical licencing application failed at a significant cost. 
Quality score 
12. 
A trial to test the effects of PRZ (Prozalin) was conducted using adult subjects, 50 in 
an experimental group who recieved PRZ, and 50 in a placebo group. Blood pressure 
scores for each group were statistically compared using a t - test, the critical significance 
level had been set at 0.05. The trial demonstrated a significant reduction in blood pressure 
levels. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials however showed there was no effect on blood 





In an experimental trial of a new drug to reduce the severity of high blood pressure 
normal dose levels of Hyperstem were administered to 15 subjects. A placebo substitute was 
administered to another 15 subjects. Resulting blood pressure measures were compared 
between these groups using a t - test; significance was set at 0.01. Statistical analysis failed 
to show a significant difference in the blood pressure scores. 
Outcome : The company involved cancelled testing. Subsequent clinical trials run by a 
competitor did find an effect on blood pressure. The drug was licenced for clinical use and 
has made significant profits for the competing company. 
Quality score 
14. 
Mestamine was tested for its effects on blood pressure in human subjects. The 
experimental design involved 100 subjects, 50 experimental (drug) and 50 control (placebo). 
The experimental hypothesis was that Mestamine would lower blood pressure, a significance 
level of 0.01 was set. This hypothesis was not proved the null hypothesis was accepted (t -
test). 
Outcome : The company involved cancelled testing. Subsequent clinical trials run by a 
competitor did find an effect on blood pressure. The drug was licenced for clinical use and 




A n experimental trial of Triole-1 consisted of administration of doses at therapeutic 
levels to 15 adult subjects in an experimental group. Resulting blood pressure measures 
were compared with those of a placebo group (15 subjects). Using a t - test for statistical 
analysis, with a pre-set significance level of 0.05 no significant reduction in blood pressure 
was found for the drug condition. 
Outcome : The company involved cancelled testing. Subsequent clinical trials run by a 
competitor did find an effect on blood pressure. The drug was licenced for clinical use and 




The hypothesis that 10 mg doses of Lipramine would significantly reduce blood 
pressure in human subjects was experimentally tested. The trial consisted of either the drug 
or a placebo being given to two groups of 50 subjects each. In this design significance 
levels were set at 0.05. When the blood pressure scores for drug and placebo groups were 
compared statistically results failed to show a significant difference (t - test). 
Outcome : The company involved cancelled testing. Subsequent clinical trials run by a 
competitor did find an effect on blood pressure. The drug was licenced for clinical use and 




Experiment two - Long-term outcome information 
A l l four possible outcomes were as follows: 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials confirmed this effect on blood pressure. 
The drug was licensed for clinical use and has made profits for this company. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials run by a competing company also found 
no effect on blood pressure. The drug was not licensed for clinical use. 
Outcome : Subsequent clinical trials however showed there was no effect on 
blood pressure and the clinical licensing application failed at a significant cost. 
Outcome : The company involved cancelled testing. Subsequent clinical trials run 
by a competitor did find an effect on blood pressure. The drug was licensed for 
clinical use and has made significant profits for the competing company. 
The subject group given long term outcome information received the same experimental 
descriptions (see above) with the addition of one of these sections counterbalanced 
across question type. 
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Experiment two - anova table for complete analysis of all subjects 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Outcome Info 1 2269.695 2269.695 .714 .4010 
Subjecl(Group) 70 222475.797 3178.226 
Outcome 1 6646.084 6646.084 15.887 .0002 
Outcome * Outcome Info I 6342.195 6342.195 15.161 .0002 
Outcome * Subjecl(Group) 70 29282.533 418.322 
Result I 2559.105 2559.105 5.968 .0171 
Result * Outcome Info 1 73.508 73.508 .171 .6801 
Result * Subject(Group) 70 30018.450 428.835 
Level 1 6646.084 6646.084 16.080 .0001 
Level * Outcome Info I 44.730 44.730 .108 .7432 
Level * Subject(Group) 70 28932.748 413.325 
Ssnumber 1 35366.918 35366.918 59.048 .0001 
Ssnumber * Outcome Info 1 250.320 250.320 .418 .5201 
Ssnumber * Subject(Group) 70 41926.325 598.947 
Outcome * Result 1 265.459 265.459 .950 .3332 
Outcome * Result * Outcome Info 1 1514.793 1514.793 5.419 .0228 
Outcome * Result * Subject (Group) 70 19567.561 279.537 
Outcome * Level 1 82.883 82.883 .560 .4569 
Outcome * Level * Outcome Info 1 .459 .459 .003 .9558 
Outcome * Level * Subject(Group) 70 10366.470 148.092 
Result * Level I 529.480 529.480 2.885 .0938 
Result * Level * Outcome Info I 336.918 336.918 1.836 .1798 
Result * Level * Subject (Group) 70 12846.165 183.517 
Outcome * Ssnumber 1 5.980 5.980 .038 .8466 
Outcome * Ssnumber * Outcome Info 1 47.938 47.938 .302 .5841 
Outcome * Ssnumber * Subject (Group) 70 1 1095.894 158.513 
Result * Ssnumber 1 471.501 471.501 2.427 .1237 
Result * Ssnumber * Outcome Info 1 175.001 175.001 .901 .3458 
Result * Ssnumber * Subjeci(Group) 70 13597.061 194.244 
Level * Ssnumber 1 219.626 219.626 1.420 .2374 
Level * Ssnumber * Outcome Info 1 15.355 15.355 .099 .7536 
Level * Ssnumbcr * Subjecl(Group) 70 10824.582 154.637 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 275.147 275.147 2.353 .1296 
Outcome * Result * Level * Outcome Info 1 34.376 34.376 .294 .5894 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subjeci(Group) 70 8185.790 1 16.940 
Outcome * Result * Ssnumber I 8.168 8.168 .057 .8127 
Outcome * Result * Ssnumbcr * Outcome Info 1 187.695 187.695 1.300 .2581 
Outcome * Result * Ssnumbcr * Subject (Group) 70 10107.450 144.392 
Outcome * Level * Ssnumber 1 14.001 14.001 .102 .7502 
Outcome * Level * Ssnumber * Outcome Info 1 453.758 453.758 3.312 .0731 
Outcome * Level * Ssnumber * Subject(Group) 70 9591.054 137.015 
Result * Level * Ssnumber 1 18.251 18.251 .134 .7155 
Result * Level * Ssnumber * Outcome Info 1 115.647 115.647 .849 .3601 
Result * Level * Ssnumber * Subjecl(Group) 70 9538.165 136.259 
Outcome * Result * Level * Ssnumber 1 216.147 216.147 2.296 .1342 
Outcome * Result * Level * Ssnumber * Outc... 1 19.793 19.793 .210 .6480 
Outcome * Result * Level * Ssnumber * Subj... 70 6590.873 94.155 
Dependent: Quality 
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Experiment two - anova table for analysis of subjects recieving only initial 
experimental result 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 35 116268.375 3321.954 
Outcome 1 1.778 1.778 .013 .9112 
Outcome * Subject 35 4928.597 140.817 
Result 1 1750.028 1750.028 3.575 .0669 
Result * Subject 35 17131.597 489.474 
Level 1 2800.174 2800.174 6.323 .0167 
Level * Subject 35 15498.951 442.827 
Ssnumber i 20784.028 20784.028 40.752 .0001 
Ssnumber * Subject 35 17850.347 510.010 
Outcome * Result 1 256.000 256.000 2.160 .1506 
Outcome * Result * Subject 35 4148.375 118.525 
Outcome * Level 1 47.840 47.840 .387 .5378 
Outcome * Level * Subject 35 4324.535 123.558 
Result * Level 1 855.563 855.563 6.066 .0188 
Result * Level * Subject 35 4936.562 141.045 
Outcome * Ssnumber 1 10.028 10.028 .085 .7728 
Outcome * Ssnumber * Subject 35 4145.097 118.431 
Result * Ssnumber 1 36.000 36.000 .189 .6664 
Result * Ssnumber * Subject 35 6664.875 190.425 
Level * Ssnumber 1 175.563 175.563 .966 .3323 
Level * Ssnumber * Subject 35 6357.813 181.652 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 57.507 57.507 .467 .4991 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject 35 4313.868 123.253 
Outcome * Result * Ssnumbcr 1 58.778 58.778 .420 .5214 
Outcome * Result * Ssnumber * Subject 35 4903.847 140.110 
Outcome * Level * Ssnumber 1 154.174 154.174 1.180 .2849 
Outcome * Level * Ssnumber * Subject 35 4574.451 130.699 
Result * Level * Ssnumber 1 21.007 21.007 .183 .6714 
Result * Level * Ssnumber * Subject 35 4017.868 114.796 
Outcome * Result * Level * Ssnumber 1 52.562 52.562 .687 .4128 
Outcome * Result * Level * Ssnumber * ... 35 2677.562 76.502 
Dependent: Quality 
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Experiment two - means table for analysis of subjects recieving only initial 
experimental result 
Means Table 
Effect: Result * Level * Ssnumber 
Dependent: Quality 
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 
Significant, Sig .01, Ss-30 72 56.111 17.213 2.029 
Significant, Sig .01, Ss-100 72 69.347 20.332 2.396 
Significant, Sig .05, Ss-30 72 49.986 18.187 2.143 
Significant, Sig .05, Ss-100 72 61.778 20.696 2.439 
Non Sig. Sig .01, Ss-30 72 50.306 18.883 2.225 
Non Sig, Sig .01, Ss-100 72 63.306 21.469 2.530 
Non Sig, Sig .05, Ss-30 72 49.819 20.966 2.471 
Non Sig, Sig .05, Ss-100 72 59.847 20.504 2.416 
Experiment two - analysis of interaction between experimental result and 
pre-set significance level 
(subjects recieving only initial experimental result) 
Least Squares Means Table 
Effect: Result * Level 
Dependent: Quality 
Significant, Sig .01 
Significant, Sig .05 
Non Sig, Sig .01 
Vs. • iff. Std. Error t-Test P-Value 
Significant, Sig .05 6.847 1.400 4.892 .0001 
Non Sig. Sig .01 5.924 1.400 4.232 .0002 
Non Sig, Sig .05 7.896 1.400 5.641 .0001 
Non Sig, Sig .01 -.924 1.400 -.660 .5136 
Non Sig, Sig .05 1.049 1.400 .749 .4587 
Non Sig, Sig .05 1.972 1.400 1.409 .1676 
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Experiment two - anova table for analysis of subjects recieving initial 
experimental result and long-term outcome information 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 35 106207.422 3034.498 
Outcome 1 12986.502 12986.502 18.663 .0001 
Outcome * Subject 35 24353.936 695.827 
Result I 882.585 882.585 2.397 .1306 
Result * Subject 35 12886.852 368.196 
Level 1 3890.641 3890.641 10.137 .0030 
Level * Subject 35 13433.797 383.823 
Ssnumber 1 14833.210 14833.210 21.564 .0001 
Ssnumber * Subject 35 24075.977 687.885 
Outcome * Result 1 1524.252 1524.252 3.460 .0713 
Outcome * Result * Subject 35 15419.186 440.548 
Outcome * Level 1 35.502 35.502 .206 .6530 
Outcome * Level * Subject 35 6041.936 172.627 
Result * Level 1 10.835 10.835 .048 .8280 
Result * Level * Subject 35 7909.602 225.989 
Outcome * Ssnumber 1 43.891 43.891 .22 1 .6412 
Outcome * Ssnumber * Subject 35 6950.797 198.594 
Result * Ssnumber I 610.502 610.502 3.082 .0879 
Result * Ssnumbcr * Subject 35 6932.186 198.062 
Level * Ssnumber 1 59.418 59.418 .466 .4995 
Level * Ssnumber * Subject 35 4466.769 127.622 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 252.016 252.016 2.278 .1402 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject 35 3871.922 110.626 
Outcome * Result * Ssnumber 1 137.085 137.085 .922 .3435 
Outcome * Result * Ssnumber * Subject 35 5203.602 148.674 
Outcome * Level * Ssnumber 1 313.585 313.585 2.188 .1480 
Outcome * Level * Ssnumber * Subject 35 5016.602 143.331 
Result * Level * Ssnumber 1 1 12.891 112.891 .716 .4033 
Result * Level * Ssnumber * Subject 35 5520.297 157.723 
Outcome * Result * Level * Ssnumber 1 183.377 183.377 1.640 .2087 
Outcome * Result * Level * Ssnumber * Subject 35 3913.311 1 1 1.809 
Dependent: Quality 
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Experiment two - means table for analysis of subjects recieving initial 
experimental result and long-term outcome information 
Means Table 
Effect: Outcome * Result * Level * Ssnumber 
Dependent: Quality 
Replicated, Significant, Sig .01, Ss-30 
Replicated, Significant, Sig .01, Ss-100 
Replicated, Significant, Sig .05, Ss-30 
Replicated, Significant, Sig .05, Ss-100 
Replicated, Non Sig, Sig .01, Ss-30 
Replicated, Non Sig, Sig .01, Ss-100 
Replicated, Non Sig, Sig .05, Ss-30 
Replicated, Non Sig, Sig .05, Ss-100 
Not replicated, Significant, Sig .01, Ss-30 
Not replicated. Significant, Sig .01, Ss-100 
Not replicated, Significant, Sig .05, Ss-30 
Not replicated. Significant, Sig .05, Ss-100 
Not replicated, Non Sig, Sig .01, Ss-30 
Not replicated, Non Sig, Sig .01, Ss-100 
Not replicated, Non Sig, Sig .05, Ss-30 
Not replicated, Non Sig, Sig .05, Ss-100 
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 
36 56.389 24.862 4.144 
36 72.000 17.180 2.863 
36 54.61 1 22.967 3.828 
36 66.472 18.767 3.128 
36 54.500 22.120 3.687 
36 64.528 22.122 3.687 
36 51.111 23.688 3.948 
36 56.417 22.435 3.739 
36 47.333 17.752 2.959 
36 59.194 24.371 4.062 
36 41.222 17.925 2.988 
36 50.722 21.530 3.588 
36 49.61 1 19.494 3.249 
36 55.278 21.663 3.61 1 
36 42.667 21.652 3.609 
36 54.028 18.913 3.152 
Experiment two - analysis of interaction between experimental result and 
long-term outcome 
(subjects recieving long-term outcome information) 
Least Squares Means Table 
Effect: Outcome * Result 
Dependent: Quality 
Replicated, Significam 
Replicated, Non Sig 
Not replicated, SigniTicant 
Vs. Di f f . Std. Error I-Test P-Valuc 
Replicated, Non Sig 5.729 2.474 2.316 .0265 
Not replicated. Significant 12.750 2.474 5.154 .0001 
Not replicated, Non Sig 1 1.972 2.474 4.840 .0001 
Not replicated, Significant 7.021 2.474 2.838 .0075 
Not replicated, Non Sig 6.243 2.474 2.524 .0163 
Not replicated, Non Sig -.778 2.474 -.314 .7551 
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APPENDIX 3 
EXPERIMENTS T H R E E and FOUR MATERIALS and ANALYSES 
Experiment three (and four) - task instructions 
Introduction 
The following description and series of questions are designed to study understanding 
of the concept of quality in experimental sampling. 
Your co-operation in this experiment is greatly appreciated, and the results should be 
of use to you as they will demonstrate general levels of understanding of sampling 
principles. Results and explanations will be made available as soon as possible. 
You do not need to put your name on the answer sheets but please print your name on 
this instruction sheet and hand it back separately at the end. 
Scenario 
A worker in a roulette wheel factory had been bribed to produce a number of wheels in 
which the slots for even numbers were slightly larger than those for odd numbers. 
It was the intention of a well financed team of fraudsters to bet heavily on even 
numbers on the biased wheels. Half the casinos ordering new wheels had received the 
biased wheels. However due to security measures it was impossible for the team to find out 
which of these casinos received true or biased wheels. 
It was decided that each member of the team would go to a different casino and make a 
number of small bets whilst counting the number of even wins to see whether the new wheel 
was one of the biased ones. Simply standing at the table without betting was regarded as 
too suspicious as casino security consistently video and study behaviour at roulette tables. 
If it was decided that the wheel was biased towards even numbers then the rest of the team 
would return to make a great number of large bets on even numbers. 
Tests involving extensive counting of even wins can be very expensive to run and 
dangerous in terms of alerting the casino to a specific interest in the roulette wheel. The 
potential cost of the larger bets is high. 
Test bets 
In initial tests sampling methods varied between individuals. Different numbers of 
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spins were counted and there were also differences in the percentage of even number wins 
which were regarded as sufficient evidence of a biased table. On an unbiased table even 
numbers have a 50% probability of winning if zero wins are disregarded; biased tables have 
a greater probabihty of even wins. Below are a series of descriptions of the tests used by 
different team members. 
Task 
Your task is to read each description and give an intuitive estimate of the quality of the 
test for a biased roulette wheel by writing a percentage mark (from 0 to 100) in the space 
provided. 
A test of high quality is one which has a high probability of 
differentiating whether a table is truly biased or not without incurring 
excessive cost. 
Please try to use the whole range of marks. 
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Experiment three (and four) - Questions (without outcome information) 
In the Monte Carlo Grand casino 300 spins of the roulette wheel were counted. The 
team member involved decided to regard anything higher than 56% even wins as sufficient 
evidence of a biased table. A bias to even numbers was found. 
Quality score 
In the Paris Melropole casino 300 spins of the roulette wheel were counted. The team 
member involved decided to regard anything higher than 54% even wins as sufficient 
evidence of a biased table. No bias to even numbers was found. 
Quality score % 
In the London Alhambra casino 700 spins of the roulette wheel were counted. The 
team member involved decided to regard anything higher than 56% even wins as sufficient 
evidence of a biased table. A bias to even numbers was found. 
Quality score 
In the Frankfurt Main casino 700 spins of the roulette wheel were counted. The team 
member involved decided to regard anything higher than 54% even wins as sufficient 
evidence of a biased table. No bias to even numbers was found. 
Quality score % 
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Experiment three (and four) - Long-term outcome information 
Al l four possible outcomes were as follows: 
Outcome : Subsequent large bets confirmed this wheel to be biased. The wheel has made 
large profits for the team. 
Outcome : Subsequent betting by customers confirmed this finding. The table was not 
biased. 
Outcome : Subsequent large bets by the team however showed no evidence of bias. A 
significant amount of money was lost. 
Outcome : The team did not go ahead with large scale bets. However subsequent betting 
by customers did show a bias towards even numbers and the wheel was eventually replaced. 
The subject group given long term outcome information received the same experimental 
descriptions (see above) with the addition of one of these sections counterbalanced 
across question type. 
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Experiment three - anova table for complete ana lysis of all subjects 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Group 1 15277.131 15277.131 4.549 .0364 
Subject(Group) 71 238424.774 3358.095 
Outcome 1 12831.721 12831.721 25.486 .0001 
Outcome * Group 1 16269.976 16269.976 32.314 .0001 
Outcome * Subjecl(Group) 71 35747.796 503.490 
Result 1 32.359 32.359 .056 .8131 
Result * Group 1 2473.220 2473.220 4.305 .0416 
Result * Subject(Group) 71 40790.038 574.508 
Level 1 10083.047 10083.047 29.360 .0001 
Level * Group I 1448.415 1448.415 4.217 .0437 
Level * Subject(Group) 71 24383.768 343.433 
Spins 1 16870.768 16870.768 24.403 .0001 
Spins * Group 1 1826.584 1826.584 2.642 .1085 
Spins * Subject(Group) 71 49085.105 691.340 
Outcome * Result 1 2628.089 2628.089 12.542 .0007 
Outcome * Result * Group 1 1687.080 1687.080 8.051 .0059 
Outcome * Result * Subject(Group) 71 14877.794 209.546 
Outcome * Level 1 90.341 90.341 1.481 .2276 
Outcome * Level * Group 1 .408 .408 .007 .9351 
Outcome * Level * Subject(Group) 71 4329.850 60.984 
Result * L^vel I 51.660 51.660 .533 .4678 
Result * Level * Group 1 59.812 59.812 .617 .4348 
Result * Level * Subject (Group) 71 6882.668 96.939 
Outcome * Spins 1 44.957 44.957 .420 .5190 
Outcome * Spins * Group 1 233.493 233.493 2.182 .1441 
Outcome * Spins * Subject(Group) 71 7598.689 107.024 
Result * Spins 1 39.653 39.653 .791 .3769 
Result * Spins * Group 1 544.254 544.254 10.850 .0015 
Result * Spins * Subjeci(Group) 71 3561.339 50.160 
Level * Spins 1 108.315 108.315 .792 .3766 
l ^ v e l * Spins * Group 1 2.375 2.375 .017 .8956 
Level * Spins * Subject(Group) 71 9714.876 136.829 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 .032 .032 3.042E-4 .9861 
Outcome * Result * Level * Group 1 4.226 4.226 .040 .8418 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject(Group) 71 7476.916 105.309 
Outcome * Result * Spins 1 16.664 16.664 .273 .6032 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Group 1 22.381 22.381 .366 .5470 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Subject(Group) 71 4339.900 61.125 
Outcome * Level * Spins 1 36.105 36.105 .524 .4715 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Group 1 215.480 215.480 3.128 .0812 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Subject(Group) 71 4890.624 68.882 
Result * Level * Spins 1 67.010 67.010 .649 .4233 
Result * Level * Spins * Group 1 96.902 96.902 .938 .3360 
Result * Level * Spins * Subject(Group) 7! 7333.739 103.292 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins 1 318.596 318.596 5.375 .0233 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * Group 1 .283 .283 .005 .9451 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * Subjec... 71 4208.091 59.269 
Dependent: Quality 
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Experiment three - means table for overall analysis 
Count Mean Sid. Dev. Sid. Em 
Correcl. Bias found, %56. Spin300. No-oulcome informalion 
CoiTCCl. Bias found. %56. Spin300, Oulcome informalion 
Corrccl. Bias found. %56. Spin700. No-oulcome informalion 
Corrccl. Bias found. %56. Spin700. Oulcomc informalion 
Correcl. Bias found, %54. Spin300, No-oulcome informalion 
Correcl, Bias found, %54, Spin300, Oulcome informalion 
Correcl. Bias found, %54, Spin700, No-oulcome informalion 
Correcl, Bias found, %54, Spin700, Oulcome informalion 
Correcl, N o Bias, %56, Spin300, No-ouicome informalion 
Correcl. N o Bias, %56. Spin300. Oulcome information 
Correcl, N o Bias, %56, Spin700, No-oulcome informalion 
Correcl, N o Bias, %56, Spin700, Oulcome informalion 
Correcl, N o Bias. %54, Spin300. No-oulcome informalion 
Correcl, N o Bias, %54, Spin300, Oulcome informalion 
Correcl. N o Bias, %54. Spin700, No-oulcome informalion 
Correcl, N o Bias, %54, Spin700, Oulcome informalion 
Incorrecl, Bias found, %56, Spin300, No-oulcome information 
Incorrect, Bias found, %56, Spin300, Oulcome informalion 
Incorrect, Bias found, %56, Spin700, No-outcome informalion 
Incorrecl, Bias found, %56, Spin700. Oulcome informalion 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin300, No-outcome information 
Incorrecl, Bias found. %54, Spin300, Outcome informalion 
Incorrecl, Bias found, %54, Spin700, No-oulcome information 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin700. Oulcome informalion 
Incorrect, N o Bias, %56, Spin300, No-oulcome informalion 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56, Spin300, Oulcome informalion 
Incorrecl, N o Bias, %56, Spin700, No-oulcome informalion 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56, Spin700, Oulcome information 
Incorrect, No Bias, %54, Spin300, No-oulcome informalion 
Incorrect, No Bias, %54, Spin300. Outcome information 
Incorrect, No Bias. %54, Spin700, No-oulcome informalion 
Incorrect, No Bias. %54, Spin7{X), Outcome information 
44 46.852 :().658 3 11 
29 241 16.440 ; 
44 57.000 22.788 3 4 3 
29 16.966 3.15 
44 4^^.432 21.427 3.23 
29 57.552 2 1.030 3.90 
44 53.886 23.385 3.52 
29 65.310 18.486 3.43 
44 43.318 1 S S 4 : M 
2 9 62.448 15.968 2.96 
44 5 2 .^98 21.612 3.25 
29 70.1 38 15.172 2.81 
44 40.102 16.536 2 . 4 4 
29 53.103 1 5.532 2.88 
44 49.659 21.178 3.19 
29 61.931 20.683 3.84 
44 46.034 19.685 2.96 
29 47.000 21.883 4.06 
44 59.295 23 K7I 3.^4 
29 50.793 26.140 4.S5 
44 42.659 2 1 .. vS K 3.22 
2 9 40.655 23,657 4.39 
44 54 159 22 120 3.3 3 
29 4 1.()U 22.138 4.1 1 
44 47.068 17.447 2.6.> 
29 55.103 18.135 3 
44 53.011 22.020 3.32 
29 60.517 UvOI 3 2.97 
44 .^9.307 17.678 2.66 
29 45.241 1 S 458 _^  4 : 
44 51.943 2 1 0 1 9 3.16 
29 51.241 19 244 3.57 
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Experiment three - anova table for analysis of subjects recieving only initial 
experimental result 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 43 186266.848 4331.787 
Outcome 1 128.267 128.267 1.440 .2367 
Outcome * Subject 43 3829.748 89.064 
Result 1 1932.844 1932.844 3.062 .0873 
Result * Subject 43 27140.422 631.173 
Level 1 2446.955 2446.955 12.033 .0012 
Level * Subject 43 8743.936 203.347 
Spins 1 18753.299 18753.299 23.333 .0001 
Spins * Subject 43 34560.092 803.723 
Outcome * Result 1 65.355 65.355 .849 .3619 
Outcome * Result * Subject 43 3308.660 76.946 
Outcome * Level 1 64.748 64.748 1.285 .2632 
Outcome * Level * Subject 43 2166.018 50.373 
Result * Level 1 .188 .188 .002 .9647 
Result * Level * Subject 43 4086.078 95.025 
Outcome * Spins 1 46.279 46.279 .757 .3891 
Outcome * Spins * Subject 43 2628.487 61.128 
Result • Spins 1 182.560 182.560 3.226 .0795 
Result * Spins * Subject 43 2433.706 56.598 
Level * Spins 1 89.847 89.847 .603 .4417 
Level * Spins * Subject 43 6407.044 149.001 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 2.216 2.216 .048 .8276 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject 43 1985.549 46.176 
Outcome * Result * Spins 1 48.878 48.878 .839 .3648 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Subject 43 2504.887 58.253 
Outcome * Level * Spins 1 47.310 47.310 .749 .3916 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Subject 43 2716.206 63.168 
Result * Level * Spins 1 204.574 204.574 1.929 .1721 
Result * Level * Spins * Subject 43 4560.941 106.068 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins 1 188.722 188.722 3.721 .0603 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * Subject 43 2180.794 50.716 
Dependent: Quality 
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Experiment three - anova table for analysis of subjects recieving initial 
experimental result and long-term outcome information 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 28 52157.927 1862.783 
Outcome 1 24056.640 24056.640 21.104 .0001 
Outcome * Subject 28 31918.047 1 139.930 
Result 1 804.571 804.571 1.650 .2094 
Result * Subject 28 13649.616 487.486 
Level 1 7953.106 7953.106 14.238 .0008 
Level * Subject 28 15639.832 558.565 
Spins 1 3150.175 3150.175 6.073 .0201 
Spins * Subject 28 14525.013 518.750 
Outcome * Result 1 3536.554 3536.554 8.559 .0067 
Outcome * Result * Subject 28 11569.134 413.183 
Outcome * Level 1 32.606 32.606 .422 .5213 
Outcome * Level * Subject 28 2163.832 77.280 
Result * Level 1 92.347 92.347 .925 .3445 
Result * Level * Subject 28 2796.591 99.878 
Outcome * Spins 1 200.485 200.485 1.129 .2970 
Outcome * Spins * Subject 28 4970.203 177.507 
Result * Spins 1 364.054 364.054 9.040 .0055 
Result * Spins * Subject 28 1 127.634 40.273 
Level * Spins 1 32.606 32.606 .276 .6035 
Level * Spins * Subject 28 3307.832 118.137 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 2.071 2.071 .01 1 .9189 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject 28 5491.366 196.120 
Outcome * Result * Spins 1 .175 .175 .003 .9592 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Subject 28 1835.013 65.536 
Outcome * Level * Spins I 177.519 177.519 2.286 .1418 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Subject 28 2174.418 77.658 
Result * Level * Spins 1 1.140 1.140 .012 .9153 
Result * Level * Spins * Subject 28 2772.797 99.028 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins 1 140.140 140.140 1.936 .1751 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * Subject 28 2027.297 72.403 
Dependent: Quality 
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Experiment four - anova table for analysis of subjects recieving initial 
experimental result and long-term outcome information (all subjects) 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 39 57006.480 1461.705 
Outcome 1 25750.550 25750.550 23.308 .0001 
Outcome * Subject 39 43087.660 1 104.812 
Result 1 49.729 49.729 .098 .7556 
Result * Subject 39 19738.481 506.115 
Level 1 122.150 122.150 .352 .5566 
Level * Subject 39 13544.560 347.296 
Spins 1 11092.230 11092.230 22.169 .0001 
Spins * Subject 39 19513.730 500.352 
Outcome * Result 1 1205.604 1205.604 4.697 .0364 
Outcome * Result * Subject 39 10010.356 256.676 
Outcome * Level 1 .110 .110 .001 .9729 
Outcome * Level * Subject 39 3682.350 94.419 
Result * Level 1 88.209 88.209 .433 .5144 
Result * Level * Subject 39 7945.251 203.724 
Outcome * Spins 1 648.830 648.830 2.729 .1066 
Outcome * Spins * Subject 39 9273.380 237.779 
Result * Spins 1 8.464 8.464 .054 .8171 
Result * Spins * Subject 39 6085.246 156.032 
Level * Spins 1 41.820 41.820 .318 .5760 
Level * Spins * Subject 39 5128.390 131.497 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 263.169 263.169 3.060 .0881 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject 39 3354.541 86.014 
Outcome * Result * Spins 1 104.329 104.329 .688 .4119 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Subject 39 5915.131 151.670 
Outcome * Level * Spins 1 181.050 181.050 2.1 14 .1539 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Subject 39 3339.910 85.639 
Result * Level * Spins 1 142.129 142.129 1.030 .3164 
Result * Level * Spins * Subject 39 5380.331 137.957 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins 1 23.409 23.409 .109 .7436 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * S... 39 841 1.301 215.674 
Dependent; Quality 
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Experiment four - means table for overall analysis 
Correct, Bias found, %56, Spin300 
Coireci, Bias found, %56, Spin700 
Correct, Bias found, %54, SpinSOO 
Correct, Bias found, %54, Spin700 
Correct, No Bias found, %56, Spin300 
Correct, No Bias found, %56, Spin700 
Correct, No Bias found, %54, Spin300 
Correct, No Bias found, %54. Spin700 
Incorrect, Bias found, %56, Spin300 
Incorrect, Bias found, %56, Spin700 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin300 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin700 
Incorrect, No Bias found, %56. Spin300 
Incorrect, No Bias found, %56, Spin700 
Incorrect, No Bias found, %54, Spin300 
Incorrect, No Bias found, %54, Spin700 
Count Mean Sid. Dev. Std. Error 
40 58.150 16.562 2.619 
40 69.025 17.035 2.693 
40 57.875 18.897 2.988 
40 66.525 16.486 2.607 
40 54.290 18.113 2.864 
40 65.200 15.590 2.465 
40 53.975 21.497 3.399 
40 64.900 20.734 3.278 
40 43.350 17.095 2.703 
40 50.450 22.647 3.581 
40 44.225 17.419 2.754 
40 51.825 18.062 2.856 
40 49.925 19.818 3.133 
40 52.300 20.962 3.314 
40 44.100 19.956 3.155 
40 52.275 18.861 2.982 
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Experiments three and four - anova table for comparative between subjects 
analysis of long-term outcome groups 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Training 1 310.616 310.616 .187 .6672 
Subject(Group) 67 111563.781 1665.131 
Outcome 1 46842.557 46842.557 42.063 .0001 
Outcome * Training 1 286.496 286.496 .257 .6137 
Outcome * Subject(Group) 67 74612.758 1113.623 
Result 1 142.721 142.721 .282 .5973 
Result * Training 1 807.646 807.646 1.594 .2111 
Result * Subject (Group) 67 33945.507 506.649 
Level 1 5977.828 5977.828 14.993 .0002 
Level * Training 1 3097.717 3097.717 7.770 .0069 
Level * Subject(Group) 67 26712.690 398.697 
Spins 1 11916.540 11916.540 24.404 .0001 
Spins * Training 1 703.458 703.458 1.441 .2343 
Spins * Subject (Group) 67 32716.275 488.303 
Outcome * Result 1 3932.611 3932.611 10.518 .0018 
Outcome * Result * Training 1 625.975 625.975 1.674 .2001 
Outcome * Result * Subject (Group) 67 25051.924 373.909 
Outcome * Level 1 46.425 46.425 .609 .4380 
Outcome * Level * Training 1 .895 .895 .012 .9140 
Outcome * Level * Subject(Group) 67 5108.422 76.245 
Result * Level 1 111.087 111.087 .873 .3534 
Result * Level * Training 1 47.905 47.905 .377 .5415 
Result * Level * Subject(Group) 67 8523.062 127.210 
Outcome * Spins 1 849.357 849.357 4.888 .0305 
Outcome * Spins * Training 1 22.607 22.607 .130 .7195 
Outcome * Spins * Subjecl(Group) 67 11641.550 173.754 
Result * Spins 1 192.538 192.538 1.878 .1751 
Result * Spins * Training 1 324.243 324.243 3.163 .0799 
Result * Spins * Subjecl(Group) 67 6868.320 102.512 
Level * Spins 1 48.258 48.258 .499 .4824 
l-cvel * Spins * Training 1 1.165 1.165 .012 .9129 
Level * Spins * Subject(Group) 67 6478.670 96.697 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 42.975 42.975 .300 .5857 
Outcome * Result * Level * Training 1 35.038 35.038 .245 .6225 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject(Group) 67 9598.592 143.263 
Outcome * Result * Spins I 25.697 25.697 .206 .6512 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Training 1 72.815 72.815 .585 .4472 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Subject(Group) 67 8345.602 124.56! 
Outcome * Level * Spins 1 9.087 9.087 .107 .7450 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Training 1 404.094 404.094 4.741 .0330 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Subject(Group) 67 5710.204 85.227 
Result * Level * Spins 1 62.317 62.317 .525 .4710 
Result * Level * Spins * Training 1 44.787 44.787 .378 .5409 
Result * Level * Spins * Subject(Group) 67 7945.404 118.588 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins 1 172.350 172.350 1.240 .2695 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * Training I 59.694 59.694 .429 .5146 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * Subject(Group) 67 9316.173 139.047 
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APPENDIX 4 - EXPERIMENT FIVE ANALYSES 
Experiment five - anova table for complete analysis of all subjects 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Perspective 1 8.939 8.939 .003 .9537 
Subject(Group) 59 154812.783 2623.945 
Oulcome 1 46850.936 46850.936 36.767 .0001 
Oulcome * Perspective 1 1297.852 1297.852 1.019 .3170 
Oulcome * Subject(Group) 59 75181.051 1274.255 
Result 1 15.513 15.513 .031 .8614 
Result * Perspective 1 1.220 1.220 .002 .9609 
Result * Subject(Group) 59 29773.545 504.636 
Level 1 2619.195 2619.195 11.140 .0015 
Level * Perspective I 210.464 210.464 .895 .3479 
Level * Subject (Group) 59 13871.496 235.1 10 
Spins 1 1 1508.872 1 1508.872 14.826 .0003 
Spins * Perspective 1 5639.702 5639.702 7.265 .0091 
Spins * Subjecl(Group) 59 45799.924 776.270 
Outcome * Result 1 4432.51 1 4432.511 11.016 .0016 
Outcome * Result * Perspective 1 1 1649.603 1 1649.603 28.953 .0001 
Oulcome * Result * SubjeclCGroup) 59 23739.162 402.359 
Outcome * Level I 2.776 2.776 .026 .8722 
Outcome * Level * Perspective 1 210.799 210.799 1.981 .1645 
Outcome * Level * Subject(Group) 59 6277.464 106.398 
Result * Level 1 133.174 133.174 .701 .4057 
Result * Level * Perspective 1 555.487 555.487 2.925 .0925 
Result * Level * Subject(Group) 59 11203.590 189.891 
Oulcome * Spins 1 228.625 228.625 1.083 .3024 
Oulcome * Spins * Perspective 1 3.357 3.357 .016 .9001 
Oulcomc * Spins * Subject(Group) 59 12459.380 211.176 
Result * Spins 1 76.346 76.346 .861 .3573 
Result * Spins * Perspective 1 213.950 213.950 2.413 .1257 
Result * Spins * Subject(Group) 59 5231.826 88.675 
Level * Spins 1 5.243 5.243 .056 .8130 
Level * Spins * Perspective 1 59.655 59.655 .643 .4260 
Level * Spins * Subject(Group) 59 5477.270 92.835 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 35.338 35.338 .229 .6343 
Oulcome * Result * Level * Perspec... 1 .217 .217 .001 .9703 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject... 59 9117.418 154.533 
Oulcome * Result * Spins 1 26.652 26.652 .184 .6699 
Oulcome * Result * Spins * Pcrspec... 1 30.003 30.003 .207 .651 1 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Subject... 59 8566.523 145.195 
Oulcome * Level * Spins 1 9.912 9.912 .064 .8004 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Perspeci... 1 90.422 90.422 .588 .4462 
Oulcome * Level * Spins * Subject(... 59 9070.261 153.733 
Result * Level * Spins 1 3.595 3.595 .019 .8914 
Result * Level * Spins * Perspective I 2.118 2.1 18 .01 1 .9165 
Result * Level * Spins * Subject(Gr... 59 1 1275.391 191.108 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins 1 549.812 549.812 1.230 .2720 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins *... 1 841.703 841.703 1.883 .1752 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins *... 59 26379.441 447.109 
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Experiment five - means table for complete analysis of all subjects 
Correct, Bias found, %56, Spin300, Manufacturer 
Correct, Bias found, %56, Spin300, Fraudster 
Correct, Bias found, %56, Spin700, Manufacturer 
Correct. Bias found, %56, Spin700, Fraudster 
Correct, Bias found, %54, Spin300, Manufacturer 
Correct, Bias found, %54, Spin300, Fraudster 
Correct. Bias found, %54, Spin700, Manufacturer 
Correct, Bias found, %54, Spin700, Fraudster 
Correct, No Bias, %56, Spin300, Manufacturer 
Correct, No Bias, %56, Spin300, Fraudster 
Correct, No Bias, %56, Spin700, Manufacturer 
Correct, No Bias, %56, Spin700, Fraudster 
Correct, No Bias, %54, Spin300, Manufacturer 
Correct, No Bias, %54, Spin300, Fraudster 
Correct. No Bias, %54, Spin700, Manufacturer 
Correct, No Bias, %54. Spin700, Fraudster 
Incorrect, Bias found, %56, Spin300, Manufacturer 
Incorrect, Bias found, %56, Spin300, Fraudster 
Incorrect. Bias found, %56, Spin700, Manufacturer 
Incorrect. Bias found, %56, Spin700. Fraudster 
Incorrect. Bias found. %54. Spin300, Manufacturer 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin300, Fraudster 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin700, Manufacturer 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin700, Fraudster 
Incorrect, N o Bias, %56, Spin300, Manufacturer 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56, Spin300, Fraudster 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56, Spin700, Manufacturer 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56, Spin700, Fraudster 
Incorrect. No Bias, %54, Spin300, Manufacturer 
Incorrect, N o Bias, %54, Spin300, Fraudster 
Incorrect, N o Bias, %54, Spin700. Manufacturer 
Incorrect. No Bias, %54, Spin700, Fraudster 
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 
30 49.233 17.754 3.241 
31 64.581 23.609 4.240 
30 61.800 19.072 3.482 
31 62.452 27.281 4.900 
30 44.333 19.987 3.649 
31 58.968 27.315 4.906 
30 56.683 18.685 3.41 1 
31 63.968 24.153 4.338 
30 50.633 19.593 3.577 
31 49.903 25.350 4.553 
30 62.667 21.619 3.947 
31 57.387 25.474 4.575 
30 48.267 19.943 3.641 
31 48.710 26.041 4.677 
30 62.367 19.188 3.503 
31 50.000 26.294 4.723 
30 39.867 19.917 3.636 
31 36.548 18.308 3.288 
30 52.533 21.061 3.845 
31 38.581 22.503 4 .042 
30 36.700 21.549 3.934 
31 34.065 18.204 3.270 
30 47.333 22.655 4.136 
31 31.419 17.536 3.150 
30 35.800 15.307 2.795 
31 50.194 21.668 3.892 
30 46.633 21.306 3.890 
31 48.484 23.176 4.163 
30 38.233 20.216 3.691 
31 40.097 18.752 3.368 
30 46.467 20.375 3.720 
31 47.258 25.457 4.572 
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Experiment five - anova table for analysis of subjects given the fraudster 
perspective 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 30 65288.335 2176.278 
Outcome 1 32403.389 32403.389 19.799 .0001 
Outcome * Subject 30 49099.673 1636.656 
Result 1 4.083 4.083 .006 .9389 
Result * Subject 30 20509.730 683.658 
Level 1 2193.244 2193.244 6.565 .0157 
Level * Subject 30 10023.069 334.102 
Spins 1 526.454 526.454 .484 .4918 
Spins * Subject 30 32609.609 1086.987 
Outcome * Result 1 15480.728 15480.728 24.941 .0001 
Outcome * Result * Subject 30 18621.085 620.703 
Outcome * Level 1 133.163 133.163 1.072 .3088 
Outcome * Level * Subject 30 3727.149 124.238 
Result * Level 1 73.550 73.550 .296 .5902 
Result * Level * Subject 30 7444.012 248.134 
Outcome * Spins 1 89.760 89.760 .330 .5701 
Outcome * Spins * Subject 30 8168.802 272.293 
Result * Spins 1 277.502 277.502 2.850 .1018 
Result * Spins * Subject 30 2921.310 97.377 
Level * Spins 1 50.970 50.970 .452 .5067 
Level * Spins * Subject 30 3384.843 1 12.828 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 15.260 15.260 .142 .7089 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject 30 3222.302 107.410 
Outcome * Result * Spins 1 .050 .0504.85 IE-4 .9826 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Subject 30 31 17.262 103.909 
Outcome * Level * Spins 1 20.567 20.567 .125 .7264 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Subject 30 4945.746 164.858 
Result * Level * Spins 1 .099 .0993.643E-4 .9849 
Result * Level * Spins * Subject 30 8135.964 271.199 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins 1 1398.970 1398.970 1.895 .1789 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * Subject 30 22150.593 738.353 
Dependent: Quality 
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Experiment five - means table for analysis of subjects given the fraudster 
perspective 
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 
Correcl, Bias found. %56. Spin300 31 64.581 23.609 4.240 
Correct, Bias found. %56. Spin700 31 62.452 27.281 4.900 
Correcl, Bias found. %54, Spin300 31 58.968 27.315 4.906 
Correct. Bias found, %54, Spin7(X) 31 63.968 24.153 4.338 
Correct. No Bias, %56, Spin300 31 49.903 25.350 4.553 
Correct, No Bias, %56, Spin700 31 57.387 25.474 4.575 
Correct, No Bias, %54, Spin300 31 48.710 26.041 4.677 
Correct, No Bias. %54, Spin700 31 50.000 26.294 4.723 
Incorrecl, Bias found, %56, Spin300 31 36.548 18.308 3.288 
Incorrect. Bias found, %56, Spin700 31 38.581 22.503 4.042 
Incorrect, Bias found. %54, Spin300 31 34.065 18.204 3.270 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin700 31 31.419 17.536 3.150 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56, Spin300 31 50.194 21.668 3.892 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56, Spin700 31 48.484 23.176 4.163 
Incorrect, No Bias. %54. Spin300 31 40.097 18.752 3.368 




anova table for analysis of subjects given the manufacturer 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square' F-Value P-Value 
Subject 29 89524.448 3087.050 
Outcome 1 16014.076 16014.076 17.806 .0002 
Outcome * Subject 29 26081.378 899.358 
Result 1 12.513 12.513 .039 .8445 
Result * Subject 29 9263.815 319.442 
Level 1 661.526 661.526 4.985 .0335 
Level * Subject 29 3848.428 132.704 
Spins 1 16362.513 16362.513 35.974 .0001 
Spins * Subject 29 13190.315 454.838 
Outcome * Result 1 841.376 841.376 4.767 .0372 
Outcome * Result * Subject 29 5118.078 176.485 
Outcome * Level 1 81.263 81.263 .924 .3444 
Outcome * Level * Subject 29 2550.315 87.942 
Result * Level 1 606.376 606.376 4.677 .0389 
Result * Level * Subject 29 3759.578 129.641 
Outcome * Spins 1 141.376 141.376 .956 .3364 
Outcome * Spins * Subject 29 4290.578 147.951 
Result * Spins 1 17.063 17.063 .214 .6470 
Result * Spins * Subject 29 2310.515 79.673 
Level * Spins 1 14.526 14.526 .201 .6570 
Level * Spins * Subject 29 2092.428 72.153 
Outcome * Result * Level 1 20.213 20.213 .099 .7548 
Outcome * Result * Level * Subject 29 5895.1 15 203.280 
Outcome * Result * Spins 1 55.692 55.692 .296 .5903 
Outcome * Result * Spins * Subject 29 5449.261 187.906 
Outcome * Level * Spins 1 78.813 78.813 .554 .4626 
Outcome * Level * Spins * Subject 29 4124.515 142.225 
Result * Level * Spins 1 5.526 5.526 .051 .8228 
Result * Level * Spins * Subject 29 3139.428 108.256 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins 1 15.230 15.230 .104 .7489 
Outcome * Result * Level * Spins * Subject 29 4228.848 145.822 
Dependent: Quality 
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Experiment five - means table for analysis of subjects given the 
manufacturer perspective 
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 
Correct, Bias found, %56, Spin300 30 49.233 17.754 3.241 
Correct, Bias found, %56. Spin700 30 61.800 19.072 3.482 
Correct, Bias found, %54. Spin300 30 44.333 19.987 3.649 
Correct. Bias found, %54, Spin700 30 56.683 18.685 3.41 ! 
Correct, No Bias, %56, Spin300 30 50.633 19.593 3.577 
Correct, No Bias, %56, Spin700 30 62.667 21.619 3.947 
Correct, No Bias, %54, Spin300 30 48.267 19.943 3.641 
Correct, No Bias, %54, Spin700 30 62.367 19.188 3.503 
Incorrect, Bias found, %56, Spin300 30 39.867 19.917 3.636 
Incorrect, Bias found, %56, Spin700 30 52.533 21.061 3.845 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin300 30 36.700 21.549 3.934 
Incorrect, Bias found, %54, Spin700 30 47.333 22.655 4.136 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56, Spin300 30 35.800 15.307 2.795 
Incorrect, No Bias, %56. Spin700 30 46.633 21.306 3.890 
Incorrect, No Bias, %54. Spin300 30 38.233 20.216 3.691 




Planned contrasts for the effects of outcome for both 
Comparison of outcome interaction means - Fraudster perspective 
Comparison 1 
Effect: Outcome * Result 
Dependent: Quality 
Correct. Bias found 
Correct. No Bias 
Incorrect, Bias found 





Sum of Squares 46176.611 







Comparison of outcome interaction means - Manufacturer perspective 
Comparison 1 
Effect: Outcome * Result 
Dependent: Quality 
Correct, Bias found 
Correct, No Bias 
Incorrect, Bias found 
Incorrect, No Bias 
df 




















EXPERIMENT SIX ANALYSIS 
Experiment six - Complete anova table 
Type III Sums of Squares 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value G-G H-F 
Perspective 1 25.352 25.352 4.552 .0402 
Subject(Group) 34 189.352 5.569 
Rating 5 475.537 95.107 25.133 .0001 .0001 .0001 
Rating * Perspective 5 74.148 14.830 3.919 .0022 .0061 .0036 
Rating * Subject(Group) 170 643.315 3.784 
Dependent: Ratings 
Table of Epsilon Factors for df Adjustment 
Dependent: Ratings 
G-G Epsilon H-F Epsilon 
Rating 7^43 .870 
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Experiment six - Overall means table 
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 
Subjects. You review 18 7.333 1.414 .333 
Subjects, They review IS 6.889 1.023 .241 
Level, You review 18 5.833 2.036 .480 
Level. They review 18 7.167 1.295 .305 
Result, You review 18 6.167 2.176 .513 
Result, They review 18 4.722 2.803 .661 
Effect, You review 18 5.944 1.21 1 .286 
Effect, They review 18 5.722 2.218 .523 
Outcome, You review 18 5.889 1.937 .457 
Outcome, They review 18 5.056 2.733 .644 
Money, You review 18 3.667 2.849 .672 
Money, They review 18 1.167 1.339 .316 
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Experiment six - Follow up analysis for ratings 
Vs. Diff. Std. Error t-Tesi P-Value 
Subjects Level .611 .459 1.333 .1844 
Result 1.667 .459 3.635 .0004 
Effect 1.278 .459 2.787 .0059 
Outcome 1.639 .459 3.574 .0005 
Money 4.694 .459 10.238 .0001 
Level Result 1.056 .459 2.302 .0225 
Effect .667 .459 1.454 .1478 
Outcome 1.028 .459 2.242 .0263 
Money 4.083 .459 8.906 .0001 
Result Effect -.389 .459 -.848 .3975 
Outcome -.028 .459 -.061 .9518 
Money 3.028 .459 6.603 .0001 
Effect Outcome .361 .459 .788 .4320 
Money 3.417 .459 7.452 .0001 
Outcome Money 3.056 .459 6.664 .0001 
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APPENDIX 6 
EXPERIMENT SEVEN ANALYSES 
Experiment seven - anova table and means tables for analysis of initial 
quality judgements 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Level 1 2 .6 2.6 0. ,02 0, .898 
Snos 3 1014 .2 338.1 2 , 16 0, , 094 
Result 1 1515 .0 1515.0 9. . 66 0. , 002 
Level*Snos 3 1120 .7 373.6 2. ,38 0. .070 
Level*Result 1 48 .6 48.6 0. .31 0. , 578 
Snos*Result 3 1192 .3 397.4 2 . ,53 0. ,058 
Level* Snos * Result 3 86 .3 28.8 0. ,18 0. ,908 
Error 224 35134 .3 156.8 























Result N Q u a l i t y 
1 120 56.638 
2 120 46.543 
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Experiment seven - anova table for analysis of quality judgements 
Type III Sums of Squares 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 59 1910.536 32.382 
Outcome 1 233.051 233.051 7.554 .0079 
Outcome * Subject 59 1820.136 30.850 
Result 1 .051 .051 .001 .9748 
Result * Subject 59 2984.886 50.591 
Outcome * Result I 18.984 18.984 .548 .4619 
Outcome * Result * Subject 59 2042.703 34.622 
Dependent: Memory for quality 
Experiment seven - means table for analysis of quality judgements 
Means Table 
Effect: Outcome 
Dependent: Memorj- for quality 
Count Mean Sid. Dev. Std. Error 
Replicated 120 1.350 5.127 .468 
Not Replicated 120 -.621 6.890 .629 
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Experiment seven - anova table for analysis of memory for subject numbers 
Type III Sums of Squares 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 59 19975.733 338.572 
Outcome 1 858.817 858.817 4.209 .0447 
Outcome * Subject 59 12038.183 204.037 
Result 1 135.000 135.000 .818 .3694 
Result * Subject 59 9736.000 165.017 
Outcome * Result 1 1 14.817 1 14.817 .416 .5215 
Outcome * Result * Subject 59 16290.183 276.105 
Dependent; Memory for subjects 
Experiment seven - means table for analysis of memory for subject numbers 
Means Table 
Effect: Outcome 
Dependent: Memorj' for subjects 
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 
Replicated 120 4.508 16.202 1.479 
Not Replicated 120 .725 15.077 1.376 
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Experiment seven - anova table for analysis of memory for significance 
levels 
Type n i Sums of Squares 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Subject 59 26.412 .448 . 
Outcome 1 .267 .267 1.000 .3214 
Outcome * Subject 59 15.733 .267 
Result 1 .150 .150 .330 .5681 
Result * Subject 59 26.850 .455 
Outcome * Result 1 .204 .204 .221 .6401 
Outcome * Result * Subject 59 54.546 .925 
Dependent: Memory for sig. level 
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A P P E N D I X 7 
C A L C U L A T I O N O F E F F E C T S I Z E S 
The use of a product moment as a standard measure of effect size is recommended by 
Cohen (1977), and was used by Chrislensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) in their meta-
analysis of hindsight studies. The same measure of effect size was used throughout this 
study to enable direct comparison. This method of determining effect size is also described 
by Lipsey (1990). 
In within subject designs, where there is a dichotomous independent variable (e.g. 
long-term outcome) and a graduated dependent variable (e.g. quality), point biserial 
correlation (r) can be used to gain a measure of the proportion of variance in the dependent 
variable which can be directly attributed to the effect of the independent variable. This 
method involves assigning numeric values to the two levels of the independent variable 
(usually 0 and 1) in line with the experimental hypothesis such that the higher value is given 
to the level which is expected to be associated with higher values of the dependent variable. 
These arbitary values are then correlated with the resulting values of the dependent variable 
producing a coefficient r. This method effectively regresses the levels of the independent 
variable onto the values of the dependent variable. As in linear regression the square of this 
correlation coefficient (r^) reflects the proportion of variance in a given measure which can 
be directly attributed to the independent variable in question. 
It should be noted that the actual numeric values assigned to the levels of the 
independent variable have no effect on the resulting r value where this variable is 
dichotomous. For example values of 7 and 139 will produce the same result as values of 0 
and 1. If these values have been assigned in line with the predictions of the experimental 
hypothesis an effect in the opposite direction to the experimental hypothesis will result in a 
negative r value. 
It should also be noted that in the case of between subject designs this method of 
calculation of effect sizes must be adjusted to allow for unequal subject group sizes. This 
adjustment was not required in the present research, however the appropriate formula may be 
found in Lipsey (1990) (Page 84) 
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